Jim Walker, Sergio Vallesi, Neil Sutherland, Peter Amos, Tim Mills
The Tekapo Canal is a 26km long hydropower canal owned by Meridian Energy Ltd in New Zealand. Completed in 1976, the canal is 40m wide, 7m deep and has a capacity of 120m3/s. The canal was constructed from compacted local glacial soils with a compacted silt lining sourced from till deposits.
During 2007 and 2008 the canal showed signs of leakage where it crossed over a twin barrel culvert structure. In October 2008 a diver inspection identified depressions and sinkholes on the invert of the canal above the culvert. Approximately 6m3 of silty gravel lining material had settled. Testing showed direct and rapid connections between lining defects and seepage outflows at the culvert outlet headwall. Subsequent ground penetrating radar survey confirmed the presence of voids above the culvert barrels. Diver placed filling of the defects with granular materials was immediately implemented, and a series of remedial actions over the next four months were required to arrest deterioration and enable the canal to remain operational.
The paper describes the initial response to this situation and the immediate measures taken to prevent failure. It also describes the medium term and ongoing measures implemented to maintain the safety of the canal while permanent remediation requirements are assessed. The lessons learned from this event, and their impacts on Meridian’s Dam Safety Assurance Programme (DSAP) are also discussed.
Immediate response measures included ongoing filling of lining defects with filter gravel, intensive land based and diver surveillance of the canal, planning and resourcing for emergency contingency actions in the event that a risk of breach developed. Medium term measures included arresting leakage by placing a low permeability blanket of silty gravel over the damaged area using a concrete pump, and constructing external buttresses capable of safely withstanding large discharges should deterioration of the canal structure occur.
These short and medium term remedial measures were completed with the canal full and in operation and continue to perform well 20 months later. Continuing risk mitigation measures include enhanced surveillance and monitoring (land based and using divers), localised treatment of defects, as well as ongoing monitoring and review of the Dam Safety management regime and sustained Emergency Management preparedness.
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Justin Howes, Peter Amos
For many years Mighty River Power has operated an intensive Dam Safety Assurance Programme with respect to our nine large hydro assets, a unique run of river cascade system built between 1927 and 1972. From 2001 to 2007 the Arapuni Foundation Enhancement Project was a high profile activity, but there has also been much dam safety analysis and minor mitigation work that could be classified as “Business As Usual Dam Safety Activity” – this paper seeks to give a high level overview of the work carried out from 2000 to 2010. Items covered include; an overview of the hydraulic structures, their hydrological and geological setting, and the current dam safety regime. Examples of typical issues identified by the Programme are given on a structure by structure basis along the river. Seismic, Flooding, Emergency Planning, Documentation, Monitoring, Control, Electrical and Mechanical type issues are covered.
Thomas Vasconi, Mike Gowan
This paper describes the methodology adopted for the design of a 180 m-high stepped chute spillway to be constructed on a mine tailings storage facility (TSF) in Africa. This TSF dam, constructed using the “downstream method”, will be raised progressively via a series of nine lifts as mining proceeds. The first eight will be equipped with an operational spillway sized for the 1in 10,000 AEP whilst the ninth will house the closure spillway sized for the Probable Maximum Flood. The problem, common to all staged tailings dams, is how to design the spillways for such raising sequence? The very steep ridge declivity favored locating them in a unique configuration rather than the more usual separate hillside spillway on each dam abutment. The design of such spillways was challenging since it had to integrate the TSF interdependency parameters (water balance, dam raise sequence) whilst including flood routing, spillway sizing, stepped spillway design components. Challenging aspects of the design also included optimizing the costs associated with the short service life of these spillways. Furthermore, the design was undertaken in a way that the operating stepped chute could be upgraded and reused at mine closure. The design incorporates an innovative solution which allows reduction in the rock armouring quantity of up to 40% with associated cost benefits, and sustainability in terms of material usage. The lessons learnt in applying this innovative and sustainable design are useful for other sites requiring adaptive construction and short service life spillways.
