On 1 July 2017, the Water Supply (Safety and Reliability) Act 2008 (Qld) was amended to improve the way referable dam owners manage dam safety and integration of dam safety with disaster management. While each dam and emergency event differs, and each state has different dam safety and disaster management legislation, it is important that communication strategies are effectively delivered to empower dam owners and emergency practitioners to improve warning capability for affected communities. The paper provides an overview of the intent of the amended legislation, key concepts, what makes an effective emergency action plan and a performance analysis of the emergency action planning regulatory program. Lessons learnt from the analysis are provided.
This paper will explore the differences in pore pressures resulting from saturated and unsaturated seepage (pore pressure) analysis. It will also evaluate some conventional recommendations, such as the inclusion of essential components of the embankment dam and omission of inessential components. In addition, the identification of inessential components will be discussed.
Finally, pore pressures obtained from these analyses will be compared to monitoring data in order to identify the most appropriate seepage (pore pressure) model.
In conclusion, advantages and disadvantages of each method will be discussed and recommendations will be provided in order to gain the most appropriate results.
The results of this paper can be used for designing new embankment dams or safety reviews of existing dams, particularly when there is lack of reliable monitoring data.
Multiple-arch dam technology enjoyed a certain popularity between the fifties and seventies, but was later discontinued for practical reasons. The multiple-arch dam that is the subject of this paper is especially peculiar since it was built using prefabricated elements and a combination of several pre-stressed steel systems.
This dam consists of 17 buttressed arches with a maximum height of 35 m on a limestone and dolostone foundation. It has a crest length of 531 m and a 15 hm3 reservoir. After 55 years in operation, several apparent degradations have surfaced and a study on the safety of the dam is currently being carried out.
The main concern is the dam’s structural safety, which is apparently linked to the integrity of the post-stressed steel elements and the precast elements in the arches. This paper describes the approach chosen for the remediation study, the visual inspection, and the tests developed on the post-stressed steel and concrete, in order to feed a 3D numerical model of the structure.
Oroville Dam is located on the Feather River in northern California (USA). At 234.7 m (770-ft) tall, this earth embankment is the tallest dam in the United States. With its 4.3 billion m3 (3.5 million acre-feet) of storage, Lake Oroville is the second largest reservoir in California, supplying water to cities as far south as Los Angeles. The Oroville Dam, reservoir (Lake Oroville), and hydropower plant facility is the flagship of the State Water Project (SWP), which is owned and operated by the State of California, Department of Water Resources (DWR).
The assessment of the geological foundations of arch dams is required as part of the asset owner’s safety obligations (ANCOLD 2003). The task is often made difficult due to steep topography where arch dams are commonly constructed. Between 2013 and 2017, GHD was engaged by South Australia Water (SA Water) to examine the geological and geotechnical conditions of the Sturt River Flood Attenuation Dam (South Australia) abutment foundations. The dam was constructed between 1964 and 1966 within the Proterozoic “Sturt Tillite”. The foundations of the dam are characterised by a folded and fractured rock mass which creates complex spatial relationships between discontinuities and outcrop expression, difficult to assess in two-dimensional space. In collaboration with Monash University’s School of Earth, Atmosphere and Environment, a high resolution ortho-photogrammetric survey of the downstream dam abutments was undertaken using an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) in areas where traditional mapping could only be obtained by rope access methods. Monash also undertook digital geological mapping of inferred discontinuities based on the UAV imagery. The data was then used to construct a three-dimensional (3D) model of the shape and position of high-persistence discontinuities, potentially critical to abutment stability. In addition to digital data, a low cost, high value field investigation to “ground-truth” the digital data and reviewed existing geological information (including rope access scanline data, foundation mapping and rotary cored boreholes) to develop a holistic understanding of the persistent discontinuities in their geological context.
In 2018, DNRME released the latest revision of the Failure Impact Assessment (FIA) Guidelines and the first significant change since 2003. An FIA is the instrument for determining if a dam is referable and therefore regulated for dam safety purposes in Queensland.
The guidelines reflect upon changes in legislation and advances in methods and tools for assessing consequences of dam failure. The revised version tends to be less prescriptive and emphasises the responsibility of the engineer completing the assessment to develop appropriate and defensible methods.
The paper provides an overview of the FIA guidelines, key concepts, the steps to follow when preparing an FIA and a comparison to ANCOLD’s latest consequence assessment guideline.