Following the catastrophic failure of the bottom outlet conduits of the Massingir Dam, a rehabilitation project was launched involving the installation of steel liners and the rehabilitation of the hydromechanical equipment. This paper describes the testing of an emergency gates for possible use as a control gate to maintain supply to downstream water users. It further describes the innovative use of alternative access for concreting and other services, the use and benefits of self-compacting concrete for infill concreting between the steel liner and existing concrete and the programme and cost benefits of pressurising the steel conduit prior to concrete encasement.
Recent advances in communication technologies have made available an array of new systems and functionalities that dam operators can use to improve automation and centralisation in the daily surveillance tasks of their portfolios. These functionalities include real-time monitoring, target-oriented video surveillance and the remote management of PLCs and data loggers.
The present paper aims to outline some integration possibilities using TCP/IP technologies for remote operations and video surveillance.
The case study features a comprehensive dam instrumentation upgrade, in which the acquisition systems were complemented with a series of IP cameras designed to be triggered by local and remote events.
HEC-LifeSim modelling has been emerging in the industry over the last few years and is increasingly becoming the preferred method for detailed consequence and failure impact assessments. The increased adoption rate of HEC-LifeSim modelling is a result of advancements to computation power and hydraulic modelling techniques and allows dam owners to obtain more robust and consistent estimates of the potential loss of life (PLL) compared to the traditional Graham (1999) and RCEM (USBR, 2014) approaches.
This paper will demonstrate, through the use of three examples, how the inputs and outputs from HEC- LifeSim have been used to identify potential ways to better understand the consequences as a result of dambreak.
Kangaroo Creek Dam is a concrete face rockfill dam (CFRD) located on the Torrens River, approximately 22 km north east of Adelaide. The dam is currently undergoing a major upgrade to align it with updated safety guidelines set by the Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD) to better withstand major flood events or earthquakes. As part of this upgrade, external omega-type waterstops have been installed on the vertical and perimetric joints to mitigate the impact of expected joint deformations due to seismic loading. Two profiles were selected for the external waterstops; one capable of extending 200 mm for the perimetric joint and the outer two vertical joints on each side, and one capable of extending 100 mm for the remaining vertical joints and the horizontal joint between the new face slab and the original face slab. Using the external omega-type waterstops as the second waterstop for the extended perimetric joint simplified construction, particularly with respect to reinforcement details adjacent to joints. It is understood that this is the first time in Australia that an omega-type waterstop is being fitted to a CFRD slab. This paper demonstrates the benefits of retrofitting waterstops to existing dam joints when required, provides general installation details, details for providing a continuous barrier with the existing waterstops by overlapping internal and external waterstops, and lessons learnt from the waterstop installation.
Many Australian and international dam owners use risk assessments to understand and manage the societal risks posed by their dams. This requires estimates of dam failure consequences, particularly the potential loss of life (PLL). The methods used to assess PLL have become more varied and sophisticated in recent times. This paper summarises the current status of the methods most relevant to the Australian dams industry (i.e. RCEM, HEC-LifeSim, the Life Safety Model), and comments on their applicability for Australian PLL assessments. This commentary is based on material presented by dam owners, regulators, researchers and consultants from the United States, Canada, United Kingdom and the Netherlands, at workshops on estimating dam failure consequences held in Denver in 2016 and Toronto in 2018.
On February 7, 2017, the gated service spillway (also known as the Flood
Control Outlet or FCO Spillway) at Oroville Dam was being used to release water
to control the Lake Oroville level according to the prescribed operations plan.
During this operation, the service spillway’s concrete chute slab failed, resulting
in the loss of spillway chute slab sections and deep erosion of underlying
foundation materials. Subsequently, as the damaged service spillway was
operated in an attempt to manage multiple risks, the project’s free overflow
emergency spillway was overtopped for the first time since the project was
completed in 1968. Significant erosion and headcutting occurred downstream of
the emergency spillway’s crest structure, leading authorities to evacuate about
188,000 people from downstream communities.