Phillip Jordan, Alan Seed, Rory Nathan, Peter Hill, Eva Kordomenidi, Clive Pierce, Michael Leonard
This paper discusses the stochastic framework that was used to generate the 5449 sets of inflow hydrographs, to develop and stress test a dam operations model. The stochastic simulations were driven by 600 different space-time patterns of rainfall generated using a stochastic space-time multiplicative cascade model. Eight significant storms were identified in the radar archive to identify parameter sets for the stochastic generation algorithm and 600 replicates of space-time rainfall were generated. The statistical properties of spatial patterns of 48-hour rainfall bursts on eight major subcatchments of the Brisbane River catchment from the 600 stochastic replicates were verified against the same statistics derived from 38 major flood causing rainfall events observed in the catchment. The hydrographs were generated using an URBS rainfall runoff routing model of the Brisbane River catchment, which was calibrated to 38 historical flood events (between 1955 and 2013) and tested on a further 10 historical flood events (between 1887 and 1947).
The stochastically simulated sets of inflow hydrographs were then used to assess the impact of variations in flood operation rules for Wivenhoe and Somerset dams. The stochastically generated events exhibit substantial variability in runoff hydrographs but with variability that is statistically consistent with observed events. The stochastically generated hydrographs provide a considerably more realistic basis for testing the outcomes for different flood operations strategies than the single design event approaches that have previously been adopted.
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Przemyslaw A. Zielinski
Three aspects of the current engineering practice in using event trees in dam safety risk analyses are discussed in the paper. These aspects include assignment of probabilities for initiating events, treat-ment of dependencies in the event tree, and dynamic aspects of dam system behaviour and accounting for time. The paper discusses limitations of the methodology and common mistakes in engineering applications of event tree methods when assessing dam safety risks and making safety decisions for specific dams. Of particular importance is the discussion of incorrect interpretation of dependency structure when addressing common cause failure modes.
Janice Green, Cathy Beesley, Cynthia The, Catherine Jolly
Design rainfall estimates are essential inputs to the design of infrastructure such as gutters, roofs, culverts, stormwater drains, flood mitigation levees and retarding basins. They are also integral to large dam spillway adequacy assessments undertaken to determine the flood magnitude that existing dams can safely withstand.
The previous design rainfall estimates for probabilities from the 1 year Average Recurrence Interval (ARI) to the 100 year ARI were derived by the Bureau of Meteorology (the Bureau) in the early 1980s using a database comprising primarily of Bureau raingauges and techniques for statistical data analysis that were considered appropriate at the time. More recently, estimates of rare design rainfall estimates for probabilities from 100 year ARI to 2000 year ARI have been derived for each state, with the exception of the Northern Territory, using the CRC-FORGE method.
As part of the revision of the 1987 edition of Australian Rainfall and Runoff: A Guide to Flood Estimation being undertaken by Engineers Australia, the Bureau conducted a five year project to revise the design rainfall estimates for probabilities from 1 year ARI to 100 year ARI. The new design rainfall estimates are based on a greatly expanded database which incorporates data collected by organisations across Australia. These data have been analysed using contemporary statistical methods that are appropriate for Australian rainfall data. These new Intensity-Duration-Frequency (IFD) design rainfalls were released in July 2013.
Over the next 18 months, the Bureau will be deriving design rainfall estimates for probabilities more frequent than 1 year ARI and revising the existing estimates of the CRC-FORGE rare design rainfalls. The estimates for more frequent design rainfalls will replace the current ad hoc estimates that have been derived by organisations in the absence of other estimates. The revised rare design rainfall estimates will replace the current estimates that were derived on a state by state basis and which, for most states, are now in need of revision as a result of the release of the new IFDs.
Dennis C. Green
Current good practice for risk management as represented in ANCOLD guidelines emphasises risk reduction beyond tolerable risk levels to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Risk reduction reflected in key design parameters such as the spillway design flood is monitored on a quantitative basis, while the guidelines also draw attention to a number of non-quantifiable measures.
Recent work health and safety legislation in Australia does not at first appear to relate to dam safety, but it mandates elimination of risk, and, if that is not possible, then it mandates reduction of risk So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFAIRP). It is tempting to believe that this is equivalent to ANCOLD’s approach to ALARP, but the devil is in the detail of the legislation. This paper argues for a change to a more systematic presentation of recording of decisions on dam safety risk management, lest the legislation expose dam owners unwittingly to liability when they thought they were following good practice. In particular, the re-focussing of ANCOLD Guidelines to align more recognisably with the new legal paradigm, including preparation and adoption of a Safety Case, is recommended.
Gavan Hunter, David Jeffery and Chris Kelly
Laanecoorie Reservoir, located in central Victoria, passed 3 significant floods in late 2010 to early 2011; the last flood being the highest on record since 1909. Significant cracking and deformation of this 100 year old puddle core earthfill embankment occurred. A series of longitudinal cracks up to 25 mm in width opened up in the crest over a length of 70 m and crest settlements were up to 70 mm; very large for a dam of this age. A significant difference at Laanecoorie compared to other similar dams is that it experiences high tail water levels during major flooding.
Investigations into the embankment following the January 2011 flood encountered several defects
including a decomposed tree root hole (large void up to 90 mm) that almost fully penetrated the raised section of puddle core, permeable gravel layers within the puddle core and transverse cracks up to 2 mm wide. The encountered defects and performance of the embankment many years after construction highlighted the deterioration that can occur with aging of these older embankments and the issues associated with poor past practices in tree management adjacent to dam embankments.
Dam safety upgrade works were undertaken in 2013 to address the identified piping and stability risks.
The works included construction of a filter buttress, replacement of a length of the raised puddle core and construction of a buried gabion wall on the left abutment to provide protection against scour should the secondary spillway fail or overtop.
GMW implemented a series of actions during the flood events in accordance with the Dam Safety
Emergency Plan (DSEP) to address cracking and deformation. Once aware of the dam safety risks, interim actions were implemented including increased frequency of monitoring, together with set up and measurement of crack pins, and temporary survey markers on the embankment.
William Ziegler and Heather Middleton
This paper presents the collation of over 20 years of data on vertical and horizontal movements around Cataract Dam in the Southern Coalfield of New South Wales, reporting subsidence that continues 25 years after extraction in the area ceased. The occurrence of increased vertical movement over old goaf areas as the result of extraction in the same seam at greater than 1km distance has been observed. Together with a change in the behaviour of measured head of water 6 years after extraction ceased in the area. These points raise the question, how long should subsidence monitoring continue after extraction has ceased in areas of important infrastructure?