Kim Robinson, Andrew Pattle and Thomas Shurvell
Rowallan Dam is a 43m high clay core rock fill dam located in Northern Tasmania. The dam impounds 121GL used for hydro power generation and has a High A consequence category.
Over the summer of 2014/15 major reconstruction works were carried out on the dam to repair a piping incident from 1968. The work entailed reconstructing two sections of the dam down to foundation level and the upper 7m of the 568m dam crest. During the work, the dam was temporarily exposed to a significantly increased flood overtopping risk.
A range of measures were taken to manage the overtopping risk; such as increasing the dewatering capacity of the dam, lake draw down, installation of a sheetpile wall, development of emergency backfill procedures and a flood forecasting system.
The focus of this paper is on the flood forecasting system and how this was integrated into the overall management of overtopping risk during construction. The forecast models were run automatically on a 2 hour schedule using the latest BoM forecast, telemetered lake levels and rainfall from 7 gauges surrounding the catchment. The system provided a continuous 7 day lake level forecast which guided the site team on when to release water to manage the storage.
In the event that the lake level forecast reached a predetermined trigger level, the dam safety team would have been automatically notified and various emergency procedures would have been triggered in response to the flood warning.
This paper discusses the measures that were taken to manage the flood risk, how it worked in practice and conclusions which are applicable more generally to managing overtopping risk during dam works.
Keywords: dam construction flood risk, flood forecasting
Krey Price, Mike Harvey, Bob Mussetter, Stuart Trabant
The California Department of Water Resources, Division of Dam Safety (DWR-DSD), has determined that San Clemente Dam on the Carmel River in Monterey County, California, does not meet seismic safety standards. Several alternatives have been considered to decommission the dam and eliminate the hazard, including thickening of the 25-m-high, concrete arch structure, lowering the dam, and complete removal. At the present time, the upstream reservoir that had an original storage capacity of about 1.8 GL, is essentially filled with sediment. The 29-km reach of the Carmel River between the dam and the Pacific Ocean passes through urbanised areas within the upscale Carmel Valley; flooding and channel stability in these areas are significant concerns. The Carmel River also contains habitat for the endangered steelhead and red-legged frog that could be positively or negatively affected by the decommissioning.
After an extensive series of hydraulic and sediment transport modelling studies, two actions remain under consideration: (1) dam thickening, which will require reconstruction of the existing fish ladder and construction of an adjacent, 3-metre diameter sluice gate to prevent sediment build-up from blocking the ladder outlet, and (2) removal of the dam and rerouting the river into a tributary branch of the reservoir, which would isolate approximately 65 percent of the existing sediment deposits from future river flows and eliminate a significant fish-passage problem. Both options were modelled extensively in hydrologic, hydraulic, and sediment transport applications. Since available models do not adequately represent sediment dynamics at the sluice gate, a special sediment routing model was formulated to evaluate this aspect of Option 1. Option 2 is currently preferred by the resource agencies, since it would optimise endangered species habitat; however, this option would be three to four times more expensive than Option 1, and funding limitations may impact the alternative selection. Evaluation efforts are ongoing, along with approaches to address liability issues associated with the decommissioning actions for the privately owned facility, while optimising the benefits and costs of the selected action.
Modelling Studies to Design and Assess Decommissioning Actions for a Seismically Unsafe, Concrete Arch Dam
Rob Campbell, Tom Kolbe, Ron Fleming, Christopher Dann
Hinze Dam is an Extreme hazard category water supply dam situated in the Queensland Gold Coast hinterland, owned and operated by Seqwater (formerly owned by Gold Coast City Council). The Hinze Dam Stage 3 works involved raising the previously 65m high central core earth and rockfill embankment approximately 15m to a maximum height of approximately 80m.
The Stage 3 works included a program of foundation curtain grouting, consisting of six discrete grout panels, five of those beneath areas where the embankment was extended and one beneath part of the spillway enhancement works. Five of the six grout panels were essentially single row panels, with one or more partial rows added in specific areas of high grout take. The remaining grout panel (Panel 4) was constructed as a triple row panel.
