Jim Walker, Jamie Macgregor
The Pukaki Canal Inlet structure is a large gated culvert and stilling basin structure, it is a High PIC appurtenant structure to the Pukaki Dam, located in the Mackenzie Basin area of New Zealand’s South Island.
The 560m3/s capacity inlet structure is founded on glacial moraines. It controls flow from the178 km2 Lake Pukaki storage into the 80m wide, 22km long Pukaki/Ohau canal. It is the owner’s (Meridian Energy) most important valve, as it feeds 1550MW of hydro generation on the Waitaki River.
A risk assessment in late 2009 identified a previously unrecognised trigger for a potential failure mode for the stilling basin. Principally, ongoing erosion of the reinforced concrete base slab could lead to failure of water stops in the slab joints potentially leading to slab uplift, foundation erosion, and ultimately, catastrophic failure of the Pukaki Dam. To better define the risk to the structure, further inspection of the stilling basin was recommended.
A dewatered inspection of the stilling basin was required, as further dive inspections would not improve our understanding of structure condition. Because the stilling basin cannot be isolated from the canal, this requires dewatering the entire Pukaki/Ohau canal, presenting significant risks of damage to the canals from slumping and lining failure. A dewatered outage also has major business revenue impacts.
This paper describes how Meridian were able to take advantage of a transmission network outage, scheduled for just six days after the risk was identified, to plan, safely dewater, inspect, and rewater 22km of hydro canal, and not just to inspect the Pukaki Canal Inlet structure, but also to implement repairs to the stilling basin slab which have successfully mitigated the structure safety and operational risks. This huge undertaking involved mobilising an army of people, plant and materials, and cost over NZ$1.8m. From identifying the risk to the structure, to completing repairs took just 13 (very busy) days.
Lessons learned in the areas of dam safety and asset management are presented. As well as those contributing to the success of the project in seizing an opportunity to mitigate the identified dam safety and operational risks.
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Paul C. Rizzo, Ph.D., P.E.; Carl Rizzo; John Bowen
The Authors served in key roles for the design and rebuild of the Dam for the Taum Sauk Rebuild Project between 2007 and 2009. Taum Sauk is the largest RCC Dam in the United States and has a symmetrical cross-section with conventional concrete faces upstream and downstream. The curvilinear shape and the cross-section presented a number of placement issues. In addition, a large number of “Lessons” were learned because of the rapid construction schedule, highly variable temperatures, highly confined working space, numerous details related to waterstops, construction joints and crest-to-gallery drains, foundation preparation, lift maturity, bedding mixes, crack repairs and the conventional concrete upstream face. The authors discuss these issues from the perspective of the Designer, Contractor and Construction Manager.
Cat McConkey, Zarmina Nasir, Rachel Caoil
The Enlarged Cotter Dam (ECD) is the first major project to be assessed and approved under the new planning regime in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). ACTEW chose the ECD as its highest priority option in securing Canberra’s water supply for the future because of its relative economic benefit to the community, reliability of water supply, technical feasibility and comparatively low environmental impact.
The planning and construction of large dams has been reduced from a typical 10 plus years to four years in the ACT and surrounds for the ECD. Australian and International Dam design and construction has significantly developed from a time when dam approvals focused on engineering, economics and constructability to now include regulatory planning processes that seek to reconcile environmental, social and economic impacts.
This paper explores and contrasts the experience of securing approvals for the ECD in 2009 to past experiences of dam planning approvals and consultation processes.
Aric Torreyson, Krey Price, Bob Hall
In a 2004 feasibility study, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and Ventura County Watershed Protection District (VCWPD) recommended decommissioning Matilija Dam, a concrete arch dam originally constructed to a 60-metre height in 1948. A decade after its completion, the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) constructed the Ventura River Project, comprising additional facilities designed to meet the growing water demand of Ventura County. Robles Diversion Dam, a 7-metre high by 160-metre long diversion structure located downstream of Matilija Dam, was built under the Ventura River Project to feed Lake Casitas, a water supply reservoir that serves as an integral part of the overall project.
