Earthquakes are a well-known threat to the safety of dams. While this threat is subdued for Australian Dams, the potential for earthquake induced failure of a dam requires risk minimisation in the downstream community through monitoring and emergency response procedures. This paper details WaterNSW’s approach to their development of a Seismic Monitoring Strategy which was to align the business and ensure an appropriate post-seismic response.
The strategy also identifies that a proactive approach to seismic instrumentation can be taken to reduce business risk by aiding decision making should a dam be in a damaged post-seismic state.
The interim outcome of implementing the Seismic Monitoring Strategy resulted in a fast emergency
response time and less overreaction/distraction of dam safety resources in insignificant seismic events. There is opportunity for other Australian dam owners to implement similar systems to = WaterNSW and achieve similar results.
Trustpower is a New Zealand based hydro generator and retailer. It started off as a business that only owned a few schemes and then during a period of rapid expansion between 1998 and 2002 acquired the bulk of its current schemes. Now it owns and operates 25 hydro schemes across New Zealand ranging from 150kW to 80MW output.
This paper examines how Trustpower’s Dam Safety Management System (DSMS) has evolved over time, taking account of developments in the business environment, proposed regulatory changes, improvements in the NZSOLD guidelines and evolution in international dam safety practice.
The Kumara-Dillmans-Duffers Hydro Electric Power Scheme (HEPS) and in particular its Kapitea Reservoir (high Potential Impact Category) will be used as an example to highlight how the DSMS evolved over this period.
HEC-LifeSim modelling has been emerging in the industry over the last few years and is increasingly becoming the preferred method for detailed consequence and failure impact assessments. The increased adoption rate of HEC-LifeSim modelling is a result of advancements to computation power and hydraulic modelling techniques and allows dam owners to obtain more robust and consistent estimates of the potential loss of life (PLL) compared to the traditional Graham (1999) and RCEM (USBR, 2014) approaches.
This paper will demonstrate, through the use of three examples, how the inputs and outputs from HEC- LifeSim have been used to identify potential ways to better understand the consequences as a result of dambreak.
In 2015, a study was undertaken where recommendations were made to provide protection to the exposed rock in the unlined channel of the spillway at Burdekin Falls Dam. The protection included a matrix of anchor bars which extended the full 504 m width of the spillway and 25 m in the downstream direction. Over 1,200 anchors were proposed comprising 36 mm diameter bar extending up to 15 m into the foundation.
A value engineering study was undertaken in 2017 where a review of the rock scour potential was undertaken. The study was based on a methodology developed by Pells (2016) as part of a research grant funded under an Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage Project which was jointly financed by the Federal Government of Australia, various state government bodies and engineering consultancies involved in dam design, operations and management.
This paper describes the approach taken as part of the value engineering study, the methods used in the assessment and the benefits of both innovative thinking and challenging the more traditional approach of rock scour assessment, the outcome of which resulted in a $11 m plus saving to the owner of the asset.
Recent advances in communication technologies have made available an array of new systems and functionalities that dam operators can use to improve automation and centralisation in the daily surveillance tasks of their portfolios. These functionalities include real-time monitoring, target-oriented video surveillance and the remote management of PLCs and data loggers.
The present paper aims to outline some integration possibilities using TCP/IP technologies for remote operations and video surveillance.
The case study features a comprehensive dam instrumentation upgrade, in which the acquisition systems were complemented with a series of IP cameras designed to be triggered by local and remote events.
The revised magnitudes of the Geoscience Australia’s NSHA18 earthquake catalogue approximately halve the rate of occurrence of earthquakes of a given Mw magnitude in Australia. This yields probabilistic ground motion levels that are significantly lower than the present design levels at dam sites in Australia that are not near faults, and is expected to result in a general reduction in ground motion levels at dams not near faults estimated for all Risk Assessments, and for Deterministic Assessments for all consequence levels except Extreme Consequence. For the latter, the ANCOLD (2018) guidelines will tend to increase existing SEE ground motion estimates for both of the methods used to estimate the safety evaluation earthquake (SEE). By requiring the use of the Deterministic SEE if it is larger than the probabilistic SEE, and by requiring use of the 85th fractile of the Probabilistic SEE if it is larger than the Deterministic SEE, the ANCOLD (2018) guidelines for Deterministic Assessments are much more conservative than the ICOLD and NZSOLD guidelines for Extreme Consequence dams, especially at those located near faults.