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Robert Keogh, Rob Ayre, Peter Richardson, Barry Jeppesen, Olga Kakourakis

SunWater owns 23 referable dams and operates a further two dams for other owners. The dams are located across Queensland from Texas and St George in the South to the Atherton Tablelands in the north to Mt Isa in the west.

During the period December 2010 to February 2011 there were several significant rainfall events across Queensland. The first occurred in late December 2010, the second in mid January 2011 and third in early February 2011. Generally it was the most significant rainfall event in Queensland since the 1970’s. 22 Emergency Action Plans were activated simultaneously by SunWater. Eleven dams experienced a flood of record during the events.

This paper will discuss what has been learnt from these events including the optimisation of management structures for a dam owner with a large portfolio of dams: review of O&M Manuals including the adequacy of backup systems: relationships with the State disaster management framework: the value of rigorous communication protocols: managing fear and a general lack of understanding in the community: and the value of being prepared.

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2011 Papers

2011 – Emergency management of SunWater’s dam portfolio in the 2010-11
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Robert Keogh, Rob Ayre, Peter Richardson, Barry Jeppesen, Olga Kakourakis

SunWater owns 23 referable dams and operates a further two dams for other owners. The dams are located across Queensland from Texas and St George in the South to the Atherton Tablelands in the north to Mt Isa in the west.

During the period December 2010 to February 2011 there were several significant rainfall events across Queensland. The first occurred in late December 2010, the second in mid January 2011 and third in early February 2011. Generally it was the most significant rainfall event in Queensland since the 1970’s. 22 Emergency Action Plans were activated simultaneously by SunWater. Eleven dams experienced a flood of record during the events.

This paper will discuss what has been learnt from these events including the optimisation of management structures for a dam owner with a large portfolio of dams: review of O&M Manuals including the adequacy of backup systems: relationships with the State disaster management framework: the value of rigorous communication protocols: managing fear and a general lack of understanding in the community: and the value of being prepared.

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2011 Papers

2011 – Management of Floods in 2010 and 2011 through Goulburn-Murray Water Dams
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Stuart Richardson,Tusitha Karunaratne

Goulburn-Murray Water (G-MW) manages 16 large dams across Northern Victoria. Since January 2010 after 10 years of continuous drought a number of significant and historic maximum floods were passed through some of these dams. Although these floods are not considered extreme in a dam safety context, for downstream communities they presented very real emergency situations. There has been significant community concern regarding the impact of the floods resulting in several inquiries.

G-MW has maintained and annually reviewed comprehensive Dam Safety Emergency Management Plans (DSEP) since 1997. During 2009 G-MW began developing and documenting a systemised approach to dam’s management, operation and emergency response by developing and integrating its Operations and Maintenance Manuals, Flood Incident Management Plans and Dam Safety Emergency Management Plans. The plans have been developed to align with the Australian Inter Service Incident Management System (AIIMS) which G-MW uses as its corporate incident response framework.

This paper provides an overview of the benefits of having structured and integrated manuals and response plans for managing assets, flood and extreme events. The paper also shares G-MW’s experiences in developing this integrated management approach.

Workshop paper – Karunaratne 2011 – Management of Floods in 2010 and 2011 through Goulburn-Murray Water Dams

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2011 – Blackman Dam Failure Emergency Management
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Ben Hanslow and David Brett

The Blackman Dam is a 27 m high, zoned earthfill dam located upstream of the township of Tunbridge in the Tasmanian Midlands. The dam has an estimated storage capacity of 7300 ML and an assigned Hazard Rating of High C.

The Blackman Dam was constructed over the period November 2003 to September 2004. The dam supplies water for irrigation to farms in the area and potentially to the local towns of Tunbridge and Oatlands.

Filling of the Blackman Dam commenced in 2005. After substantial filling of the dam and following a heavy rain event, an area of seepage was noted on the far left abutment of the main embankment mid morning of Thursday 13th October 2005. The seepage was reported by the dam operators as being “garden hose flow”. By mid afternoon of that day, this had increased to “100 mm pipe flow” and discoloured. The Dam Safety Emergency Plan was activated.

This paper discusses lessons learnt and provides details on the implementation of the Dam Safety Emergency Plan and emergency actions taken to successfully avoid a breach of the dam wall. The paper also provides details on the geotechnical investigations that were carried out and factors contributing to the piping failure. Embankment repairs were successfully completed by mid 2010 and first filling of the Blackman Dam occurred in 2011.
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2011 – January 2011 Brisbane River Floods and Examination by Media of the Dam Operations
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Michel Raymond

The large flood inundating areas of Brisbane and Ipswich along the lower Brisbane River below Wivenhoe Dam in January 2011 was extensively reported by the media. An independent Commission of Inquiry was formed soon after the flood with broad terms of reference including matters related to dam operations. Prior to the Inquiry hearings and findings, reporting in the media continued and made strong allegations of blame of the flood on dam operations. The media relied on limited expertise but the articles were portrayed and subsequently re-produced by other media outlets as ‘expert’ analyses. The author’s interpretation is that media claims were misleading and damaging to the public confidence in the role of dams for flood mitigation, and this damage occurred before official Inquiry findings were available.

