David Stephens, Peter Hill, Rory Nathan
The estimation of incremental consequences of dam failure often requires consideration of coincident flows in downstream tributaries. In the past overly simplistic assumptions have often been adopted. Examples include an assumption that flows in downstream tributaries are negligible, equivalent to the 1 in 100 Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) flood, the mean annual flood or the flood of record. Experience has shown that these assumptions often underestimate coincident flows, particularly for extreme events approaching the AEP of the Probable Maximum Precipitation. Additionally, the justification for adopting these techniques is usually driven by ease of use rather than the degree to which they represent the relevant physical processes at play. For some dams, these techniques may have a negligible influence on the overall consequence assessment. However, there are many dams for which an improved understanding of coincident flows using a joint probabilistic framework can result in significantly altered estimates of the natural flood and dambreak flood inundation zone. This can frequently lead to the consequences of the natural flood being larger than would otherwise have been the case, leading to a reduction in incremental consequences. Two examples of such situations are presented, including a description of the techniques used to estimate coincident flows and a discussion on likely influence of these flow estimates on incremental consequences. These examples are then used to draw some general principles for the types of dams at which an improved understanding of coincident flows is warranted.
Keywords: dam failure, coincident, joint probability, consequence assessment
Now showing 1-12 of 40 2976:
Mike Phillips, Kelly Maslin
A spillway upgrade conceptual design and selection process was undertaken to identify options for upgrading the Dartmouth Dam to pass the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF). A number of upgrade options were investigated, including variations of dam raise heights and spillway modifications. One of the options, the piano key weir, was initially developed from the limited available publications on the weir design, and further developed with the use of a 1:60 scale model. The piano key weir, a variation of the labyrinth weir, is a passive spillway that utilises a total weir length several times that of the effective spillway width. For the Dartmouth Dam study, the piano key weir design that was developed consisted of a 7-cycle, 9 m high structure, with a total weir length of nearly 600 m, or more than 6 times the existing effective spillway width of 91 m. The spillway was designed to pass the routed PMF outflow of approximately11,500 m3/s with a head of approximately 11 m.
The piano key weir design was developed using the following analyses:
Initial 1:60 scale physical model of the piano key weir based on published papers on piano key weirs and design manuals for labyrinth weirs;
Structural analysis and weir member sizing using initial physical model results;
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modelling to improve the hydraulic efficiency of the weir for the range of flows;
Revised 1:60 scale physical model of the piano key weir; and
Confirmation of conceptual structure design.
This paper describes the process of developing the piano key weir option for the Dartmouth Dam spillway and lessons learned.
Keywords: Piano key weir, CFD, spillway, physical model
This paper highlights the importance of hydraulic diversion control structures during construction of large dams and the value of allocating sufficient resources during project planning and implementation.
The design of the diversion gate for construction of the Enlarged Cotter Dam presented various challenges, including operation for up to 38m head for discharge into a 3m diameter conduit and the need to serve as an upstream concrete form during eventual diversion closure.
The short duration of operation allowed acceptance of increased level of operational risk and a higher level of design uncertainty. The design used generally accepted gate design methods, but no hydraulic modelling. The hydrodynamic forces were estimated using published data. After installation, a 1 in 100 AEP flood event resulted in the gate being subjected to 90% of its design head while operating in conditions close to the maximum design down-pull force. Attempts to raise the gate succeeded only after increasing the hydraulic pressure above the design value.
Keywords: Guard gate design, outlet works, dam, construction.
Sofia Vargas, Robert Wark
Logue Brook Dam, 130 km south east of Perth, was completed in 1963 and comprises a 49 m high main embankment with a crest length of approximately 335 m and the reservoir impounds 24.59 GL of storage. The outlet works comprise an inlet tower, an outlet pipe (DN 1100 mm) and a valve house. Water from the dam is released through a clam shell valve and there is a sluice valve upstream of the clam shell which acts as a scour isolation valve.
Previously Logue Brook Dam supplied water into the Harvey irrigation system by releasing water down the river which was then drawn off downstream and pumped into the piped network. The scheme planning had identified that constructing a pipeline from the dam outlet to connect directly into the piped irrigation system would eliminate the need for pumping as the system could then be gravity fed directly from the dam.