Keywords: Tailings storage facility, stepped chute spillway, hydrology, hydraulics, mine water management.
David S. Bowles, Loren R. Anderson, Michael E. Ruthford, David C. Serafini, Sanjay S. Chauhan, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Sacramento, CA
In 2005 the Sacramento District of the US Army Corps of Engineers implemented an operating restriction to reduce the risk of an earthquake-induced failure of Success Dam, which could cause significant life loss and property damage. This paper describes an update of the 2004 risk-based evaluation of operating restrictions for Lake Success, which incorporated new information obtained by the District and enabled a re-evaluation of the level of the operating restriction and provided a basis for a possible modification of the restriction.
A RISK-BASED RE-EVALUATION OF RESERVOIR OPERATING RESTRICTIONS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF FAILURE FROM EARTHQUAKE AND PIPING
Glen Hobbs, Robert Rigg, Alan Hobbs, Adam Butler
Maintenance errors and associated non-conformances are becoming increasingly recognised as a source of system failures in a wide range of industries. Research in other industries has shown that errors often arise in response to local factors beyond the control of the maintainer. Various dam ‘incidents’ have been attributed to maintenance errors. In Australia we have been fortunate with few serious dam safety events. However, the dam operating and maintenance environment is changing dramatically.
A survey of dam maintenance personnel was recently undertaken in Australia. The survey was in the form of 49 questions that asked participants to state how frequently a situation occurred. This survey format has previously been used in other industries; thus allowing a comparison of dam maintenance with other high-risk industries such as rail infrastructure, oil and gas, and airline maintenance.
A number of ‘error-producing’ conditions have been identified and survey results indicate a high level of poor procedures/documentation and supervision; highlighting the need for accurate and appropriate manuals and supervision of tasks. These and other factors are leading to instances of maintenance non-compliance, which may threaten the reliability and safety of equipment. The survey has revealed that trade training needs to be addressed. However, occupational safety issues are low; indicating a positive approach to a safe working environment. The paper also discusses the responses to specific maintenance questions relevant to the dam industry.
Jared Deible, Richard Herweynen, Gary Dow
The foundation is an important element in the stability of any dam. Understanding the foundation and the potential failure mechanisms associated with the dam foundation is critical to developing the final dam design. This paper will discuss the challenges encountered with the foundation at the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Dam and the Wyaralong Dam.
The Upper Reservoir of the Taum Sauk project is a 2.3 million cubic metre roller compacted concrete (RCC) dam located near Ironton, Missouri, USA. The RCC dam was constructed in accordance with United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) guidelines to replace a rockfill dike that failed abruptly on December 14, 2005. Wyaralong Dam is a new RCC dam, for water supply, located on the Teviot Brook near the township of Beaudesert in south-east Queensland.
Wyaralong and Taum Sauk each had challenges associated with identifying potential failure mechanisms in the foundation and with analysing the stability of the dam for these potential failure mechanisms. The geology at the projects was very different, but challenges for each project were quantifying the amount of reliance that was placed on the rock mass at the toe of the dam, developing the shear strength parameters, and developing the associated failure mechanisms that would be analysed.
The design of Wyaralong and the rebuilt Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir, including the geometry of the dam sections, were developed based on the foundation features at each project. Foundation treatments and excavation designs were developed based on the stability analyses conducted during the design phase. These foundation treatments included removal of weak layers or defects where necessary, but features were left in place in the foundation at selected locations at each project. Where features were left in place, stability analyses concluded the dam was stable. The stability analyses at each project considered three dimensional effects along features in the foundation where appropriate.
As the foundation was uncovered during the construction phase of each project, the parameters used in the stability analysis conducted during the design phase were confirmed or adjusted. The excavation and foundation preparation activities were adjusted as necessary based on actual conditions during the construction phase.
Challenges Associated with Identifying and Analysing Potential Failure Mechanisms in Dam Foundations – Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Dam & Wyaralong Dam Case Studies