Kristen Sih, Peter Hill, Susan Ryan, Siraj Perera
Although ANCOLD provides guidance on good dam safety practices, in Australia it is the State and Territory Governments’ role to protect the public from dam safety incidents and in many cases these jurisdictions have legally binding regulations in place that dam owners must adhere to. This paper presents a comparative analysis of the dam safety regulations currently in place for Australian states, as well as selected international jurisdictions. The limit of applicability of the regulations, number of dams regulated, content of the regulations and powers and responsibilities of the regulator are all compared. It was found that there is a large range within each of these categories with regulatory approaches varying from light-handed and objective based, to highly prescriptive. The extent to which risk management principles are used in the regulations for each jurisdiction has also been investigated. It was found that in jurisdictions where higher hazard category dams account for a higher proportion of dams being regulated, risk analysis is included in the regulations. Finally, the ANCOLD societal risk criteria and ALARP considerations have been compared and contrasted with those from international jurisdictions and other hazardous industries.
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Ted Montoya, David Hughes, Orville Werner
The existing Hinze Dam was raised beginning in 2007 to increase water storage capacity, improve its ability to regulate floods, and raise the level of structural safety as compared to the current dam. As part of the 15 m raise of Hinze Dam, the existing 33 m high spillway structure was raised using mass concrete. This new composite structure was constructed as a downstream raise, placing mass concrete on the downstream and top of the existing spillway. The designers of the composite spillway structure developed a finite-element model to consider the early expansion and subsequent slow contraction of the new concrete against the existing concrete. The temperature rise of the new section of mass concrete had to be monitored and controlled to reduce the tensile strains along its interface with the existing spillway, and differential temperatures had to be limited to avoid cracking of the new mass section. Low-heat cement for a conventional mass concrete mix was not readily available so a mix was developed using local materials.
Typical mass concrete dams are monolithic structures constructed with lowheat cement. The Hinze Dam spillway design was predicated on the use of materials readily available. The paper presents the assumptions, methods, and criteria that were used in developing the mass concrete mix. It also presents the means and methods for tracking temperature gain during construction of the raised spillway, and how temperature was influenced by placement temperature, construction sequencing, and seasonal conditions. Lastly, the paper will compare the actual performance of the mix with the design analysis, laboratory testing, and finite element studies that were performed during the design.
Glen Hobbs, Robert Rigg, Alan Hobbs, Adam Butler
Maintenance errors and associated non-conformances are becoming increasingly recognised as a source of system failures in a wide range of industries. Research in other industries has shown that errors often arise in response to local factors beyond the control of the maintainer. Various dam ‘incidents’ have been attributed to maintenance errors. In Australia we have been fortunate with few serious dam safety events. However, the dam operating and maintenance environment is changing dramatically.
A survey of dam maintenance personnel was recently undertaken in Australia. The survey was in the form of 49 questions that asked participants to state how frequently a situation occurred. This survey format has previously been used in other industries; thus allowing a comparison of dam maintenance with other high-risk industries such as rail infrastructure, oil and gas, and airline maintenance.
A number of ‘error-producing’ conditions have been identified and survey results indicate a high level of poor procedures/documentation and supervision; highlighting the need for accurate and appropriate manuals and supervision of tasks. These and other factors are leading to instances of maintenance non-compliance, which may threaten the reliability and safety of equipment. The survey has revealed that trade training needs to be addressed. However, occupational safety issues are low; indicating a positive approach to a safe working environment. The paper also discusses the responses to specific maintenance questions relevant to the dam industry.
Shao Kwan Ng
Asset management aims to ensure that assets, such as dams, are sustainable. In order to achieve this, management decisions need to be defensible and the long-term impacts of short-term decisions need to be clearly demonstrated, such that an asset operates and is maintained in an appropriate fashion and in a satisfactory condition. Expert rule systems are becoming widely recognised as powerful and elegant tools suitable for engineering and management decision-making. They are powerful, transparent and flexible tools that mimic how people make decisions, and hence provide a natural way of thinking for decision-making. This paper reviews the current usage of expert systems in asset management, and illustrates the potential of these tools, in conjunction with the available (ANCOLD) guidelines, to assist dam owners in decision-making, such as in condition evaluation and dam hazard assessment applications.
Keywords: Decision-making, expert rule systems.
David Ryan, Sean Fleming
The Connors River Dam and Pipeline Project comprises the construction of a 367,540 ML storage on the Connors River located in central Queensland and a 130 km pipeline capable of delivering annually 49,500 ML of high priority water to the rapidly expanding Central Queensland Coalfields. The dam also has the capacity to supply water for the downstream agricultural sector.
Key outcomes of SunWater’s recent business case investigations included the identification of a strategy that would deliver the project in parallel with the construction programs currently being developed by the coal mining sector, the delivery of a quality product with high certainty cost and the ability to supply water at a commercially attractive rate. Construction activity is currently scheduled to commence in mid 2011, with commissioning of the works early 2014.
The paper outlines the project details, the design features of the dam and pipeline and the contract strategy adopted in an attempt to deliver the project on time and within budget.
Keywords: Roller Compacted Concrete, Early Contractor Involvement, Design and Construction.
Justin Howes, Peter Amos
For many years Mighty River Power has operated an intensive Dam Safety Assurance Programme with respect to our nine large hydro assets, a unique run of river cascade system built between 1927 and 1972. From 2001 to 2007 the Arapuni Foundation Enhancement Project was a high profile activity, but there has also been much dam safety analysis and minor mitigation work that could be classified as “Business As Usual Dam Safety Activity” – this paper seeks to give a high level overview of the work carried out from 2000 to 2010. Items covered include; an overview of the hydraulic structures, their hydrological and geological setting, and the current dam safety regime. Examples of typical issues identified by the Programme are given on a structure by structure basis along the river. Seismic, Flooding, Emergency Planning, Documentation, Monitoring, Control, Electrical and Mechanical type issues are covered.