A brief summary is presented of now publicly available credible reports on the flood event, and a summary is also presented of the key matters and allegations reported in the media related to the dam operations. An analysis and commentary of media reporting on the flood operations of the Wivenhoe Dam is presented in the context of time and people with reference to information and expertise available to the media, and media conduct in relation to fair public interest and professional practice.

Matters of importance for objective and informed knowledge of key technical matters in relation to operation of dams, dam safety, and the inevitable extremes of nature and floods are discussed. The paper then examines the roles and possible limitations of dams engineering professionals in relation to media reporting of such matters.

This paper solely focuses on matters of media examination of the floods and dam operations, and generally does not comment on technical matters that are in the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry.

2011 – January 2011 Brisbane River Floods and Examination by Media of the Dam Operations

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2011 Papers

2011 – Assessment of Hydrologic Risk for Hume Dam
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Nanda Nandakumar, Janice Green, Rory Nathan, Kristen Sih& Robert Wilson

A detailed assessment of hydrologic risk was undertaken for Hume Dam. Data available and relevant to the hydrologic risk assessment were collated and assessed. The catchment was divided into 35 different sub-catchments, each with its own set of parameters that characterised the local hydrologic response. Recorded streamflow was used to calibrate the flood response of selected gauged sub-catchments, and a combination of historic and synthetically-derived data was used to validate the model and loss parameters. The 35 models were combined into a single catchment-wide model. A Monte Carlo approach was adopted for the validation of the models and the derivation of Hume Dam inflow and outflow frequency curves. A range of PMFs which satisfy ANCOLD’s definition of the PMF were also estimated. The PMPDF outflow was estimated to be 7,600 m3/s which can be passed by the dam. Depending upon the assumptions made, the peak PMF outflow was estimated to be in the range from 10,300 m3/s to 14,900 m3/s

2011 – Assessment of Hydrologic Risk for Hume Dam

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2011 – ACHIEVING CONSISTENCY IN DERIVATION OF THE PROBABLE MAXIMUM FLOOD
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R.J. Nathan, P.I. Hill, and P.E. Weinmann

The current definition of the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) is open to subjective interpretation, and this lack of objectivity can lead to inconsistencies in the application of risk-based and standards-based criteria. This paper summarises the different approaches used to estimate the PMF, and highlights how these reflect differences in the availability of design information and local tradition and experience. A number of approaches are available that can aid the objective definition of the PMF. These approaches attempt to define the “reasonableness” of the manner in which the various flood producing factors are combined by reference to the relative shift in the annual exceedance probability of the event. The implications of the different approaches to deriving the PMF are summarised for a number of dams from across Australia. Guidance on deriving the PMF is provided in the paper with a view to seeking feedback from industry and consideration for inclusion in relevant guidelines.
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2011 – Awoonga Dam Acceptable Flood Capacity design – the anguish of erosion risk and implications for design
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Malcolm Barker, Toby Loxton

The Gladstone Area Water Board (GAWB) owns and operates Awoonga Dam, which is a concrete-faced rock fill embankment with a fixed crest concrete spillway on the left bank impounding a storage volume of 770,000 ML.

The current arrangement can accommodate the Probable Maximum Flood, allowing for flow over Saddles 3, 4 and 6 on the left abutment. A comprehensive study was carried out to evaluate the erosion potential downstream from Saddles 3 and 6 as well as other spillway options adjacent to the existing dam. One option was a radical approach including the removal of the Saddle Dam 3 and provision of downstream erosion protection works. This reduced the PAR and improved the overall dam flood capacity; however concerns were expressed about the environmental impact of possible erosion downstream from Saddle 3 for relatively frequent events.

A risk assessment showed that the erosion protection works downstream from the Saddle 3 or 6 were not cost effective and the preferred option for the upgrade was the closure of the Saddle Dam 3 with an auxiliary spillway created in Saddle 6,

This paper summarises the methods used and the outcomes from this study.

2011 – Awoonga Dam Acceptable Flood Capacity design – the anguish of erosion risk and implications for design
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2011 – The Quality Chain of Dam Surveillance
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Dan Forster, Murray Gillon

A robust and defensible dam surveillance process is considered to be the ‘front-line of defence’ in ensuring dams do not present an unacceptable risk to people, property and the environment. The concept of a ‘Quality Chain of Dam Surveillance’ describes the surveillance process as a multi-linked chain where each step in the process forms a critical link. Without rigorous attention given to quality assurance links in the chain can become tenuous or broken and thus compromise the integrity of the whole chain. Hydro Tasmania is currently re-engineering its existing surveillance process using the Quality Chain of Dam Surveillance as a basis.

