Many mapped faults in the south-eastern highlands of New South Wales and Victoria are associated with apparently youthful topography, suggesting that faulting may have played a role in shaping the modern landscape. This has been demonstrated to be the case for the Lake George Fault, and may reasonably be inferred for the poorly characterised Murrumbidgee, Khancoban, Tantangara, Berridale Wrench and Tawonga faults. More than a dozen nearby major faults with similarly youthful topography are uncharacterised. In general, fault locations and extents are inconsistent across different scales of geologic mapping, and rupture lengths, slip rates and other fault behaviours remain largely unquantified. A more comprehensive understanding of these faults is required to support safety assessments for communities and large infrastructure in the region.
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Following the catastrophic failure of the bottom outlet conduits of the Massingir Dam, a rehabilitation project was launched involving the installation of steel liners and the rehabilitation of the hydromechanical equipment. This paper describes the testing of an emergency gates for possible use as a control gate to maintain supply to downstream water users. It further describes the innovative use of alternative access for concreting and other services, the use and benefits of self-compacting concrete for infill concreting between the steel liner and existing concrete and the programme and cost benefits of pressurising the steel conduit prior to concrete encasement.
An assessment of dam failure consequence for Jandowae Water Supply Dam in South-West Queensland was performed using HEC-LifeSim. The purpose of the assessment was to investigate the applicability of the software to inform decisions on an appropriate regulatory pathway for the dam that reflects the consequences of failure. This paper details the development of the hydrologic and hydraulic models behind the HEC-LifeSim simulations, the assignment of key parameters and their sensitivities, and a comparison of predictions to existing procedures for assessing potential loss of life and populations at risk. The paper reflects upon the level of effort required to develop HEC-LifeSim assessments and the relative benefits gained using this information in the regulatory space.
On February 7, 2017, the gated service spillway (also known as the Flood
Control Outlet or FCO Spillway) at Oroville Dam was being used to release water
to control the Lake Oroville level according to the prescribed operations plan.
During this operation, the service spillway’s concrete chute slab failed, resulting
in the loss of spillway chute slab sections and deep erosion of underlying
foundation materials. Subsequently, as the damaged service spillway was
operated in an attempt to manage multiple risks, the project’s free overflow
emergency spillway was overtopped for the first time since the project was
completed in 1968. Significant erosion and headcutting occurred downstream of
the emergency spillway’s crest structure, leading authorities to evacuate about
188,000 people from downstream communities.
Oroville Dam is located on the Feather River in northern California (USA). At 234.7 m (770-ft) tall, this earth embankment is the tallest dam in the United States. With its 4.3 billion m3 (3.5 million acre-feet) of storage, Lake Oroville is the second largest reservoir in California, supplying water to cities as far south as Los Angeles. The Oroville Dam, reservoir (Lake Oroville), and hydropower plant facility is the flagship of the State Water Project (SWP), which is owned and operated by the State of California, Department of Water Resources (DWR).
The paper describes the development of UK guidance on reservoir drawdown capacity. The guidance provides for a consistent thought process to be used in determining the recommended capacity. A basic recommended standard is proposed for embankment dams which varies with the consequences of failure of a dam. The drawdown rate for the highest consequence dams is 5% dam height/day with an upper limit of 1m/day. Engineering judgement is used to vary this standard allowing for ‘other considerations’ including the vulnerability to rapid dam failure, surveillance and precedent practice. A different approach is proposed for concrete/masonry dam, which considers the prime purpose of drawdown being to lower the reservoir in a reasonable timeframe to permit repairs rather than rapid lowering to avert failure. The UK approach is compared with that used in Australia and suggestions made for where its use may be appropriate.