Francisco Lopez and Michael McKay
At 36 m high and completed in 1902, Barossa Dam is one of the first true concrete arch dams in the world. During the 1954 Darlington Earthquake the dam sustained some damage, in the form of several vertical cracks on both dam’s abutments. In 2013, GHD conducted a nonlinear time-history seismic assessment of Barossa Dam. The analyses, carried out using finite element techniques, included ground motion loading corresponding to Maximum Design Earthquakes (MDEs) with 1 in 10,000 Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP).
This paper will explain the purpose of the study, the material investigation phase, the methodology, model results, the anticipated seismic behaviour of the dam wall, as well as the predicted level of damage under the MDEs. The paper examines the dam construction practices of the beginning of the 20th century, and how such practices affected the material properties and the structural performance of Barossa Dam.
A C Mostert, D J Hagen, P C Blersch
The changes in flood operations since the 2006 flood, covering weather monitoring, hydrological flood station monitoring, and downstream monitoring, are discussed in detail in the paper.
Dr Andy Hughes , Tom Wanner , Ben Jones
This paper will present the ideas formulated to safely pass the design floods for ten dams within this sensitive environment, which include the installation of new spillways and/or the raising of dam crests, whilst taking in to account the site constraints and the age of the dams, some of which are up to 300 years old. The risk assessment carried out to quantify the overall risk of the dam failures will also be discussed including the breach inundation flood modelling of central London.
The paper will focus on the engineering and environmental constraints of the project in relation to the highly urbanised area, and the challenges faced when trying to accommodate the needs of many government and high profile stakeholder bodies, and pieces of legislation, in one of the most politically sensitive parts of the country.
Leonard Wiliem, Rob Keogh, and David Thomas
Progressive rope creep on the steel ropes which hold 14 counterweights in tension on the seven spillway gates was monitored regularly. The 2011 annual inspection identified that the creep had taken the lower guide wheels of the suspended counterweights beyond the extent of the wheel guides.
A programed project to extend the guides was delayed due to Workplace Health and Safety concerns on confined access and working under a suspended load. A study was commissioned to deliver a safe method of extending the guides. Because regular testing and two flood events had proved the gates were functioning well, the risk of failure in gate operation during flood event was considered low and a lower priority was assigned to rectification work.
Callide Dam is a SunWater owned dam located in Central Queensland. It has a similar spillway gate mechanism as Coolmunda Dam. The only difference is that Callide Dam gates work in pairs with one counterweight attached to each gate.
In January 2013 due to heavy rainfall caused by the ex-cyclone Oswald, Callide Dam experienced a flood event which triggered a gate operation. During the draining phase, the gates operated abnormally sustaining damage to the structure and to the automatic gate opening mechanism. SunWater undertook investigations to identify the cause of the abnormal operation and found that the primary cause of the gate abnormal operation was due to jamming of the suspended counterweight on the end of the guides. This was due to cable stretched over 26 years of service to the extent that the lower wheel assembly was beyond the guide rails at the time of the flood event.
The event at Callide Dam was a wake up call for SunWater to re-evaluate the risk assessment for Coolmunda Dam. This re-evaluation recommended to assign the highest priority on the rectification of the wire rope creep issue on the radial gate as the risk of failure in gate operation during flood event was high.
This paper discusses the actions in re-evaluating the risks at SunWater’s Coolmunda Dam and the measures taken to quickly undertake remedial action on both dams and the challenges involved with each.
Wark, Bob; Thomas, Louise
This paper discusses the rating curves developed for several case studies from the Pilbara and Kimberley, including the Harding Dam, Moochalabra Dam and Ophthalmia Dam. The paper will discuss the impact of underestimated rating curves on the design of infrastructure. An example has occurred at Harding Dam where the pump station was designed to be inundated at a 1:100 AEP and this is now estimated to occur at a lower AEP. The paper will also discuss methods to improve the accuracy of rating curves and the challenges associated with determining accurate rating curves.
Gavan Hunter, David Jeffery and Chris Kelly
Laanecoorie Reservoir, located in central Victoria, passed 3 significant floods in late 2010 to early 2011; the last flood being the highest on record since 1909. Significant cracking and deformation of this 100 year old puddle core earthfill embankment occurred. A series of longitudinal cracks up to 25 mm in width opened up in the crest over a length of 70 m and crest settlements were up to 70 mm; very large for a dam of this age. A significant difference at Laanecoorie compared to other similar dams is that it experiences high tail water levels during major flooding.
Investigations into the embankment following the January 2011 flood encountered several defects
including a decomposed tree root hole (large void up to 90 mm) that almost fully penetrated the raised section of puddle core, permeable gravel layers within the puddle core and transverse cracks up to 2 mm wide. The encountered defects and performance of the embankment many years after construction highlighted the deterioration that can occur with aging of these older embankments and the issues associated with poor past practices in tree management adjacent to dam embankments.
Dam safety upgrade works were undertaken in 2013 to address the identified piping and stability risks.
The works included construction of a filter buttress, replacement of a length of the raised puddle core and construction of a buried gabion wall on the left abutment to provide protection against scour should the secondary spillway fail or overtop.
GMW implemented a series of actions during the flood events in accordance with the Dam Safety
Emergency Plan (DSEP) to address cracking and deformation. Once aware of the dam safety risks, interim actions were implemented including increased frequency of monitoring, together with set up and measurement of crack pins, and temporary survey markers on the embankment.