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Mark Arnold, Gavan Hunter and Mark Foster

Following the dam safety risk assessment for Greenvale Dam in 2008, Melbourne Water implemented a 3.0 m reservoir level restriction on the operation of the storage as an interim risk reduction measure. The 3.0 m restriction coincided with the ‘as constructed’ top of the chimney filter in the main embankment. This interim action reduced the dam safety risk to below the ANCOLD limit of tolerability.

Dam safety upgrade works were undertaken in 2014/15 to bring the dam in-line with current risk based guidelines and to enable the removal of the interim reservoir restriction, bringing the storage back to full operating capacity. Greenvale Dam was required to remain operational throughout the works and this required careful consideration of the dam safety risk during construction.

Deep excavations were required within the crest and downstream shoulder of the embankments, that,, without adequate management, had the potential to increase risk to the downstream population. Excavations up to 18 m depth were required into the wing embankments for construction of full height filters from foundation to crest, excavations up to 7 m deep were required in the main embankment to expose and connect into the existing filters and secant filter piles up to 13 m deep were used to connect the new chimney filter of the wing embankments with the original chimney filter of the main embankment.

A key element of the design and construction of the upgrade works was managing dam safety during construction. Dam safety considerations included (i) design based decisions to manage the level of exposure; (ii) implementation of further restrictions on reservoir level by the owner Melbourne Water; (iii) construction methods to manage exposure; (iv) an elevated surveillance regime during the works and (v) emergency preparation measures including emergency stockpiles and 24 hour emergency standby crew. The construction based dam safety requirements were focused on early detection and early intervention, and were managed via the project specific Dam Safety Management Plan.

This paper focuses on dam safety management including the decisions made, actions taken and construction requirements and touches on how these relate to the key project features.

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2016 Papers

2016 – Dam Safety Management for Upgrade of an Extreme Consequence Storage
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Mark Arnold, Gavan Hunter and Mark Foster

Following the dam safety risk assessment for Greenvale Dam in 2008, Melbourne Water implemented a 3.0 m reservoir level restriction on the operation of the storage as an interim risk reduction measure. The 3.0 m restriction coincided with the ‘as constructed’ top of the chimney filter in the main embankment. This interim action reduced the dam safety risk to below the ANCOLD limit of tolerability.

Dam safety upgrade works were undertaken in 2014/15 to bring the dam in-line with current risk based guidelines and to enable the removal of the interim reservoir restriction, bringing the storage back to full operating capacity. Greenvale Dam was required to remain operational throughout the works and this required careful consideration of the dam safety risk during construction.

Deep excavations were required within the crest and downstream shoulder of the embankments, that,, without adequate management, had the potential to increase risk to the downstream population. Excavations up to 18 m depth were required into the wing embankments for construction of full height filters from foundation to crest, excavations up to 7 m deep were required in the main embankment to expose and connect into the existing filters and secant filter piles up to 13 m deep were used to connect the new chimney filter of the wing embankments with the original chimney filter of the main embankment.

A key element of the design and construction of the upgrade works was managing dam safety during construction. Dam safety considerations included (i) design based decisions to manage the level of exposure; (ii) implementation of further restrictions on reservoir level by the owner Melbourne Water; (iii) construction methods to manage exposure; (iv) an elevated surveillance regime during the works and (v) emergency preparation measures including emergency stockpiles and 24 hour emergency standby crew. The construction based dam safety requirements were focused on early detection and early intervention, and were managed via the project specific Dam Safety Management Plan.

This paper focuses on dam safety management including the decisions made, actions taken and construction requirements and touches on how these relate to the key project features.
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2016 Papers

2016 – Tullaroop Dam: Dealing with Filter Breakdown and Compaction During Construction
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Jamie Cowan, Chris Kelly and Gavan Hunter

Dam safety upgrade works were undertaken at Tullaroop Dam in 2015/16 to reduce the risk of piping through the main embankment. Unexpected cracking and elevated pore water pressures were observed within this earthfill embankment over a period of 10 to 15 years. In 2005/06 a filter and rockfill buttress local to the embankment was constructed on the left abutment after a 60 mm wide diagonal crack opened up on the downstream shoulder from crest to toe.

Similar to the 2005/06 upgrade works, the 2015/16 embankment works were direct managed by Goulburn-Murray Water. Filter and rockfill materials were sourced from commercial quarries previously used for dam upgrade projects and for which significant testing of materials had been undertaken, especially on the fine filter.
Mid project it became clear that the fine filter was breaking down under handling and compaction such that several in-bank gradings fell outside the specified fine limit. Further testing of quarry surge piles, site stockpiles and in-bank placed filters was undertaken to understand the extent of the breakdown. It was assessed that the breakdown was occurring on the 0.5 to 2.0 mm fraction, generating finer sizes in the 0.1 to 0.6 mm fraction. The increase in fines content (minus 75 micron) was less than 1% and met specification. The in-bank material was accepted as placed and the specified filter envelope adjusted to allow for the observed breakdown.

