Richard Mannix, Michael Cawood, Joseph Matthews, Siraj Perera
Guidance material available to dam owners both domestically and internationally on testing dam safety emergency plans (DSEP) and running exercises is relatively general in nature. Guidance specific to dams that assists owners to design risk informed exercise scenarios tailored to their dam(s) total risk profile and the broader context in which the consequences of dam and operational safety failures would materialise, is limited.
This paper presents a framework that guides dam owners through a progressive scenario development process that enables the systematic identification of both dam and operational safety matters that require exploration as part of DSEP exercising. This level of rigour in guidance material has, until now, been missing and is particularly relevant in the context of dam owners demonstrating due diligence and SFAIRP imperatives while also bringing dam safety management closer to achieving the safety case.
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Now showing 1-12 of 37 3483:
Ryan Cantrill, Petros Armenis & Angus Cannon
Large Australian dams span a range of ages and were designed and constructed to the prevailing
standards and practices of the day. Since that time, there has been a veritable explosion in monitoring and surveillance technologies available to dam owners to assist with risk management of their portfolio. Coupled with this has been the formalization and ongoing development of regulatory frameworks across the industry.
This paper endeavours to share Sunwater’s recent experience on this topic. Specifically, the following question is considered – how best to apply modern monitoring and surveillance technologies to manage dam safety risks associated with decades old structures, all while still meeting regulatory requirements? In answering this question, the authors necessarily had to consider several inputs including – physical condition of the existing assets; analysis of existing controls and mitigation measures; risk assessment and risk profile of the assets; and operational constraints. As always, outputs invariably required the prioritization of recommendations.
While dam owners must strive to comply with a standard and accepted way of managing their portfolio, it is vital they recognize and address the unique risks that each structure presents. It therefore follows that owners must be prepared to allow the time and provide the necessary resources when formulating a monitoring and surveillance program commensurate with the dam safety risk that their respective portfolio presents
Jonathon Reid, Brendan Trebilco
The dam reviewed was designed and constructed in two stages, with the embankment completed in 1965. The dam comprises a 37 m high earth and rockfill maximum section on the creek alignment and zoned earthfill embankments of varying arrangements on the abutment flanks with a total crest length over 2km.
A Dam Safety Review was undertaken as part of the owners on-going commitment to maintain its portfolio of dams in a safe and functional state. The dam has suffered from high seepage rates that were first observed in 1971 after the reservoir rose to a historic high level, which was then exacerbated in 2011 after the reservoir rose a further 10m to reach the Full Supply Level for the first time. Reviews of the embankment stability at this time resulted in operating restrictions being placed on the reservoir level.
Detailed instrumentation data collected over a range of filling events showed the rock foundations to be highly responsive in the areas of observed seepage. This resulted in rapid pore pressure responses in foundation soils and the lower portion of the embankment after a rise in reservoir level, but a much slower pore pressure response in the upper parts of the embankment.
Seepage and stability analyses were undertaken based on the high quality instrumentation data to review the stability of the sections for various operating levels and with projected pore pressure increases for rapid flood loading scenarios. The paper explores the sensitivity of the analyses completed and how different construction standards applied to varying sections on the same embankment resulting in acceptable and undesirable outcomes.
Zara Bostock, Helena Sutherland
Ewen Maddock Dam is located approximately 12.0 km west of Caloundra, in the Sunshine Coast area of Southern Queensland. The dam is a homogeneous earthfill embankment dam 10.5 m high and 724 m long. The dam was originally built between 1973 and 1976 and later upgraded in 1982 to raise the ogee spillway crest by 2.44 m to the current Full Supply Level (FSL) of 25.38 m AHD.
Seqwater is undertaking a staged upgrade of Ewen Maddock Dam to address deficiencies identified during the Acceptable Flood Capacity (AFC) Review (GHD, 2010). The consequence category assigned to Ewen Maddock Dam is ‘Extreme’ with a downstream Population at Risk greater than 1000.
Stage 1 construction was completed in 2012 to manage the seepage underneath the dam to reduce the risk of piping and improve embankment stability. Stage 2A involved retrofitting a filter in the existing embankment and raising the dam 1.61 m to 30.11 m AHD using a reinforced concrete parapet wall. Stage 2B involves spillway upgrade works and was split from 2A due to approval constraints.
Stage 2A construction was completed in April 2021, navigating various project and dam safety challenges. This paper presents some practical ways dam safety and risk was managed on the ground from the perspective of both the designer and owner.
Chris Nielsen, Ron Guppy, Donna Dunn, David Murray
Following several years of investigations and analysis a serious safety issue with the stability of the primary spillway during major flood events was identified at Paradise Dam that required urgent risk reduction works. The response to this safety issue was significant.
The Inspector General Emergency Management conducted a review into the effectiveness of emergency response if a dam safety event were to occur, taking into consideration process and communications to manage around 40,000 population at risk, comprised mostly of residents within the city of Bundaberg.
An essential works program to reduce the risk was urgently prepared then executed effectively within a calendar year. This short timeframe required significant and novel amendments to Queensland’s laws to bypass normal legislated process for such a major project.
The Paradise Dam Commission of Inquiry was established to identify the root cause of the issues, the facts and circumstances that contributed to them and recommendations to consider for future dam projects. All recommendations from the commission were accepted by the Queensland government and, following an extensive stakeholder engagement exercise, have been implemented through changes in policy and methodology and described in published guideline revisions.
For future dam projects the lessons learnt highlighted the need for early and ongoing engagement of
independent technical review, project governance that is cognisant of risk and the ownership and capacity to bear of that risk, the need to consider testing to confirm critical design parameters and the need for an effective regulator. The essential works program has established a precedent for the timely and appropriate application of risk reduction measures.
Jarrad Coffey and John Plunkett
As tailings standards continue to evolve, a greater focus is being placed on the monitoring of tailings storage facilities (TSFs). While this is a positive development for TSF safety into the future, it is only one component of the work required to implement Performance Based Risk Informed (PBRI) management. There is also a significant human element that can be aided by reducing the time spent of personnel sourcing/aggregating data and instead focussing on decision making. It is discussed in this paper how a more holistic approach to monitoring via a dashboard that displays all management data relevant to a portfolio of TSFs can be applied in parallel to risk assessment to work towards the goal of PBRI. The dashboard also facilitates review and governance activities, which are central to the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management. An example of the dashboard utilised at Rio Tinto Iron Ore is presented to provide an example of such a system and its benefits.