Susantha Mediwaka, Nihal Vitharana, Badra Kamaladasa
Nalanda dam is the oldest concrete gravity dam on the Island built in the 1950s by the Ceylon Department of Irrigation. The dam was built in 9 monoliths having a dam crest length of approximately 125m and a maximum height of about 36m. The spillway consists of: (1) a low-level uncontrolled ogee-crested horse-shoe section with a crest length of 46m, and (b) a high-level broad crested weir with a crest length of 43m.
It was designed and constructed according to the then standard practices adopted throughout the world. Over the years, Nalanda dam has been showing signs of deterioration which is suspected to be Alkali-Aggregate Reaction (AAR). The dam was also shown to be deficient with respect to the stability levels required by modern standards. Under a program of dam safety improvement of the dams throughout Sri Lanka, it was decided to stabilise Nalanda dam as the first step in addressing a series of issues affecting the dam.
This paper presents the construction history, current issues, design assumptions and salient construction features in the upgrading of the dam to modern dam safety requirements.
Keywords: Concrete dams, dams Sri Lanka, concrete buttressing, upgrade, horse-shoe spillway
Robert Kingsland, Michelle Black, Andrew Russell
Managing the vibration impacts associated with blasting is a challenge for mine planners and operators. In an open cut mining environment production blasting is often an integral part of operations. The management of surface water is a key operational requirement for open cut pits and mine water dams are often a part of the water management infrastructure. Consequently, mine water dams are often subject to blasting impacts.
For the mine operator the foremost questions are, “how close can mine blasting progress towards the dam?” and “what is the maximum vibration that the structure can be safely subjected to?” For the dam safety regulator the key concerns are around potential modes of failure, consequence of failure, the likelihood of failure and the management of risk.
With reference to case studies, this paper will discuss the acceptable blasting limits for earth dams, impacts on various dam elements and failure mode analysis. Failures modes discussed include embankment cracking, slope failure and deformation, foundation cracking and outlet structure cracking. Risk mitigation measures will be presented including design, operation and monitoring controls.
Keywords: blasting impacts, embankment dams, coal mine.
Jiri Herza and John Phillips
The design of dams for mining projects requires processes and technology that are unfamiliar to many mine owners and managers. Dam designers rely on ANCOLD assessments of Consequence Category, commonly leading to a High rating for mining dams due to a combination of potential loss of life, impact on environment and damage to assets such as mine voids, process plants, workshops, offices, roads, railways etc.
From this High Consequence Category the relevant annual exceedance probabilities for design parameters and loading conditions such as earthquakes and floods are selected.
Mining companies have sophisticated methods available for assessing risk, yet for their assets they often adopt an order of magnitude lower security for earthquake and floods even though the consequences in terms of lives at risk and impact on project are similar.
The discrepancies in the design standards lead to situations where extreme dam loads are adopted to prevent damage and loss of life in assets that theoretically would have already collapsed under much lower loads.
One difference may be that some mining dams exist in an environment which is controlled by a single entity. Unlike other dams, failure of these mining dams would therefore impact only individuals and assets which fall under the responsibility of the same entity.
This paper discusses the discrepancies between the design of mining dams and the design of other mine infrastructure. The paper considers the impact of discrepancies on the overall risk to the mine and compares the degree of protection offered by a factor of safety and the influence of reliability of design input parameters, alternate load paths and design redundancy.
Keywords: Dams, tailings dams, mining, acceptable risk, factors of safety
Russell Cuerel, Richard Priman, Michel Raymond, Ian Hanks
Following significant flood events across Queensland over the last five years causing significant damage in South East Queensland, Bundaberg Burnett region, St. George in the south west and more recently in Central Queensland in the Callide Valley, there has been renewed interest in finding solutions to flooding issues.
Increasing the available flood storage within a catchment is a well-known method of improving flood mitigation outcomes for developed areas. In many basins/catchments, potential flood storage development options (new storages or augmentations to existing storages) can be identified by reviewing previous water supply investigations and flood studies and by scanning topographic mapping. From such site identification there will often be numerous combinations of possible flood storage development options to consider because of the number of tributaries which may contribute to major flood events.
This paper outlines a methodology to screen, within a relatively short timeframe and at relatively low cost, a large number of identified flood storage development options and combination development scenarios and shortlist for more detailed analysis. The screening process is heavily reliant on hydrologic assessments to rapidly short-list scenarios for assessment and then relies on traditional engineering and economic assessments to do the fine tuning of the analysis.
Keywords: flooding, damages, impacts, flood storage, flood mitigation, dams, benefit-cost ratio.
P C Blersch, W van Wyk , R Steenkamp
Construction of the partially completed Calueque Dam on the Cunene River in Angola was abandoned in 1976 due to the hostilities in Angola. In 1988 the dam was bombed, causing significant damage to the bridge deck, other structures and equipment. Work to complete and rehabilitate the dam commenced in late 2012 and included major earthworks, extensive concrete repairs and refurbishment and installation of mechanical equipment, including ten spillway radial gates and two outlet gates with lifting equipment, emergency gates and cranes, including electrical and control systems. A number of challenges were encountered in planning and executing the project but were overcome largely as a result of detailed historical project information having been retained well beyond the norm and through the involvement of a key member of the original project team in the current project.
Keywords: Dam rehabilitation, radial gates, zoned earthfill embankment
R. Nathan, P. Jordan, M. Scorah, S. Lang, G. Kuczera, M. Schaefer, E. Weinmann
This paper describes the development and application of two largely independent methods to estimate the annual exceedance probability (AEP) of Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP). One method is based on the Stochastic Storm Transposition (SST) approach, which combines the “arrival” and “transposition” probabilities of an extreme storm using the total probability theorem. The second method – termed “Stochastic Storm Regression”(SSR) – combines frequency curves of point rainfalls with regression estimates of areal rainfalls; the regression relationship is derived using local and transposed storms, and the final exceedance probabilities are derived using the total probability theorem. The methods are used to derive at-site estimates for two large catchments (with areas of 3550 km2 and 15280 km2) located in inland southern Australia. In addition, the SST approach is used to derive regional estimates for standardised catchments within the Inland GSAM region. Careful attention is given to the uncertainty and sensitivity of the estimates to underlying assumptions, and the results are compared to existing AR&R recommendations.
Keywords: Annual exceedance probability, Probable Maximum Precipitation.