Difficulties were experienced with compaction of the fine filter in the inclined chimney filter to achieve the target density in the range 65% to 80% Density Index when the layer width reduced to 0.75 m for a 0.5 m compacted lift thickness. No difficulties were experienced when the layer width was 1.5 m or in trenches. Further trials were undertaken on the embankment to better understand the compaction issues and used different roller types. It was assessed that an important factor was the arching effect of the adjacent coarse filter. Going forward thinner lifts were used and smaller width rollers to achieve the specified minimum density.

The paper provides details on the embankment construction works, focusing on the fine filter breakdown and compaction issues. Details of the testing undertaken, the actions to resolve the issues and interactions with the supply quarry and construction team are provided.
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2017 Papers

2017 – Tullaroop Dam: Ongoing Cracking and Unusual Pore Water Pressure Response in a 60 Year Old Earth Embankment
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Gavan Hunter, David Jeffery and Stephen Chia

The Main Embankment at Tullaroop Dam in central Victoria is a 43 m high earthfill embankment with a very broad earthfill zone and rockfill zones at the outer toe regions. There has been an extensive history of cracking within the Main Embankment since formalisation of visual inspections in 1987.Widespread cracking has been observed on the crest and downstream shoulder. Cracking on the crest has mainly been longitudinal, but transverse cracks have also been observed. Cracking on the downstream shoulder has comprised longitudinal, diagonal and transverse cracking. In April 2004, a 60 mm wide diagonal crack opened on the downstream shoulder of the left abutment (from crest to toe) and Goulburn-Murray Water constructed a local filter buttress in 2005/06 on the left abutment. In 2011/12 a longitudinal crack opened up on the upper downstream berm toward the right abutment. The crack was initially 15m long and 10 to 215 mm wide, then propagated several months later to 70 m in length, 40 to 50 mm width and greater than 3 m in depth.In May 2011 three piezometers within the earth fill core recorded a very rapid rise in pore water pressure equivalent to 12 to 13 m pressure head above their previous readings. The piezometers were located on the same alignment (upstream to downstream) and were located below the crest and downstream shoulder, and the rise was to levels close to and above the embankment surface. The piezometers then showed a steady fall with time returning to the pre rise levels after 4 to 6 weeks.In 2015/16 Goulburn-Murray Water undertook dam safety upgrade works to reduce the risk of piping through the Main Embankment by extension of the filter buttress across the full width of the embankment. During these upgrade works, very deep (greater than 5 m) and extensive transverse cracks were observed in the embankment over relatively subtle slope changes on the right abutment.Thecracking and pore water pressure behaviour in the Main Embankment at Tullaroop Reservoir present an important case study. The paper provides details on the cracking and postulated crack mechanisms, and the rapid pore water pressure rise and postulated mechanisms. A summary of the upgrade works is also provided.
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2020 Papers

2020 – The Safety Case
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Shane McGrath, Mark Arnold, Josh Rankin, Gavan Hunter

Greenvale Dam is a critical storage for the supply of potable water to Melbourne. The dam had been upgraded through current risk management techniques, and an ALARP assessment completed at that time. However, it was decided that a more comprehensive demonstration of ALARP was warranted to satisfy the dam owner’s duty of care. Since there is no comprehensive guidance in the dams industry for owners and their advisors to reference, the safety case approach used extensively in other hazardous industries was adopted. Considering the approaches used by Victoria’s Worksafe, the Institution of Engineers Australia and the National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA), the key components of the safety case for Greenvale dam were identified then developed to provide a logical, structured and comprehensive argument for the safety of Greenvale Dam. This paper provides an overview of components of the safety case developed for Greenvale Dam, the use of safety cases for dams and where process improvements could be made.
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2014 Papers

2014 – Cracking and Dam Safety of a 100 Year Old Puddle Core Embankment
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Gavan Hunter, David Jeffery and Chris Kelly

