P C Blersch, W van Wyk , R Steenkamp
Construction of the partially completed Calueque Dam on the Cunene River in Angola was abandoned in 1976 due to the hostilities in Angola. In 1988 the dam was bombed, causing significant damage to the bridge deck, other structures and equipment. Work to complete and rehabilitate the dam commenced in late 2012 and included major earthworks, extensive concrete repairs and refurbishment and installation of mechanical equipment, including ten spillway radial gates and two outlet gates with lifting equipment, emergency gates and cranes, including electrical and control systems. A number of challenges were encountered in planning and executing the project but were overcome largely as a result of detailed historical project information having been retained well beyond the norm and through the involvement of a key member of the original project team in the current project.
Keywords: Dam rehabilitation, radial gates, zoned earthfill embankment
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Sarah McComber, Peyman Bozorgmehr
Boondooma Dam is a concrete-faced rockfill dam with an unlined, uncontrolled spillway chute. Construction was scheduled for completion in 1983; however a spill event occurred during the last stage.of construction Following this spill event an Erosion Control Structure (ECS) was built across the spillway chute to help mitigate any future scouring.
The spillway performed as expected during minor spill events in the 1990s and early 2000s. During the significant rainfall event of 2010/11, significant scour occurred to the spillway chute and downstream of the ECS, as a result of the spillway operation.
Following the 2010/11 flood, emergency repairs were made and long term repair solutions were investigated. However, during Tropical Cyclone Oswald in January 2013, the dam experienced the flood of record, and further scour occurred in the spillway chute.
The long term repair solution was reviewed in light of the 2013 damage. A solution is required that would satisfy the engineering problem and prevent further damage, while satisfying the commercial considerations faced by dam owners, insurers, customers and downstream stakeholders.
Keywords: Boondooma Dam, flood damage, scour damage, commercial engineering solutions.
Mark Arnold, Chris Topham, Phil Cummins
A central tenet of the ANCOLD Guidelines on Dam Safety Management (2003) is that the higher the consequence of failure of a dam, the more stringent the surveillance scope, frequency, and safety criteria that should be applied to that dam. This concept has generally served the industry well to date in assisting regulators and dam owners to focus on the dams that could have the highest impacts if they failed. ANCOLD 2003 does also suggest that risk may be taken into consideration, however it is the experience of the authors that for dam surveillance and monitoring programmes, the majority of owners and consultants are reluctant to stray too far from the tables provided in the Guideline. However, two owners have recently embarked on a formal process to apply a risk based approach to the specification of surveillance and monitoring for their dams. This paper outlines how sub-optimal outcomes that can arise when the guideline tables are applied exclusively, presents the process undertaken by two owners of large portfolios of high consequence dams, and demonstrates the benefits achieved when a risk based approach is used. The paper concludes that any update or rewrite of the 2003 Dam Safety Management Guidelines should promote a risk based, rather than a consequence based approach to surveillance and monitoring.
Keywords: Risk, risk-based surveillance programme, instrumentation, monitoring.
Maree Dalakis, Dr Saman de Silva, Siraj Perera and Dr Gamini Adikari
This paper describes the results of a statistical and qualitative analysis on historical dam safety incidents in Victoria, the first study of its kind conducted in the State. The study investigates trends arising from qualitative dam safety incident data collected by the Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning since the year 1996. The reported incidents are categorised based on their severity and statistical trends are identified in relation to the types of incidents common to regulated and unregulated dams, as well as common responses to incidents, including their post-incident operation. The geographical distribution of incidents across the State is also analysed to determine the effects of seismicity on dam safety incident rates. Furthermore, the unique Victorian conditions of sustained drought and subsequent flooding and their impact on incident rates are investigated through the combined analysis of geographical incident distribution and streamflow data. The incident data is further assessed according to the frequency of visual inspection and reporting of the structures in order to gauge the relative influence of these practices, and dam regulation in general, on mitigating incident risk in dams. An understanding of dam safety incident trends and the impact of inspection and reporting practices is increasingly important given the increasing expectation for dam owners to properly operate and maintain their assets with minimal resources and finances.
Keywords: dam, safety, incident, historical, failure.
Paul Southcott, Tim Griggs & Jamie Campbell
Suma Park Dam is the principal water supply dam for the City of Orange in central NSW. The 30m high single curvature concrete arch dam has a High A consequence category and required an upgrade due to an inadequate spillway capacity. To maximise the benefits of this major capital works, the Council also sought to increase the storage capacity and modernise the outlet works to help supply the rapidly growing population of the city.
Challenges that needed to be overcome to develop an affordable and safe solution included: very high flood inflows; limited freeboard; a highly stressed arch with a narrow crest width; poor access to the toe and right abutment; and a saddle dam located on a deeply weathered foundation.
Innovations incorporated into the design of the works included: Monte-Carlo based modelling of the flood hydrology that better estimated the design inflows resulting in a significant reduction in flood upgrade requirements; precast parapet crest units that incorporated crest widening to improve constructability; an anchored toe block to ensure the toe of the arch is stable; an upgrade to the stilling basin; and an auxiliary spillway incorporating Fusegates at the saddle location designed only to operate in floods in excess of the 1;1,000 AEP event with minimal loss of storage.
Construction of the works is now well underway. A number of challenges have been overcome during the construction stage including a re-design of the auxiliary spillway to use Fusegates and discovery of Naturally Occurring Asbestos (NOA) on site. Construction of the upgrade works is expected to be completed by the end of 2015.
Keywords: Concrete arch dam, flood upgrade, pre-cast, fuse gates, anchoring.
Jiri Herza and John Phillips
The design of dams for mining projects requires processes and technology that are unfamiliar to many mine owners and managers. Dam designers rely on ANCOLD assessments of Consequence Category, commonly leading to a High rating for mining dams due to a combination of potential loss of life, impact on environment and damage to assets such as mine voids, process plants, workshops, offices, roads, railways etc.
From this High Consequence Category the relevant annual exceedance probabilities for design parameters and loading conditions such as earthquakes and floods are selected.
Mining companies have sophisticated methods available for assessing risk, yet for their assets they often adopt an order of magnitude lower security for earthquake and floods even though the consequences in terms of lives at risk and impact on project are similar.
The discrepancies in the design standards lead to situations where extreme dam loads are adopted to prevent damage and loss of life in assets that theoretically would have already collapsed under much lower loads.
One difference may be that some mining dams exist in an environment which is controlled by a single entity. Unlike other dams, failure of these mining dams would therefore impact only individuals and assets which fall under the responsibility of the same entity.
This paper discusses the discrepancies between the design of mining dams and the design of other mine infrastructure. The paper considers the impact of discrepancies on the overall risk to the mine and compares the degree of protection offered by a factor of safety and the influence of reliability of design input parameters, alternate load paths and design redundancy.
Keywords: Dams, tailings dams, mining, acceptable risk, factors of safety