Gavan Hunter, David Jeffery and Stephen Chia
The Main Embankment at Tullaroop Dam in central Victoria is a 43 m high earthfill embankment with a very broad earthfill zone and rockfill zones at the outer toe regions. There has been an extensive history of cracking within the Main Embankment since formalisation of visual inspections in 1987.Widespread cracking has been observed on the crest and downstream shoulder. Cracking on the crest has mainly been longitudinal, but transverse cracks have also been observed. Cracking on the downstream shoulder has comprised longitudinal, diagonal and transverse cracking. In April 2004, a 60 mm wide diagonal crack opened on the downstream shoulder of the left abutment (from crest to toe) and Goulburn-Murray Water constructed a local filter buttress in 2005/06 on the left abutment. In 2011/12 a longitudinal crack opened up on the upper downstream berm toward the right abutment. The crack was initially 15m long and 10 to 215 mm wide, then propagated several months later to 70 m in length, 40 to 50 mm width and greater than 3 m in depth.In May 2011 three piezometers within the earth fill core recorded a very rapid rise in pore water pressure equivalent to 12 to 13 m pressure head above their previous readings. The piezometers were located on the same alignment (upstream to downstream) and were located below the crest and downstream shoulder, and the rise was to levels close to and above the embankment surface. The piezometers then showed a steady fall with time returning to the pre rise levels after 4 to 6 weeks.In 2015/16 Goulburn-Murray Water undertook dam safety upgrade works to reduce the risk of piping through the Main Embankment by extension of the filter buttress across the full width of the embankment. During these upgrade works, very deep (greater than 5 m) and extensive transverse cracks were observed in the embankment over relatively subtle slope changes on the right abutment.Thecracking and pore water pressure behaviour in the Main Embankment at Tullaroop Reservoir present an important case study. The paper provides details on the cracking and postulated crack mechanisms, and the rapid pore water pressure rise and postulated mechanisms. A summary of the upgrade works is also provided.
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C.Jolly and J.Green
New rare design rainfalls were released for Australia in February 2017, for durations from one to seven days and probabilities from 1in 100Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) up to 1 in 2000 AEP.The differences between the previous rare design rainfalls using estimated Cooperative Research Centre –FOcussed Rainfall Growth Estimation (CRC-FORGE) method and the new rare design rainfall estimates vary with location, duration and probability. In this paper, these differences are explored spatially through the use of national maps, comparing percentage change between the two datasets for selected durations and probabilities. Before this comparison with the new rare design rainfalls could be completed, the State-basedestimates had to be resampled and aggregated to form a national data set for Australia.For rare design rainfalls, it is often the catchment values that are required to determine the gross rainfall for design purposes. The impact of the revised areal reductions factors and rare design rainfalls is explored through case study catchments in Tasmania.
Colleen Baker, Sean Ladiges, Peter Buchanan, James Willey, Malcolm Barker
Dam Owners and Designers are often posed with the question “what is an acceptable flood risk to adopt during the construction of dam upgrade works?” Both the current ANCOLD Guidelines on Acceptable Flood Capacity (2000) and the draft Guidelines on Acceptable Flood Capacity (2016) provide guidance on the acceptability of flood risk during the construction phase. The overarching principle in both the current and draft documents is that the dam safety risk should be no greater than prior to the works, unless it can be shown that this cannot reasonably be achieved.Typically with dam upgrade projects it is not feasible to take reservoirs off-line during upgrade works, with commercial and societal considerations taking precedent. It is therefore often necessary to operate the reservoir at normal levels or with only limited drawdown. The implementation of measures to maintain the risk at or below that of the pre-upgraded dam can have significant financial and program impacts on projects, such as through the construction of elaborate cofferdam arrangements and/or staging of works. This is particularly the case where upgrade works involve modifications to the dam’s spillway.The use of risk assessment has provided a reasonable basis for evaluating the existing and incremental risks associated with the works, such as the requirement for implementation of critical construction works during periods where floods are less likely, in order to justify the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) position. This paper explores the ANCOLD guidelines addressing flood risk, and compares against international practice. The paper also presents a number of case studies of construction flood risk mitigation adopted for dam upgrades on some of Australia’s High and Extreme consequence dams, as well as international examples. The case studies demonstrate a range of construction approaches which enable compliance with the ANCOLD Acceptable Flood Capacity guidelines
Paul S. Meeks
In June 2008 a young girl kayaking at a hydroelectric control dam owned by Alcan in Quebec Canada, tragically drowned when she was swept through the open spillgates. The public safety boat barrier, installed the year before, failed to prevent this accident. In June 2015, Stephen Hembree took his daughter and 7 of her friends out for a pontoon boat ride on Lake Linganore to celebrate her 16th birthday. A short time later, Mr. Hembree was dead while his daughter and her friends were be rescued by helicopter as they clung to boulders in the spillway. Contrast these incidents to one in March 2017, when the public safety boat barrier installed by Alliant Energy at Kilbourn Dam was credited with preventing the loss of life after a woman fell into the river above the dam. What went wrong in the first 2 instances and what can we learn from the third incident? What steps can dam owners take to prevent accidents like these from happening?
