Dennis C. Green
Current good practice for risk management as represented in ANCOLD guidelines emphasises risk reduction beyond tolerable risk levels to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Risk reduction reflected in key design parameters such as the spillway design flood is monitored on a quantitative basis, while the guidelines also draw attention to a number of non-quantifiable measures.
Recent work health and safety legislation in Australia does not at first appear to relate to dam safety, but it mandates elimination of risk, and, if that is not possible, then it mandates reduction of risk So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFAIRP). It is tempting to believe that this is equivalent to ANCOLD’s approach to ALARP, but the devil is in the detail of the legislation. This paper argues for a change to a more systematic presentation of recording of decisions on dam safety risk management, lest the legislation expose dam owners unwittingly to liability when they thought they were following good practice. In particular, the re-focussing of ANCOLD Guidelines to align more recognisably with the new legal paradigm, including preparation and adoption of a Safety Case, is recommended.
Gavan Hunter, David Jeffery and Chris Kelly
Laanecoorie Reservoir, located in central Victoria, passed 3 significant floods in late 2010 to early 2011; the last flood being the highest on record since 1909. Significant cracking and deformation of this 100 year old puddle core earthfill embankment occurred. A series of longitudinal cracks up to 25 mm in width opened up in the crest over a length of 70 m and crest settlements were up to 70 mm; very large for a dam of this age. A significant difference at Laanecoorie compared to other similar dams is that it experiences high tail water levels during major flooding.
Investigations into the embankment following the January 2011 flood encountered several defects
including a decomposed tree root hole (large void up to 90 mm) that almost fully penetrated the raised section of puddle core, permeable gravel layers within the puddle core and transverse cracks up to 2 mm wide. The encountered defects and performance of the embankment many years after construction highlighted the deterioration that can occur with aging of these older embankments and the issues associated with poor past practices in tree management adjacent to dam embankments.
Dam safety upgrade works were undertaken in 2013 to address the identified piping and stability risks.
The works included construction of a filter buttress, replacement of a length of the raised puddle core and construction of a buried gabion wall on the left abutment to provide protection against scour should the secondary spillway fail or overtop.
GMW implemented a series of actions during the flood events in accordance with the Dam Safety
Emergency Plan (DSEP) to address cracking and deformation. Once aware of the dam safety risks, interim actions were implemented including increased frequency of monitoring, together with set up and measurement of crack pins, and temporary survey markers on the embankment.
Peter Allen and Kevin Bartlett
One of the recommendations of the Queensland Flood Commission of Inquiry was for the introduction of a legislative requirement for all referable dams in Queensland to have Emergency Action Plans (EAPs) formally approved by the Dam Safety Regulator. Prior to this EAPs were required under the dam safety conditions applied to each referable dam and they were not formally approved. This recommendation has now been implemented as a requirement of the Water Supply (Safety and Reliability) Act 2008. This paper summarizes the emergency action planning system now applicable to Queensland’s referable dams and details the actions involved in implementing this system. It involves significant consultation between dam owners and local disaster managers and gives local disaster managers an opportunity to formally comment on EAPs prior to them being submitted for approval. Development of associated regulatory guidelines to cover all aspects of EAPs was done in order to make EAPs more consistent and more readily understood by users and other stakeholders in emergency situations. Once the guidelines had been developed, the Regulator undertook a state-wide series of seminars to raise the level of awareness of local disaster management groups and dam owners of the new requirements. The legislation also requires the publication of the approved EAPs on the department’s website to raise the public’s awareness of the risks involved and improve their responses in advance of emergency events. This represents a challenge from a public relations perspective because people will become more aware of the risks to which they are exposed. The paper summarises the Regulator’s experience in reviewing and considering the EAPs submitted for approval and it indicates some of the benefits and challenges of the ongoing program.
Wark, Bob; Thomas, Louise
This paper discusses the rating curves developed for several case studies from the Pilbara and Kimberley, including the Harding Dam, Moochalabra Dam and Ophthalmia Dam. The paper will discuss the impact of underestimated rating curves on the design of infrastructure. An example has occurred at Harding Dam where the pump station was designed to be inundated at a 1:100 AEP and this is now estimated to occur at a lower AEP. The paper will also discuss methods to improve the accuracy of rating curves and the challenges associated with determining accurate rating curves.
Peter F Foster and Peter K Silvester
Clyde Dam, the largest concrete gravity dam in New Zealand, was constructed in the 1980’s on the Clutha River in New Zealand. Lake Dunstan, which is the reservoir formed by the dam, reached its full operating level in 1993, some 21 years ago.
This paper summarises the performance of the dam over this period, the changes in operations that have been undertaken and looks to future challenges. The performance and management of the landslides around Lake Dunstan that were remediated prior to lake filling is outlined. The large floods experienced in the Clutha River in the 1990’s highlighted aspects of the flood management procedures that needed amending to capture lessons learned and some modifications to appurtenant structures have been completed. Changes to the environmental management in moving from water rights to consent conditions under the Resource Management Act are addressed.
Over the last 21 years a sediment delta has progressed down Lake Dunstan, as expected, and a long term sediment management plan has been developed for both Lake Dunstan and Lake Roxburgh which is downstream of Clyde Dam. A summary of the plan is discussed. The seismic hazard at the dam site is currently under study to update the seismic assessment parameters for the dam.
This paper outlines lessons learned from 8 years of regular operations and testing of 111 gates at 22 sites. It points out that the implementation challenges involved are not only technological in nature, but also encompass human factor and organizational issues. This is perhaps understandable since the initiative is part of the cultural shift to sustain gate reliability long-term.
An increase in gate testing frequency has led to the identification of more performance anomalies, ranging from deficiencies to operational failures. This finding may not be unique to a single dam owner. It leads to the following question to the general dam owner community: Are we testing our gates enough?