Due to extreme sedimentation, Matilija Dam no longer serves its intended water supply and flood control purposes. In addition to the loss of storage capacity, other issues surround the dam, including adverse environmental impacts from its continued operation, seismic considerations, and structural concerns. These concerns led to the decision to decommission the dam as an essential step in rehabilitating key ecosystems in the Ventura River Catchment and reducing future risks to public safety. According to current estimates, 5 million cubic metres of sediment has accumulated behind the dam and will need to be removed in conjunction with the dam decommissioning; minimising the associated downstream impacts has been the subject of additional government studies.
The USBR determined through detailed hydrologic, hydraulic, and sediment transport analyses, including numerical and physical modelling, that the existing Robles Diversion Dam was not capable of passing the increased sediment load expected to result from the removal of Matilija Dam. To increase the sediment transport capacity across its spillway, the existing diversion dam requires modification. Under contract with the Corps, Tetra Tech and its subcontractors are completing the design plans for the Robles Diversion Dam modifications.
This paper presents unique aspects of the Robles Diversion Dam modifications, including sediment management procedures guided by numerical and physical model results and issues associated with the design of a rock ramp spillway and high-flow fishway, expansion of the existing spillway gate structure, and raising of the dam embankment. The rehabilitation efforts reduce impacts to the migration of endangered fish species and allow for the eventual removal of Matilija Dam, which is the ultimate goal in the effort to balance engineered structures with a natural river setting. When completed, the project will provide fish passage to the upper catchment for the first time in over sixty years.
C.Johnson, D.Stephens, M.Arnold and N.Vitharana
As part of Melbourne Water’s dam safety upgrade program, emergency release capacity is being investigated at a number of dams. Recent work undertaken by the Water Resources Alliance (WRA) for Melbourne Water has highlighted the lack of current Australian guidelines for appropriate emergency release capacity. With no relevant ANCOLD Guidelines, current practice still references the 1990 USBR guidelines which relate the length of time to empty a reservoir to the hazard and risk associated with dam failure. As hazard category assessment criteria has been improved since and dam design and safety standards are more stringent, the applicability of the USBR criteria in today’s environment is under consideration.
With the prevailing climatic conditions requiring the augmentation of Melbourne’s water supplies, the Tarago Reservoir was recently brought back into service. However, the dam lacked adequate emergency and environmental release capacity, with this being critical to manage construction flood risk for a pending filter raising project. Through an analysis of recorded inflow data, it was evident the existing scour facility had insufficient capacity to handle the recorded inflows, and would not be able to maintain the reservoir at an appropriate level during the proposed works. The length of time to empty the reservoir for the existing scour facility and the preferred scour upgrade option were calculated and it was found that by providing a new 1200mm scour facility, USBR emptying times were met or exceeded. The enlarged outlet capacity was also required to meet the new environmental flow requirements for the dam.
The paper will review international guidelines, share the experience of several Australian water authorities in assigning emergency release capacity for their dams, and discuss the specific work undertaken to provide suitable emergency release capacity at Tarago Reservoir for Melbourne Water.
Justin Howes, Peter Amos
For many years Mighty River Power has operated an intensive Dam Safety Assurance Programme with respect to our nine large hydro assets, a unique run of river cascade system built between 1927 and 1972. From 2001 to 2007 the Arapuni Foundation Enhancement Project was a high profile activity, but there has also been much dam safety analysis and minor mitigation work that could be classified as “Business As Usual Dam Safety Activity” – this paper seeks to give a high level overview of the work carried out from 2000 to 2010. Items covered include; an overview of the hydraulic structures, their hydrological and geological setting, and the current dam safety regime. Examples of typical issues identified by the Programme are given on a structure by structure basis along the river. Seismic, Flooding, Emergency Planning, Documentation, Monitoring, Control, Electrical and Mechanical type issues are covered.