An assessment of dam failure consequence for Jandowae Water Supply Dam in South-West Queensland was performed using HEC-LifeSim. The purpose of the assessment was to investigate the applicability of the software to inform decisions on an appropriate regulatory pathway for the dam that reflects the consequences of failure. This paper details the development of the hydrologic and hydraulic models behind the HEC-LifeSim simulations, the assignment of key parameters and their sensitivities, and a comparison of predictions to existing procedures for assessing potential loss of life and populations at risk. The paper reflects upon the level of effort required to develop HEC-LifeSim assessments and the relative benefits gained using this information in the regulatory space.
Earthquakes are a well-known threat to the safety of dams. While this threat is subdued for Australian Dams, the potential for earthquake induced failure of a dam requires risk minimisation in the downstream community through monitoring and emergency response procedures. This paper details WaterNSW’s approach to their development of a Seismic Monitoring Strategy which was to align the business and ensure an appropriate post-seismic response.
The strategy also identifies that a proactive approach to seismic instrumentation can be taken to reduce business risk by aiding decision making should a dam be in a damaged post-seismic state.
The interim outcome of implementing the Seismic Monitoring Strategy resulted in a fast emergency
response time and less overreaction/distraction of dam safety resources in insignificant seismic events. There is opportunity for other Australian dam owners to implement similar systems to = WaterNSW and achieve similar results.
Ulu Jelai project is a recently completed 372MW hydroelectric peak – power project located in the Cameron Highlands of Malaysia. A combination of power generating and reservoir operating conditions together with the site topography, existing road infrastructure, geology and hydrogeological conditions pose a significant risk to the viability of the project during operation. As a result, significant reservoir rim stability treatments were designed and constructed along a 3.5km section of the right abutment of t he Susu Reservoir to reduce the risk of instability to acceptable levels. This paper describes the methods of investigations, stability assessment and design aspects of the reservoir rim stability treatments that were constructed.
On February 7, 2017, the gated service spillway (also known as the Flood
Control Outlet or FCO Spillway) at Oroville Dam was being used to release water
to control the Lake Oroville level according to the prescribed operations plan.
During this operation, the service spillway’s concrete chute slab failed, resulting
in the loss of spillway chute slab sections and deep erosion of underlying
foundation materials. Subsequently, as the damaged service spillway was
operated in an attempt to manage multiple risks, the project’s free overflow
emergency spillway was overtopped for the first time since the project was
completed in 1968. Significant erosion and headcutting occurred downstream of
the emergency spillway’s crest structure, leading authorities to evacuate about
188,000 people from downstream communities.
Many Australian and international dam owners use risk assessments to understand and manage the societal risks posed by their dams. This requires estimates of dam failure consequences, particularly the potential loss of life (PLL). The methods used to assess PLL have become more varied and sophisticated in recent times. This paper summarises the current status of the methods most relevant to the Australian dams industry (i.e. RCEM, HEC-LifeSim, the Life Safety Model), and comments on their applicability for Australian PLL assessments. This commentary is based on material presented by dam owners, regulators, researchers and consultants from the United States, Canada, United Kingdom and the Netherlands, at workshops on estimating dam failure consequences held in Denver in 2016 and Toronto in 2018.
Lake Buffalo located on the Buffalo River near Myrtleford in Victoria was constructed in the 1960s as a cofferdam for the then proposed Big Buffalo dam. Consequently, the dam was designed for a short life (<10 years) and design features and criteria for a permanent dam were not implemented.
Critical features include a primary spillway with three vertical lift gates, two outlet conduits located
through the spillway piers, a single upstream valve on each outlet conduit for regulation and isolation, and a multi-part bulkhead which is installed in front of the valves for inspection and maintenance.
With the continued operation of the dam beyond 60 years, upgrades appropriate to a permanent dam have been implemented, including addressing deficiencies with spillway gate hoists lifting equipment and redundancy of the outlet conduit vales. This proved challenging, as the operation of spillway structures does not readily align with industry or Australian Standards. This paper will outline the issues encountered, their resolution and the lessons learnt during this upgrade work.