The outlet works upgrade comprised the refurbishment of the Inlet Tower, refurbishment of the Valve House, installation of new valves, environmental release and magnetic flow meters, electrical, communications, SCADA, instrumentation and security upgrades.
This paper describes the diving inspection and above water inspections of the inlet tower, refurbishment of the existing installation, challenges of the design, adopted solutions, connection to the Harvey Water pipeline and construction issues. The project represents an interesting case history of improving dam safety standards to current ANCOLD guidelines to provide a modern and safe facility.
Keywords: Outlet works, diving, OH &S Issues, safety, deterioration
Dr. Mark Locke, Jiri Herza
Gördes Dam is a nickel and cobalt mine tailings dam situated in a seismically active zone in Manisa Province, Western Turkey. The dam is a conventional cross valley earthfill structure with a fully lined storage basin. The starter embankment with a maximum height of 50 m will be raised in downstream lifts to an ultimate height of 90 m. The total storage capacity is 19 million m3. Construction of the starter embankment is planned to commence in late 2012 and the dam will be commissioned in June 2013.
The tailings will be discharged from the dam crest and return water will be collected by a floating decant pump at the opposite site of the storage. Decant water has high calcium sulphate levels and will require treatment before re-use in the plant or release. The tailings contain about 33 % of solids and are classified as high plasticity silts and clays with more than 90 % of particles passing the 0.075 mm sieve.
The dam is founded on a complex formation of altered sedimentary and metamorphic rocks including mudstones, siltstones, limestones and serpentines. The mudstone blocks, the predominant foundation materials, are juxtaposed with siltstones and serpentines via a complex arrangement of faults. Where exposed, the mudstones are highly to completely weathered with a well-developed structure of smooth bedding surfaces leading to anisotropic strength characteristics. Several landslides, likely associated with the anisotropic character of the mudstones, were identified within the area including a significant landslide under the upstream shoulder of the dam.
Mining development in Turkey has a complex legislative environment. There is also standard practice which is not legislated but expected, this can be considerably different to normal design practice in Australia. The Turkish legislation is based on waste management guidelines and may be more appropriate to landfills than large tailings storages. The legislation is very prescriptive in some aspects and silent in others, with little consideration of risk or consequence based design.
This paper discusses the design difficulties associated with the challenging foundation conditions, which have been magnified by the requirements and limitations embedded in the approval documentation and the legislative environment in Turkey. It will also address some of the key differences between the design philosophy in Australia and in Turkey with a focus on the major risk elements of the design.
Keywords: Tailings, Turkey, Liner, HDPE, Nickel laterite
M C N Taylor, Dr H E Cherrill, S F Croft, S F Eldridge
The Stuart Macaskill Lakes are two raw water storage lakes with a combined storage of approximately 3280 ML supplying Wellington City, New Zealand. The lakes are High Potential Impact Category (PIC) earth embankment dams constructed on terrace gravel deposits adjacent to the Hutt River and located within approximately 20 to 50 metres of the Wellington Fault Deformation Zone. Construction of the lakes began in 1982 and they were commissioned in 1985.
In early 2008, the lake’s owner Greater Wellington Regional Council (GWRC), embarked on a programme to supplement Wellington City’s water supply storage. Whilst that study is ongoing, GWRC engaged Tonkin & Taylor (T&T) to investigate the feasibility of increasing the Stuart Macaskill Lakes capacity as an interim measure.
The feasibility study concluded in late 2009 that the lake dam embankments could be raised by up to 1.3 metres in height to gain an approximate additional 450 ML of water storage. An important finding of that feasibility study has been that the seismic requirements have increased significantly since the construction of the lakes. To address this issue GWRC is currently constructing Stage Two of a two stage construction programme to both raise the lakes and to incorporate seismic resistant features into the lakes.
The primary design features are downstream rock buttressing in the critical areas of the lakes and synthetic lining the inside of the lake embankments. The buttressing works were completed in early 2011 and the lining and crest raising works are due for completion in 2013.
This paper summarises the design, laboratory testing and construction to enhance the lakes performance during very strong seismic accelerations (Peak Ground Accelerations of up to 1.08g) expected during a maximum design earthquake originating from the Wellington Fault.
Keywords: Water Reservoir, Seismic Design, Geomembrane, Rock Buttressing, Seismic Risk Assessment, Wellington Fault