A number of challenges were encountered and overcome during the Stage 3 foundation grouting works due to highly variable foundation conditions, ranging from extremely low strength residual soil to highly fractured and permeable high strength rock.
The grouting works were undertaken using downstage grouting techniques, with manual recording of data, manual control of grout pressures and injection rates and use of predominantly neat cement grout mixes.
A key issue in the execution of the foundation grouting works was the maximum grout pressures applied to the foundation and this was discussed in detail between the project design team and external review panel. This paper presents the results from project specific grout trials and production grouting to demonstrate that closure of the foundation was consistently achieved (with one exception discussed herein), which supports the grouting approach employed and the adopted grout pressures.
This paper presents a case study description of the Stage 3 foundation curtain grouting works, including a summary of key learnings which may be of benefit to future dam foundation curtain grouting projects.
Kirsty Carroll, Kelly Maslin, Richard Rodd
Melbourne Water manages over 210 retarding basins across Greater Melbourne ranging in size from 4ML to 4700 ML with embankment heights from 0.3m to 10m. Over the years the basins have been designed and constructed by a range of different owners and authorities. Varying design and construction standards with the majority of retarding basins generally being located in highly urbanised areas, has resulted in Melbourne Water having a large portfolio of assets that have potential to pose a significant risk to the downstream communities they are designed to protect.
High level hazard category assessments completed over the last10 years identified that approximately 90 structures were either High or Extreme hazard categories based on the ANCOLD Guidelines on Assessment of the Consequences of Dam Failure.
In an attempt to identify retarding basins requiring priority consideration for remedial works Melbourne Water embarked on a process of completing a dam safety risk assessment for five of the retarding basins in accordance with the ANCOLD Guidelines on Risk Assessment. The objective of the risk assessment was to develop an understanding of the key risk issues that might affect retarding basins as distinct from water supply storages, identify potential remedial works and develop a prioritised risk management strategy for the five basins considered. In completing the risk assessment there was also significant discussion about ways to streamline the process to allow assessment of the remaining basins.
This paper details the results obtained from the risk assessment, investigates the application of the base safety condition and implementation of a risk management strategy. It also looks at similarities between sites to enable common upgrades to be implemented across the range of retarding basins. This paper also discusses the need for guidelines specific to retarding basins to be developed.
How do you solve a problem like retarding basins? An asset owner’s perspective
Robert Keogh RPEQ, CE Civil (Hon), Mal Halwala, Peter Boettcher, Renee Butterfield
SunWater is a Government Owned Corporation (GOC), operating in a competitive market on an equal commercial footing with the private sector. SunWater owns 23 referable dams. Over the last fifty years there has been significant development of the methodologies used to estimate extreme rainfall events. These have resulted in substantial increases in probable maximum flood (PMF) estimates for most of SunWater’s dams.
SunWater has undertaken a Comprehensive Risk Assessment program across its portfolio. SunWater now has a good understanding of the deficiencies and available risk reduction options for each dam under all load conditions. The total cost to rectify all deficiencies is several hundred million dollars and well beyond the financial capacity of the organisation in the short term.
ANCOLD and Regulators have different published opinions on decision making criteria for dam safety upgrades. Once the conditions for the tolerability of Societal and Individual Risk are satisfied the onus remains with the dam owner to meet the ALARP principle. The decision making process is complicated by uncertainties in inputs to risk assessments. The authors have considered these uncertainties as well as the legal implications, differing ANCOLD and Regulator requirements, and business and economic loss, in formulating the decision making process. The methodology is simplified but effective. If the process is followed the dam owner’s investments will meet ANCOLD, Regulatory, legal and business requirements.
This Paper details a logical decision making process designed to allow a non technical Board to balance social, legal and financial objectives. The process considers overall risk, tolerability, the ALARP principle, and project prioritisation. The process is being used by SunWater to determine the Acceptable Flood Capacity of each dam, which dams will be upgraded, priorities and scheduling of each upgrade.
How SunWater, as a commercial dam owner makes investment decisions for dam safety upgrades