The first two incidents represent preventable loss of life at a dam while the third incident proves how a proactive approach to public safety results in reduced liability for dam owners and lower loss of life. In the Alcan instance, the public safety barrier installed to prevent this very scenario was instead installed in a location that doomed the girl even before she set her kayak in the water. The second instance demonstrates how a dam owners lack of risk awareness coupled with a boat owners carelessness resulted in a fatality.
Using the incidents above, this presentation, modeled after the Canadian Dam Associations Guidelines for Public Safety Around Dams, will educate owners and operators how to identify “dangerous” zones above and below dams. We will consider the effects of surface water velocity of individual survivability and barrier effectiveness. Flow-3D models will be shown to illustrate the effect of barrier alignment and velocity to increase an individual’s ability to “self-rescue”. Lastly, we will integrate within the presentation practical guidelines for the use of signage, sign size, lettering height and message consistency. The presentation will conclude by examining lessons learned in the Alcan incident and presenting how a proper public safety barrier and signage plan would be implemented.
More people have died from accidents around dams than have died from dam failures. The Canadian Dam Association published its guidelines in 2011 and the result has seen a significant reduction in fatalities and injuries as a result of recreating around Canadian Dams. The United States Society on Dams (USSD), the Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) all have embarked on efforts, modeled in large part around the CDA Guidelines to bring Public Safety out of the dam safety toolbox so Public Safety is viewed as a separate managed system. This is being conducted in an effort to educate and alert dam owners, operators and recreational users to hazards and risks in and around dams.
James Stuart, Michael Hughes
Several recent rain events in Australia have resulted in impoundment flood levels where there was a surprising variability between the Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) of the flood level and that of the rainfall. The issue was highlighted during the Queensland Flood Commission of Inquiry (QFCI, 2011) by the Queensland Dam Safety Regulator who suggested there may be a problem with design hydrology after a dam safety event that saw impoundment levels of around 1:9000 AEP with a 1:200 AEP catchment rainfall at North Pine Dam, north of Brisbane in 2011. Wide disparities have occurred at Wivenhoe Dam west of Brisbane, at Callide Dam, west of Gladstone and at other locations.
This paper examines the Generalised Short Duration Method (GSDM) (BoM, 2003) and the Revised Generalised Tropical Storm Method (GTSMR) (BoM, 2003) typically used for dam flood capacity assessments in an attempt to explain the variability outlined above and whether it is, in part, exacerbated by the methods themselves.
It finds that processes of generalising rainfall depth, intensity, temporal and spatial characteristics are working together with adopted hydrological methods to contribute to such variability, that in the worst case could lead to PMF levels in dams with much less rainfall than the associated PMP would infer.
Moreover, two key assumptions; that of AEP neutrality (AEP of rainfall is equal to that of the flood) and frequency of PMP based on catchment area, which are the foundations stones of our understanding of flood frequency for large structures, are found to be untested or simply interim advice. This leads to the conclusion that the likelihood of floods in the range 2000 year AEP to PMF may continue to show surprising variability, potentially of an order of magnitude or more, compared to the rainfall AEP.
There is a need for a review of these methods and potentially provision of interim guidance as these methods are currently being used in dam upgrade programs throughout Australia and are also the basis for emergency planning. The identification of these issues concerns current methods and are independent to any discussion on climate change.Prior to commencing, it is worth defining two terms that re-occur throughout the document:
Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP): The probability that a given rainfall total accumulated over a given duration will be exceeded in any one year. AEP Neutrality is the theory that assumes the probability of the rainfall can be transferred to the resulting flood.
Average Variability Method (AVM): Technique for estimating design temporal pattern of average variability to ensure AEP Neutrality in transition from PMP to PMP design flood
Richard Herweynen, Suraj Neupane, Paul Southcott and Ashish B. Khanal
Kathmandu, the capital city of Nepal, is home to more than five million people. Three major rivers including the Bagmati run through the city of Kathmandu, providing the environmental and cultural lifelines for the civilisation and local people. High population growth in Kathmandu over the past 30years has put a serious environmental strain on the Bagmati River. Water is drawn from the Bagmati River for drinking, farming, industries and construction. Due to the lack of capacity in the current sewerage systems, untreated sewage is entering the river system, along with high quantities of rubbish. Although a holy river, the Bagmati River is highly degraded, with reduced flows, high pollution, and a fresh water ecosystem that is now destroyed.To revive the Bagmati River, the Government of Nepal with funding from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), is undertaking the Bagmati River Basin Improvement Project (BRBIP). One of the sub-projects is the construction of a dam on the Nagmati River to store water during the monsoon period for environmental release during dry season.Since November 2015, Entura have been involved in the investigation and detailed design of the Nagmati Dam. Through a simple storage model, it was determined that 8.2Mm 3 of live storage was required to meet the environmental flow objectives. To achieve this storage a 95m high dam was required at the Nagmati site, with a concrete faced rockfill dam (CFRD) determined to be the best option.This paper will present the development of this unique project, highlighting how a number of the challenges were addressed, leading to a sustainable project.