This paper presents the concept of the quality chain and uses the Hydro Tasmania improvement initiative as an example application of the concept. The paper is intended to provide a fresh perspective on what is sometimes considered a stale topic and reinforces the need for a considered approach to dam surveillance.

2011 – The Quality Chain of Dam Surveillance
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2011 – Refurbishing Outlet Valves utilising Shutdown Periods
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Frank Nitzsche

Awoonga Dam is the sole source of water for the City of Gladstone and the heavy industries in the region. The area’s distribution reservoirs hold little more than a day’s supply. Extended water supply disruption could have severe economic impacts.

The nine large valves in the inlet tower and river outlet of the dam cannot be inspected or maintained without shutting down the entire water abstraction system. Consequentially limited maintenance has been carried out in the 25 years since the valves were installed.

Recent Dam Safety inspections carried out for the dam owner, the Gladstone Area Water Board (GAWB,) noted some deterioration of the valves and recommended that the valves should be removed, inspected and refurbished as necessary

GAWB was thus presented with a daunting challenge to refurbish valves at Awoonga Dam, as it was generally believed that their removal for refurbishment would not be possible within the time limitations imposed by the system and customer requirements.

In 2008 GAWB commissioned GHD to develop a strategy to refurbish the valves within a 12 hour shutdown period. The strategy proposed and adopted required a rigorous risk management approach and close collaboration between GAWB’s operational staff, two contractors and the consulting engineers. The work was successfully completed during 2011.

This paper discussed the strategies and processes developed and how the project planning, supervision and execution was driven by the risk management based approach. It also highlights some of the experiences and lessons learnt during the project.

2011 – Refurbishing Outlet Valves utilising Shutdown Periods

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2011 – Safer Access at Water Corporation Dams
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Alex Gower, Graeme Mannand Peter Hulcup

The Water Corporation is the principal dam owner in Western Australian with a portfolio of 70 dams. Many of these dams are more than 30 years old and were designed and constructed prior to the writing of most occupational health and safety legislation and associated regulations and standards. Achieving compliance with these regulations and standards on the older assets has led to increasingly complex procedures and increased costs to undertake what were previously routine inspection, operation and maintenance tasks. In some cases achieving compliance has become impractical and modification to the assets is required.

This paper discusses a range of different safety issues, hazards and challenges faced at dams in Western Australia. These include prevention of falls from height, rescue of injured personnel within intake towers and drainage galleries and public access on the dams. Solutions adopted to improve safety and security for operators and the public are presented.

2011 – Safer Access at Water Corporation Dams

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2011 – Horror Stories with Outlet Works
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Bob Wark, Alex Gower, Paul Hurstand Sofia Vargas-Pedroza

ANCOLD has been working towards setting up guidelines for outlet works and has a standing committee that is addressing this issue. Recent papers have addressed the issues of current technical practice. However the authors believe that there is a sufficient body of experience available from recent incidents to provide a valuable tool that the guidelines can use to address the issues that are important. The authors have identified almost 40 incidents with outlet works that have occurred over the last 40 years, many of them within the last 20 years and have tabulated them as part of this paper. These range from the interesting to those that can and have threatened worker safety and life. The paper outlines the most significant of these and summarises the causes and corrective action necessary.

Horror Stories with Outlet Works

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2011 – Refurbishment of Ambuklao and Binga Hydro Power Dams and Appurtenant Works
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John Grimston, Robin Dawson

The Ambuklao and Binga Hydro-Electric Power Projects are located in Luzon, Philippines and were privatised in early 2008 after public bidding. Ambuklao dam forms an impoundment on the Agno River. The nearest city, Baguio, is approximately 45km or 1.5hrs drive away. The key headworks feature is an embankment central core rockfill dam and reaches a maximum height of some 129 m above the bed of the Agno River. A gated spillway is located at the left abutment, with a steep chute and flip bucket. Binga dam forms an impoundment approximately 20 km downstream of the Ambuklao dam. The rockfill embankment with an inclined clay core reaches a height of about 107 m above the bed of the Agno River. The spillway is located at the left abutment.

Heavy tropical rains and typhoons can cause very high flows in the rivers leading into the Ambuklao and Binga reservoirs. PMF peak flow is 11,600 cumecs. Due to the steep slopes surrounding the reservoir and along the access roads to the Binga Dam, landslides can create a hazard in the reservoir or for emergency access to the dam. There are numerous active faults in the area, including the Abra, Digdig and Philippines Faults (the latter being one of the most active faults around the Philippines). The region around the dams is capable of and has experienced earthquakes with a magnitude of 7.8 on the Richter Scale. This was demonstrated by the 1990 earthquake (7.8 magnitude) and caused minor damage to the dam structures.