Laanecoorie Reservoir, located in central Victoria, passed 3 significant floods in late 2010 to early 2011; the last flood being the highest on record since 1909. Significant cracking and deformation of this 100 year old puddle core earthfill embankment occurred. A series of longitudinal cracks up to 25 mm in width opened up in the crest over a length of 70 m and crest settlements were up to 70 mm; very large for a dam of this age. A significant difference at Laanecoorie compared to other similar dams is that it experiences high tail water levels during major flooding.
Investigations into the embankment following the January 2011 flood encountered several defects
including a decomposed tree root hole (large void up to 90 mm) that almost fully penetrated the raised section of puddle core, permeable gravel layers within the puddle core and transverse cracks up to 2 mm wide. The encountered defects and performance of the embankment many years after construction highlighted the deterioration that can occur with aging of these older embankments and the issues associated with poor past practices in tree management adjacent to dam embankments.
Dam safety upgrade works were undertaken in 2013 to address the identified piping and stability risks.
The works included construction of a filter buttress, replacement of a length of the raised puddle core and construction of a buried gabion wall on the left abutment to provide protection against scour should the secondary spillway fail or overtop.
GMW implemented a series of actions during the flood events in accordance with the Dam Safety
Emergency Plan (DSEP) to address cracking and deformation. Once aware of the dam safety risks, interim actions were implemented including increased frequency of monitoring, together with set up and measurement of crack pins, and temporary survey markers on the embankment.
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2012 Papers

2012 – Backward Erosion Piping: What are the chances of that?
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Gavan Hunter, Robin Fell, Chris Topham

Backward erosion piping is a failure mode that can affect water retaining structures with earthen cores of very low or no plasticity. Backward erosion involves the progressive detachment of soil particles as seepage through a core material exits to a free surface or unfiltered zone. In contrast to other piping failure mechanisms, backward erosion does not require a defect to be present for initiation, and is heavily influenced by the inherent characteristics of the core materials and the available hydraulic head. For dams with non-plastic or very low plasticity core materials, backward erosion can be a material contributor to the overall piping risk and warrants careful consideration during quantitative risk assessments of such dams. However, there is very little published literature for evaluating the potential for backward erosion piping, particularly in broadly graded soils. This paper concerns one such dam where backward erosion of the glacial till core needed to be assessed in the context of a detailed risk assessment for the facility. The backward erosion mechanism was tested in laboratory tests set up to model the situation in the core of the dam at a range of hydraulic heads. The paper describes the core material and objectives for the testing, presents the apparatus used, summarises the findings, and explains how they contributed to the risk assessment for the dam. Recommendations are also made for future similar testing and research needs.
Keywords: Backward erosion, piping, embankment dam, laboratory testing, quantitative risk assessment, glacial till.

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2009 Papers

2009 – Innovative Solution to foundation piping risk at Hinze Dam
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Gavan Hunter, Chris Chamberlain, Mark Foster

Hinze dam, an extreme hazard storage, is under the authority of Seqwater (Southeast Queensland) and is principle potable water storage supplying the Gold Coast. Hinze Dam Stage 3, presently under construction, involves raising the existing embankment almost 15m to a maximum height of 80m.

The foundation geology on the right abutment of the main embankment comprises of a deeply weathered sequence of greywacke and variably silicified greenstone and chert. The deeply (and variably) weathered soil profile below the right abutment of the existing embankment presented an unacceptable piping risk for the embankment in its existing condition. Contributing factors included: 1/ the highly erodible extremely weathered greywacke and presence of continuous defects in the weathered soil mass; 2/ the extremely weathered greenstone in direct contact with highly fractured, highly permeable silicified greenstone and chert bodies aligned normal to the dam axis which provide continuous seepage paths through the foundation.

Works were required as part of the Stage 3 raise to address the foundation piping risk. Significant issues for design included: 1/ the depth of weathering extended up to 25to 40m into the foundation.; 2/ extremely weathered and highly erodible greenstone was present below the right abutment of the embankment and extended down to the lower abutment some 50 to 60 m below the existing dam crest; 3/ the reservoir level could not be drawn down during construction and the probability it would be near full supply level during the works was high; and 4/ the variability of strength in the greenstone form soil to extremely high strength presented challenges for excavation.

The options assessed to address the piping risk included a plastic concrete cut-off wall and an upstream blanketing option. The plastic concrete cut-off wall (220m long and up to 50m deep) and deep filter trench was the selected option. The cut-off wall had been successfully completed ahead of time and below budget. The innovative design required excavation through earthfill core of the embankment under full reservoir level and use of a purpose built trench cutter (by Bauer Foundations Australia) for the variable excavation conditions.

Keywords: dam safety, piping, risk assessment, cut-off wall.
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2009 Papers

2009 – Embankment design and constrtuction risk management for the right abutment at Hinze Dam
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Gavan Hunter and James Toose

Hinze Dam, an extreme hazard storage, is under the authority of Seqwater (Southeast Queensland) and is the principal potable water storage supplying the Gold Coast. The Stage 3 raise, presently under construction, involves raising the embankment almost 15m to a maximum height of 80m.

The central core earth and rockfill embankment is founded on competent greywacke rock within the valley floor and left abutment. On the right abutment it is founded on extremely weathered greywacke and rockfill stability berms were constructed upstream and downstream on this weak foundation.

