There are a number of software packages that have been developed to conduct Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessments (PSHA’s). Each one has advantages and disadvantages. Two such programs are compared; the licenced subscription-based EZ-FRISK software package developed by Fugro USA Land, Inc. and the open-sourced OpenQuake-engine (OQ) software package by the Global Earthquake Model (GEM) Foundation. Both of these packages use the classical PSHA methodology as described by Cornell (1968) and modified by McGuire (1976). Each of these packages offers different advantages; OQ is freely distributed, code based and provides easy access to a number of tools. EZ-FRISK doesn’t rely on command-line tools and instead provides an easy user interface with quick access to plots to check results. EZ-FRISK is computationally faster than the OQ program.
A simple rectangular source model with four sites was used to investigate the degree of agreement between these two software packages. Results indicate that hazard estimates from the two packages agree to within 4% for the two closest sites. At long return periods for the two furthest sites, the difference is larger.
The As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle was established in the Australian Dams
community in the ANCOLD Guidelines on Risk Assessment in 1994. Since that time, dam owners have been focused on reducing their societal risk to below the ANCOLD Limit of Tolerability (LoT) through dam safety upgrades and are now considering how to justify an ALARP position. This paper presents a framework that provides a systematic approach to assembling the inputs, applying a process and documenting the outcomes of an ALARP assessment. It is a pragmatic approach that aligns with the safety case, which is a legislated requirement for Major Hazard Facilities in Victoria.
The framework has been applied to two dams in Melbourne Water’s portfolio with differing societal risk, size, uses and criticality to the water supply system. It has highlighted the importance of dam safety governance, documentation of procedures, defensible technical analysis and an ongoing engagement with leading industry practice, in demonstrating risks are ALARP.
The paper describes the development of UK guidance on reservoir drawdown capacity. The guidance provides for a consistent thought process to be used in determining the recommended capacity. A basic recommended standard is proposed for embankment dams which varies with the consequences of failure of a dam. The drawdown rate for the highest consequence dams is 5% dam height/day with an upper limit of 1m/day. Engineering judgement is used to vary this standard allowing for ‘other considerations’ including the vulnerability to rapid dam failure, surveillance and precedent practice. A different approach is proposed for concrete/masonry dam, which considers the prime purpose of drawdown being to lower the reservoir in a reasonable timeframe to permit repairs rather than rapid lowering to avert failure. The UK approach is compared with that used in Australia and suggestions made for where its use may be appropriate.
Following the catastrophic failure of the bottom outlet conduits of the Massingir Dam, a rehabilitation project was launched involving the installation of steel liners and the rehabilitation of the hydromechanical equipment. This paper describes the testing of an emergency gates for possible use as a control gate to maintain supply to downstream water users. It further describes the innovative use of alternative access for concreting and other services, the use and benefits of self-compacting concrete for infill concreting between the steel liner and existing concrete and the programme and cost benefits of pressurising the steel conduit prior to concrete encasement.
Deformation Survey is a simple and widely implemented technique to identify the early signs of dam failure and is regularly undertaken on many dams. Thanks to advances in equipment and more accurate survey records, there is now a better understanding of measurement and movement of embankments and previous records.
However, the “expected” range of transverse deformation and implications for failure modes of dams is not particularly well researched or understood.
This paper collates a case history of transverse deformation for a number of Tasmanian dams and examines the relative behaviour of the embankment dams. From this the “expected behaviour” of an embankment dam can be estimated and related to key influencing factors, such as observed settlements, height and age of the dams, and thereby providing guidance on when transverse deformation is considered unusual for similar dams.
Junction and Clover Dams are central spillway slab-and-buttress dams located in Victoria. Previous safety reviews and assessments of the dams concluded that neither dam met modern dam design standards and remedial works were recommended, including infilling the slab-and-buttress dams with mass concrete to sustain seismic loadings. These conclusions were based largely on the assessed seismic hazard at the site, the results of response spectrum analyses and observed conditions of the dams including alkali-aggregate reaction of the concrete. AECOM used current seismic hazard assessment techniques, conducted concrete investigations and testing, assessed long term surveillance monitoring results and used modern finite element techniques to demonstrate that no upgrade works were required at either dam resulting in a significant saving for AGL.