The Project owner commenced rehabilitation implementation planning immediately after purchasing the facilities aimed at reactivating the Ambuklao plant’s 75MW capacity (inoperable since 1999 due to reservoir siltation issues triggered by the 1990 earthquake) and increasing it to 105MW. Rehabilitation at the Binga plant will increase capacity from it’s current 100MW to 120MW. The overall rehabilitation works include plant, intakes, associated tunnels, etc. This paper will focus primarily on the dam and spillway related rehabilitation, studies and design including review of the PMF and spillway capacity for both dams, Ambuklao innovative upstream face rehabilitation, Ambuklao spillway studies and rehabilitation and Binga spillway works and reservoir sedimentation studies.

2011 – Refurbishment of Ambuklao and Binga Hydro Power Dams and Appurtenant Works

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2011 Papers

2011 – Western Australian Dam Safety Challenges for ANCOLD Part 2
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Michael Somerford and Steven Fox

The Water Corporation of Western Australia has been implementing the risk assessment process promulgated by ANCOLD for 12 years. This approach has been central to a $310 million dam safety remedial works program that has reduced life safety risk across the Water Corporation’s portfolio of dams by an order of magnitude. However, whilst this process has provided a rational basis to prioritise dam safety upgrades, there are still questions that have not been fully answered and further development of the application of risk assessment to dams is desirable.

This paper revisits some of the key concerns that remain evident with the process and argues that unless further guidance is provided it may be that dam safety upgrades have effectively “hit the wall”; and upgrade programs commenced may never be completed as envisaged by ANCOLD.

2011 – Western Australian Dam Safety Challenges for ANCOLD Part 2
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2011 Papers

2011 – Perspectives of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami
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Norihisa Matsumoto

The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake of magnitude 9.0 shook the east Japan and caused enormous damage. As of September 22, The Japanese National Police Agency has confirmed 15,805 deaths, and 4,040 people missing, as well as over 295,047 buildings completely or partially destroyed. About 8,700,000 homes lost power, and about 2,290,000 homes were shut down from water supply. The transportation lifelines such as highways and railways including Shinkansen (high speed train) were disrupted. The earthquake triggered extremely destructive tsunami waves of the height of 15 metres, in the east coast of the Pacific Ocean. Fukushima No.1 nuclear power plant had accidents.

2011 – Perspectives of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami

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2011 – Recent Developments in Seismic Hazard Analysis
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Paul Somerville, Hong Kie Thio

There is a large degree of uncertainty as to the true state of nature (i.e. epistemic uncertainty) regarding many aspects of seismic hazard analysis. Such differences are often highlighted by differences between alternative models put forth by different model proponents. This epistemic uncertainty is treated by giving weight to all viable alternative models through the use of logic trees in probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, rather than just using a preferred model. This paper reviews epistemic uncertainties that arise from alternative distributed earthquake source models; alternative models for the recurrence of earthquakes on those sources; alternative approaches to including active faults; alternative models for the recurrence of earthquakes on active faults; alternative ground motion prediction models for Australia; and alternative methods for incorporating site response. It also reviews alternative representations of the design response spectrum for the development of ground motion time histories.

2011 – Recent Developments in Seismic Hazard Analysis

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2011 – Towards increased clarity in the application of ALARP
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Roger Vreugdenhil, Peter Hill, Siraj Perera, Susan Ryan

All Australian water authorities have in place dam safety programs that seek to ensure the ongoing safety and serviceability of their dams along with the benefits they secure for the wider community. Many have progressed multiple dam safety upgrades over the past decade and embraced risk assessment as a helpful tool in prioritising upgrade investment.

The ANCOLD Guidelines on Risk Assessment (2003) have been applied across the country and, coupled with State regulation, have supported dam owner efforts in reducing risks below the ANCOLD “Limit of Tolerability”. However, it is generally acknowledged that in their current form, the ANCOLD guidelines provide limited guidance to dam owners for determining appropriate levels of risk reduction and timing of dam safety improvements. This has contributed to a range of guideline interpretations and inconsistency in subsequent dam safety investment decisions across Australia. Having achieved priority risk reduction, a number of owners are beginning to assess their dams against the ALARP principle, bringing dam safety investment within an owner’s portfolio into more direct competition with other important and urgent organisational investment decisions.

This paper outlines the outcomes of a recent study commissioned by the Victoria Department of Sustainability and Environment into risk reduction principles and the application of ALARP by a number of Australian and international dam owners and regulators, hazardous industry owners and regulators, and the interaction of ALARP with whole-of-organisation investment. The paper highlights the study process and significant points of interest regarding risk reduction principles and current application of ALARP and some options for refinement and clarity.

Towards increased clarity in the application of ALARP
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