Prior to filling the Clyde Dam reservoir in 1992-93 large scale stabilisation works were undertaken on several pre-existing landslides along the reservoir margins. Monitoring and visual observations indicate that the landslides are behaving satisfactorily and have confirmed that the stability improvements undertaken have successfully offset the negative effects of the reservoir on the landslides.
This paper presents selected records detailing more than 25 years of landslide behaviour that demonstrate the effectiveness of the stabilisation works. Monitoring has been able to detect increasing water levels, drainage flow changes and, in some cases, deformation following periods of high rainfall.
However, the highly satisfactory performance of the landslides experienced to date does not allow complacency and although the surveillance monitoring has been progressively scaled back to a more focussed strategy, ongoing assessment and reviews will be required. The paper also briefly discusses the current challenges associated with changing personnel and aging instrumentation.
As part of the development of some dams and hydroelectric power schemes, deep infrastructure is often required which requires and understanding of the in situ stresses of the rock mass. Recent works completed in southern Australia and Europe have led to improved methodologies for conducting effective, reliable, and repeatable measurements of in situ strain and/or deformation, as well as the subsequent estimation of in situ stress.
In situ stress testing is generally an item that is specified as part of a geotechnical investigation, however it is not commonly well understood in terms of reliability, repeatability, or, in fact, what the result actually means and its implications to project design. Commonly, a handful of tests are completed, with variable results, which often generates more confusion than answers.
This paper provides a discussion of recent in situ stress testing completed for two deep Australian projects. It summarises the aim of the investigations, test selection process, laboratory testing, data review and model development. This is to illustrate how complex the estimation of in situ stress can be and some of the pitfalls that may be avoided whilst acquiring and assessing the data. It also examines several different testing methods available in the Australian and International industry and some of the analysis techniques available to dam and tunnel projects. Finally, the paper provides an update on topical developments provided at recent workshops in Europe.
The Keepit Dam Safety Upgrade Project is being implemented to bring the 54m high concrete gravity dam in line with current guidelines for flood and earthquake loading. Stage 2A of the project involves the installation of two vertical 91 strand post-tensioned anchors on each monolith of the spillway section.
During coring of the anchor head blocks for the vertical anchors, deep cracks were observed across some monoliths, dipping diagonally in an upstream direction. In two of the monoliths the cracks were found to be continuous enough to possibly daylight at the upstream face and form freestanding blocks. If the freestanding blocks postulate is correct, the block stability could be currently relying on the friction of the cracked surface and on the engagement with shear keys of adjacent monoliths, which are provided in the vertical contraction joints.
This paper will explain the complex 3-D nonlinear Finite Element Analysis (FEA) conducted to replicate the conditions of the cracked spillway monoliths during the post-tensioned anchor installation. The nonlinearity captured the expected opening, closing and sliding of the crack, as well as its potential pressurisation, and the residual shear strength retention due to asperities of the crack surface. For the shear keys of the vertical contraction joints, the nonlinearity captured the force-deformation relationship of the plain concrete, up to a brittle failure condition if the shear strength threshold was reached.
The 3-D nonlinear FEA was also used to design the optimum number of Macalloy post-tensioned bars required to stitch the freestanding block to the monolith, so that the vertical anchors can be safely installed. In addition, the remedial design accounted for future extreme design flood and extreme earthquake loading conditions, the latter modelled with a time-history analysis.
Loss of life estimates in dam breach circumstances are a key determining input in establishing the appropriate risk profile for these assets. They can also be useful in identifying the most effective emergency management responses. While there are a range of approaches described in the literature for assessing loss of life for concentrated population centres, there is little specific guidance on approaches to be taken when there is only a small number of properties or where itinerant loss of life has the potential to be the dominant risk element. Itinerants are most commonly considered to be road users, although, they can alternatively be any temporary users of the floodplain. The literature on flood fatalities indicates that the largest number of deaths occurs at vehicle crossings or otherwise when individuals voluntarily enter waterways. An approach has been developed for identifying the cases where itinerant loss of life has the potential to be the dominant vector for flood fatalities. In addition, the available flood fatality literature and associated databases have been reviewed to establish the precursors to fatalities.
A simple stepped procedure is presented which allows the user to identify cases where itinerant risk to life on roads should be considered with a separate procedure and a method presented by which itinerant life loss may be identified.
Recent tailings dam failures have led to worldwide alarm that we are still getting an average of two
significant tailings dam incidents a year. This is despite the efforts of various industry organisations aroundthe world to raise the standards of tailings dam management. Clearly, a significant number of mining dams are not re silient enough to ensure the required level of safety for sustainable mining operations in a modern world in which there is increasing concern for the environment. This paper updates ANCOLD with international developments in attempting to address shortcomings in the mining industry that is allowing these failures to continue to occur.
In Australia, ANCOLD have released an addendum to the 2012 ANCOLD Guidelines on Tailings Dams, Planning, Design, Construction, Operation and Closure, to coincide with the new ANCOLD Guidelines for Design of Dams and Appurtenant Structures for Earthquake. This addendum also addresses issues of governance of tailings dams and provides additional guidance on the serious issue of static-liquefaction, a critical factor in recent failures.
On the international scene, ICOLD is progressing a Tailings Dam Safety Bulletin that is hoped will set
minimum standards for Tailings Dams for all member countries. In addition, the International Council of Mining and Metallurgy (ICMM) similarly wants to establish an international standard. It is likely that these international bodies will cooperate to ensure a consistent set of guidelines and that countries will accept and implement these.
This paper updates the ANCOLD position regarding guidelines and describes the state of various
international guidelines following the June ICOLD meeting in Ottawa.
Auckland Council (Council) is developing a dam safety management system with an overall objective to protect people, property, infrastructure, and the environment, from the harmful effects of a dam failure.
Council has responsibilities as an owner and operator of approximately 600 stormwater ponds and wetlands, many associated with dams. Council also has wider responsibilities for safety in the Auckland region, which may be affected by dams owned by others and even by inadvertent dams, such as road or rail embankments across streams that have the unintended but potential function of diverting, storing or holding back water. Three categories of dams have been distinguished, associated with Council’s different types of responsibility. Each category of dam is managed differently in the dam safety management system.
Given the large number of structures, which are not always obviously dams, a key activity has been the initial identification of dams across the Auckland region. Prioritisation has also been a necessary tool to direct resources and programme. Once dams have been identified, the consequences and risk of dam failure have been assessed, and commensurate measures have been established to manage those risks. There is limited guidance for some of these activities, and new procedures and tools have been developed.
This paper describes the process and the challenges encountered, for consideration by other councils when developing their own systems, and for consideration by the wider dams’ community.