Key issues for the design of Stage 3 embankment raise on the right abutment were: 1/ removal of the existing downstream stability berm and deep excavation at the toe of the Stage 2 embankment to connect into the blanket filters under the downstream shoulder; 2/ the soil strength properties of the weathered greywacke foundation and the presence of pre-sheared defects with strength properties significantly below the strength of the soil mass; and 3/ undertaking the works while the reservoir remained in operation and close to full supply level.

It was not possible to undertake large scale excavation at the downstream toe of the right abutment as the factor of safety for the excavation condition was below the design criterion for slip surfaces extending back to the upstream shoulder. The innovative design solution was for a staged excavation and back fill operation up the right abutment. In this ay the stability requirements were achieved by a 3-dimensional buttressing support and reduced the time that critical excavation sections were exposed.

The construction risk is being managed under a dam safety management plan. Key elements of this plan include instrumentation monitoring and increased surveillance for early detection of a potential incident, a series of trigger levels and responses to these levels, a clear hierarchy of contacts and adequate preparation for a dam safety emergency (including materials, personnel and equipment).

The embankment construction is presently in progress. The most critical sections have been successfully completed without incident and displacements are within the predicted range. Communication and planning within the Alliance between the designers and constructors has been a key element in the successful construction works to date.

Keywords: construction risk, embankment design, embankment construction, dam safety management
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2009 Papers

2009 – Construction of the Plastic Concrete Cut-off Wall at Hinze Dam
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Steve O’Brien, Christopher Dann, Gavan Hunter, Mike Schwermer

One of the principal geotechnical issues identified for the Hinze Dam Stage 3 project was the potential for internal erosion and piping within the extremely complex geology at the right abutment. A plastic concrete cut-off wall was selected as the best solution to reduce the risk of piping to acceptable levels and careful planning of this work was required to manage a range of key project risks that included complex technical challenges, potential risks to dam safety, the environment, the surrounding community as well as delivering the works on a tight construction schedule to an agreed budget value. Construction of the 220m long and up to 53m deep cut-off wall, the largest wall of this type constructed to date within Australia, was undertaken by Bauer Foundations Australia and completed in January 2009. A major key to the success of the project was the planning and risk reduction measures that were undertaken during both the design and construction phases, a summary of which is presented in this paper.

Keywords: Cutoff Wall, Plastic Concrete, Hinze Dam.
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2010 Papers

2010 – Hinze Dam: numerical modelling prediction versus performance
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Gavan Hunter and James Toose

Hinze Dam, located on the Gold Coast in Queensland, is an Extreme hazard storage under the authority of Seqwater (Southeast Queensland). The Stage 3 works, which are coming to completion, require raising the existing 65 m high central core earth and rockfill embankment almost 15 m to a maximum height of 80 m. The reservoir has been near full supply level for the construction period.
Numerical modelling and empirical predictive methods were used to estimate the deformation at three key embankment sections during construction; the right abutment of the main embankment, the maximum section and the main to saddle embankment connection. The results of the analysis were incorporated into the dam safety management plan to provide a framework for evaluation of the monitored deformation during construction.
This paper summarises the numerical modelling and outlines the framework of the dam safety management plan. It then compares the actual deformation measured during construction against the predictions. Overall, the modelled deformation has compared very well in terms of trend and reasonably well in terms of magnitude with the actual deformation to date. On one occasion the deformation has exceeded the estimates and triggered a response to elevate the review to higher levels within the Alliance. Concluding comments are provided on the useful aspects and limitations of the numerical modelling at Hinze Dam.
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2010 Papers

2010 – Deformation and dam safety of earthfill dams
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Gavan Hunter and Robin Fell

Earthfill embankments in Australia have been widely used in dam construction since the start of the 20th century replacing the older puddle type and concrete corewall embankment designs. Most Australian dam portfolios will have one or more of these embankment types. A key component to the dam safety assessment of these dams is understanding their deformation behaviour, in particular the assessment of the future performance of these structures as they now reach ages of 40 to 80 years or more.
This paper presents the findings of a study on the deformation behaviour of earthfill embankments. It draws on a database of 54 case studies from mainly Australia, the United States and Europe. It is a component of a broader study on the deformation behaviour of embankment dams undertaken as a research project at University of New South Wales earlier this decade.
The data presented in this paper allows dam owners and their consultants to compare the deformation behaviour of their dam to the performance of other similar earthfill dams in evaluating dam safety. Typical patterns of deformation behaviour are presented and guidance is provided on identifying trends in deformation behaviour that are assessed as “abnormal” and that may be potentially indicative of marginal stability.
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