Shane McGrath, Phillip Cummins, and David Stewart
Dam owners and regulators now commonly use risk assessment techniques to assist with decision making for an individual dam or a portfolio of dams. In many cases risk assessment is used to select an optimal course of action in relation to ongoing safety performance of dams, including the achievement of public safety objectives. However, whilst it is an important tool, the use of risk assessment alone is not sufficient to establish that a dam is “safe”.
In modern organisations, business objectives are achieved through a systematic approach to management which described simply sets out what needs to be achieved, how the required outcomes will be delivered and audits the process and results.
In hazardous industries such as mining, chemical, nuclear and dams, it is necessary to reliably achieve business objectives such as product volumes, unit costs and workplace health and safety alongside public safety objectives. In the dams industry, dam safety management systems are now being implemented to document how the organisation satisfies its corporate and business objectives, governance responsibilities and risk management processes.
It is also common in hazardous industries that a “safety case” is required by regulators to demonstrate that the owner has identified what could go wrong at its facility, what controls are in place and that there is a system in place to ensure that the controls are reliable. Whilst dam owners may rely on a dam safety risk assessment to meet regulatory obligations and demonstrate due diligence, the results of risk assessments are not routinely documented sufficiently to satisfy a “safety case” and therefore will not fully meet the organisation’s requirements.
Many dam owners are also responsible for the safety management of other hazardous facilities, such as urban water and mining corporations which typically manage hazardous chemical installations and hazardous or toxic waste disposal. For such organisations, the corporate awareness and processes should already exist to extend the “safety case” philosophy to the management of their dams.
This paper sets out the importance of a dam “safety case”, the essential elements of a safety case and its relationship to the dam safety management system.
Now showing 1-12 of 39 2978:
Wark, Bob; Thomas, Louise
This paper discusses the rating curves developed for several case studies from the Pilbara and Kimberley, including the Harding Dam, Moochalabra Dam and Ophthalmia Dam. The paper will discuss the impact of underestimated rating curves on the design of infrastructure. An example has occurred at Harding Dam where the pump station was designed to be inundated at a 1:100 AEP and this is now estimated to occur at a lower AEP. The paper will also discuss methods to improve the accuracy of rating curves and the challenges associated with determining accurate rating curves.
Gavan Hunter, David Jeffery and Chris Kelly
Laanecoorie Reservoir, located in central Victoria, passed 3 significant floods in late 2010 to early 2011; the last flood being the highest on record since 1909. Significant cracking and deformation of this 100 year old puddle core earthfill embankment occurred. A series of longitudinal cracks up to 25 mm in width opened up in the crest over a length of 70 m and crest settlements were up to 70 mm; very large for a dam of this age. A significant difference at Laanecoorie compared to other similar dams is that it experiences high tail water levels during major flooding.
Investigations into the embankment following the January 2011 flood encountered several defects
including a decomposed tree root hole (large void up to 90 mm) that almost fully penetrated the raised section of puddle core, permeable gravel layers within the puddle core and transverse cracks up to 2 mm wide. The encountered defects and performance of the embankment many years after construction highlighted the deterioration that can occur with aging of these older embankments and the issues associated with poor past practices in tree management adjacent to dam embankments.
Dam safety upgrade works were undertaken in 2013 to address the identified piping and stability risks.
The works included construction of a filter buttress, replacement of a length of the raised puddle core and construction of a buried gabion wall on the left abutment to provide protection against scour should the secondary spillway fail or overtop.
GMW implemented a series of actions during the flood events in accordance with the Dam Safety
Emergency Plan (DSEP) to address cracking and deformation. Once aware of the dam safety risks, interim actions were implemented including increased frequency of monitoring, together with set up and measurement of crack pins, and temporary survey markers on the embankment.
Andrew Richardson, Stephen Farrelly and Phil Farnik
In 2012 an update to the Portfolio Risk Analysis (PRA) was undertaken by State Water Corporation for its 18 major dams in New South Wales. The updated portfolio level risk analysis of all the dams has taken account of the completion of major components of the 2006 dam safety upgrade program, while also incorporating continued engineering research into dam safety performance. This paper will provide an overview of the approach, the challenges faced in the process and it will highlight the innovative advances made representing industry best practice. Some future implications and directions will also be discussed.
The three main components of the PRA update in 2012 have included a significant amount of dam break hydraulic modelling including revised hydrology and flood inundation mapping delivered in-house by State Water with consultant support. The Consequence Assessment was developed with a spatial link to natural flooding and dam failure consequences by Sinclair Knight Mertz (SKM), while the third element in producing the event trees, risk analysis and PRA reports was undertaken by consultants GHD. Peer review of the PRA process and reports and additional technical review of the failure modes and event trees by a panel of industry experts provided the necessary independent input and oversight required by the NSW Dams Safety Committee.
State Water’s PRA update builds on the large body of work undertaken for and since the last PRA in 2002. The update process has applied a systematic and quantitative approach across the Portfolio that provides a robust basis for managing dam safety risk. The results of the PRA have identified further work required to investigate and assess the need for dam safety upgrade options for non-compliant dams. State Water’s investment in the PRA has produced a risk-based position on each dam in the portfolio that can be used to identify a range of measures in a revised dam safety upgrade program for the future.
This paper presents the methods used to apply a Flood Operation Simulation Model, and the methods used to present results of thousands of flood simulations in a way that different operational options could be compared. The approach was found to be valuable to understand the capacity of the dams to mitigate floods. The study identified shortcomings for the conventional design event approach to flood estimation. A broader range of stochastic floods was an advantage to assess flood mitigation performance and extreme floods of interest to dam safety.
Janice Green, Cathy Beesley, Cynthia The, Catherine Jolly
Design rainfall estimates are essential inputs to the design of infrastructure such as gutters, roofs, culverts, stormwater drains, flood mitigation levees and retarding basins. They are also integral to large dam spillway adequacy assessments undertaken to determine the flood magnitude that existing dams can safely withstand.
The previous design rainfall estimates for probabilities from the 1 year Average Recurrence Interval (ARI) to the 100 year ARI were derived by the Bureau of Meteorology (the Bureau) in the early 1980s using a database comprising primarily of Bureau raingauges and techniques for statistical data analysis that were considered appropriate at the time. More recently, estimates of rare design rainfall estimates for probabilities from 100 year ARI to 2000 year ARI have been derived for each state, with the exception of the Northern Territory, using the CRC-FORGE method.
As part of the revision of the 1987 edition of Australian Rainfall and Runoff: A Guide to Flood Estimation being undertaken by Engineers Australia, the Bureau conducted a five year project to revise the design rainfall estimates for probabilities from 1 year ARI to 100 year ARI. The new design rainfall estimates are based on a greatly expanded database which incorporates data collected by organisations across Australia. These data have been analysed using contemporary statistical methods that are appropriate for Australian rainfall data. These new Intensity-Duration-Frequency (IFD) design rainfalls were released in July 2013.
Over the next 18 months, the Bureau will be deriving design rainfall estimates for probabilities more frequent than 1 year ARI and revising the existing estimates of the CRC-FORGE rare design rainfalls. The estimates for more frequent design rainfalls will replace the current ad hoc estimates that have been derived by organisations in the absence of other estimates. The revised rare design rainfall estimates will replace the current estimates that were derived on a state by state basis and which, for most states, are now in need of revision as a result of the release of the new IFDs.