2011 – Numerical Modelling of Seismic Liquefaction for Bobadil Tailings Dam

Categories: 2011, Papers Tags: 2011, B. Ghahreman Nejad, earthquake, H. Taiebat, K. Seddon, liquefaction analysis, M. Dillon, modelling, Numerical, tailings dam

B. Ghahreman Nejad, H. Taiebat, M. Dillon and K. Seddon

One of the causes of tailings dam failure has been seismically induced liquefaction during earthquakes. Liquefaction, if mobilised, significantly reduces the stiffness and strength of affected soils in the embankment dam or its foundation and may lead to large deformations and dam failure. This paper reports the results of seismic liquefaction assessment and deformation analyses of Bobadil tailings dam located in Tasmania. The tailings dam consists of a perimeter rockfill starter dam which has been raised in stages using the “upstream” construction method. The embankment raises (formed by clay or coarse tailings) are constructed over a foundation of previously deposited tailings in the impoundment which is potentially susceptible to liquefaction. Extensive field and laboratory tests were carried out to assess the tailings liquefaction potential and also to determine the material properties required for seismic stability and deformation analyses. Numerical modelling of seismic liquefaction and deformation analyses were carried out to predict the magnitude and pattern of deformations that may lead to uncontrolled release of tailings. The results of these analyses are presented and compared with literature report of those observed during past earthquakes.

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Papers 2011

2011 – Cultural Change – A Mechanical Perspective on Dam Safety Management
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George Bolliger and Clare Bales

Traditionally, the dams engineering profession has been a career path for engineers of civil/structural or geotechnical persuasion. As dams are constructed there is understandably a predominate focus on the civil requirements. Beyond the first few years of the dam’s life, effective operation and maintenance becomes increasingly important. A number of mechanical/electrical components and plant items form part of the critical infrastructure of the dam. A good maintenance routine is an essential requirement of the dam safety management program.

State Water Corporation, as the owner of 20 large dams and over 280 weir and regulator structures, runs a dam safety management program that is in line with the Australian National Committee on Large Dams Guidelines and NSW Dams Safety Committee requirements. The maintenance procedures and outcomes are audited through an internal maintenance audit program.

The maintenance audits form an integral part of the total asset management plan as well as the dam safety program. They are used to identify areas of strength as well as common errors or defects. Using State Water’s internal maintenance audits as case studies, the paper elaborates the role of maintenance audit program in enabling a cultural change to further include mechanical/electrical aspects and thereby enhance the longevity and safety of the assets.

Cultural Change – A Mechanical Perspective on Dam Safety Management

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Papers 2011

2011 – Emergency management of SunWater’s dam portfolio in the 2010-11
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Robert Keogh, Rob Ayre, Peter Richardson, Barry Jeppesen, Olga Kakourakis

SunWater owns 23 referable dams and operates a further two dams for other owners. The dams are located across Queensland from Texas and St George in the South to the Atherton Tablelands in the north to Mt Isa in the west.

During the period December 2010 to February 2011 there were several significant rainfall events across Queensland. The first occurred in late December 2010, the second in mid January 2011 and third in early February 2011. Generally it was the most significant rainfall event in Queensland since the 1970’s. 22 Emergency Action Plans were activated simultaneously by SunWater. Eleven dams experienced a flood of record during the events.

This paper will discuss what has been learnt from these events including the optimisation of management structures for a dam owner with a large portfolio of dams: review of O&M Manuals including the adequacy of backup systems: relationships with the State disaster management framework: the value of rigorous communication protocols: managing fear and a general lack of understanding in the community: and the value of being prepared.

Workshop paper – Robert
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Papers 2011

2011 – Comparison of wave passage and incoherence effects on nonlinear non-uniform excitation of concrete arch dams
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M. A. Hariri Ardebili, M. Akbari and H. Mirzabozorg

This paper presents a study on the effects of incoherence (considering the Harichandran and Vanmarcke coherency model) and wave-passage (considering various wave velocities) on the nonlinear responses of concrete arch dams . A double curvature arch dam was selected as numerical example, the reservoir was modeled as incompressible material and the foundation was modeled as a mass-less medium. Ground motion time-histories were artificially generated based on a Monte Carlo simulation approach. Four different models were considered in the generation of ground motions; Uniform excitation; Just incoherence effect; Just wave passage effect; and finally take into account both incoherence and wave passage effects. It was revealed that modeling incoherency can have significant effect on the structural response of the dam by modifying the dynamic response of uniform excitation and inducing pseudo-static response. Also, it was concluded that incoherency effect overshadow wave passage effect and results caused by wave passage effect are close to the results of uniform excitation.

2011 – Comparison of wave passage and incoherence effects on nonlinear non-uniform excitation of concrete arch dams
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Papers 2011

2011 – Towards increased clarity in the application of ALARP
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Roger Vreugdenhil, Peter Hill, Siraj Perera, Susan Ryan

All Australian water authorities have in place dam safety programs that seek to ensure the ongoing safety and serviceability of their dams along with the benefits they secure for the wider community. Many have progressed multiple dam safety upgrades over the past decade and embraced risk assessment as a helpful tool in prioritising upgrade investment.

The ANCOLD Guidelines on Risk Assessment (2003) have been applied across the country and, coupled with State regulation, have supported dam owner efforts in reducing risks below the ANCOLD “Limit of Tolerability”. However, it is generally acknowledged that in their current form, the ANCOLD guidelines provide limited guidance to dam owners for determining appropriate levels of risk reduction and timing of dam safety improvements. This has contributed to a range of guideline interpretations and inconsistency in subsequent dam safety investment decisions across Australia. Having achieved priority risk reduction, a number of owners are beginning to assess their dams against the ALARP principle, bringing dam safety investment within an owner’s portfolio into more direct competition with other important and urgent organisational investment decisions.

This paper outlines the outcomes of a recent study commissioned by the Victoria Department of Sustainability and Environment into risk reduction principles and the application of ALARP by a number of Australian and international dam owners and regulators, hazardous industry owners and regulators, and the interaction of ALARP with whole-of-organisation investment. The paper highlights the study process and significant points of interest regarding risk reduction principles and current application of ALARP and some options for refinement and clarity.

Towards increased clarity in the application of ALARP
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Papers 2011

2011 – Blackman Dam Failure Emergency Management
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Ben Hanslow and David Brett

The Blackman Dam is a 27 m high, zoned earthfill dam located upstream of the township of Tunbridge in the Tasmanian Midlands. The dam has an estimated storage capacity of 7300 ML and an assigned Hazard Rating of High C.

The Blackman Dam was constructed over the period November 2003 to September 2004. The dam supplies water for irrigation to farms in the area and potentially to the local towns of Tunbridge and Oatlands.

Filling of the Blackman Dam commenced in 2005. After substantial filling of the dam and following a heavy rain event, an area of seepage was noted on the far left abutment of the main embankment mid morning of Thursday 13th October 2005. The seepage was reported by the dam operators as being “garden hose flow”. By mid afternoon of that day, this had increased to “100 mm pipe flow” and discoloured. The Dam Safety Emergency Plan was activated.

This paper discusses lessons learnt and provides details on the implementation of the Dam Safety Emergency Plan and emergency actions taken to successfully avoid a breach of the dam wall. The paper also provides details on the geotechnical investigations that were carried out and factors contributing to the piping failure. Embankment repairs were successfully completed by mid 2010 and first filling of the Blackman Dam occurred in 2011.
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