Ben Greentree, David Bamforth, Matthew O’Rourke and James Willey
A series of relatively small floods occurring between end of construction in 1978 and late 1980s caused extensive and dramatic rock erosion to the very steep unlined section of the Googong Dam spillway. Following a review of hydraulic performance at larger floods, the spillway’s future erosion potential was evaluated and it became clear that extensive remedial work was required. A detailed design was developed comprising the retro-fitting of a full concrete-lined chute, the raising and extension of the spillway chute walls, strengthening of the upstream training walls and excavation of a large plunge pool. The Googong Dam has an ANCOLD hazard rating of ‘extreme’ because of its location upstream of Queanbeyan and Canberra.
In early 2008, the Bulk Water Alliance (BWA), comprising ACTEW Corporation Ltd, (in cooperation with ActewAGL) (the Owner), GHD Pty Ltd (the Designer) and Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd in joint venture with John Holland Pty Ltd (the Constructors) was formed to deliver a package of water security projects for the ACT, one of which is the Googong Dam Spillway Upgrade.
After preparation of a construction methodology and target outturn cost (TOC), the project was approved by the Actew Board and construction commenced in February 2009. Completion is due in late 2010. A number of significant geotechnical, structural and logistical challenges were encountered during construction, resulting in major changes to the construction methodology necessitating design changes. The changes were incorporated within the original TOC, without instigating scope change contractual claims and while still maintaining spillway functionality in line with Owner operational requirements.
This paper presents delivery phase challenges that necessitated construction methodology and design changes to achieve best for project outcomes; how these challenges were overcome through genuine innovation reliant on a collaborative effort by all the Alliance partners; and how the contractual framework of the Alliance was essential for the change management process to be successful.
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Thomas Vasconi, Mike Gowan
This paper describes the methodology adopted for the design of a 180 m-high stepped chute spillway to be constructed on a mine tailings storage facility (TSF) in Africa. This TSF dam, constructed using the “downstream method”, will be raised progressively via a series of nine lifts as mining proceeds. The first eight will be equipped with an operational spillway sized for the 1in 10,000 AEP whilst the ninth will house the closure spillway sized for the Probable Maximum Flood. The problem, common to all staged tailings dams, is how to design the spillways for such raising sequence? The very steep ridge declivity favored locating them in a unique configuration rather than the more usual separate hillside spillway on each dam abutment. The design of such spillways was challenging since it had to integrate the TSF interdependency parameters (water balance, dam raise sequence) whilst including flood routing, spillway sizing, stepped spillway design components. Challenging aspects of the design also included optimizing the costs associated with the short service life of these spillways. Furthermore, the design was undertaken in a way that the operating stepped chute could be upgraded and reused at mine closure. The design incorporates an innovative solution which allows reduction in the rock armouring quantity of up to 40% with associated cost benefits, and sustainability in terms of material usage. The lessons learnt in applying this innovative and sustainable design are useful for other sites requiring adaptive construction and short service life spillways.
Keywords: Tailings storage facility, stepped chute spillway, hydrology, hydraulics, mine water management.
Peter A Ballantine, Christopher V Seddon
Massingir Dam, constructed in the late 1970’s on the Olifants River in Mozambique, is a 48 m high zoned earthfill dam. Due to various safety concerns, the dam was operated at a reduced full supply level of 110 masl, compared to the design full supply level of 125 masl. Between 2004 and 2006 remedial works were undertaken, including the construction of a berm on the downstream face of the dam, grouting and drainage of the foundations and installation of the spillway crest gates. From December 2005 the storage level of the dam was allowed to increase.
On 22 May 2008, with the reservoir storage level at 122.43 masl and the gates on the outlet conduits closed, the reinforced concrete conduits failed at the downstream end, releasing an estimated 1,000 m3 /s of water into the Olifants River.
A 2-D finite element analysis was undertaken in order to establish the safe load bearing capacity of the as-constructed conduits. On the basis of the analysis, it was concluded that the original design did not take proper account of the pressure that would develop within the thick concrete sections of the conduit. In view of assumptions regarding the load paths, the reinforcement was not placed in the most appropriate positions.
This paper describes the events leading up to the failure of the conduit, presents the findings of the investigation into the failure and makes recommendations on the basis of the findings.
Justin Howes, Peter Amos
For many years Mighty River Power has operated an intensive Dam Safety Assurance Programme with respect to our nine large hydro assets, a unique run of river cascade system built between 1927 and 1972. From 2001 to 2007 the Arapuni Foundation Enhancement Project was a high profile activity, but there has also been much dam safety analysis and minor mitigation work that could be classified as “Business As Usual Dam Safety Activity” – this paper seeks to give a high level overview of the work carried out from 2000 to 2010. Items covered include; an overview of the hydraulic structures, their hydrological and geological setting, and the current dam safety regime. Examples of typical issues identified by the Programme are given on a structure by structure basis along the river. Seismic, Flooding, Emergency Planning, Documentation, Monitoring, Control, Electrical and Mechanical type issues are covered.
Ted Montoya, David Hughes, Orville Werner
The existing Hinze Dam was raised beginning in 2007 to increase water storage capacity, improve its ability to regulate floods, and raise the level of structural safety as compared to the current dam. As part of the 15 m raise of Hinze Dam, the existing 33 m high spillway structure was raised using mass concrete. This new composite structure was constructed as a downstream raise, placing mass concrete on the downstream and top of the existing spillway. The designers of the composite spillway structure developed a finite-element model to consider the early expansion and subsequent slow contraction of the new concrete against the existing concrete. The temperature rise of the new section of mass concrete had to be monitored and controlled to reduce the tensile strains along its interface with the existing spillway, and differential temperatures had to be limited to avoid cracking of the new mass section. Low-heat cement for a conventional mass concrete mix was not readily available so a mix was developed using local materials.
Typical mass concrete dams are monolithic structures constructed with lowheat cement. The Hinze Dam spillway design was predicated on the use of materials readily available. The paper presents the assumptions, methods, and criteria that were used in developing the mass concrete mix. It also presents the means and methods for tracking temperature gain during construction of the raised spillway, and how temperature was influenced by placement temperature, construction sequencing, and seasonal conditions. Lastly, the paper will compare the actual performance of the mix with the design analysis, laboratory testing, and finite element studies that were performed during the design.
C.Johnson, D.Stephens, M.Arnold and N.Vitharana
As part of Melbourne Water’s dam safety upgrade program, emergency release capacity is being investigated at a number of dams. Recent work undertaken by the Water Resources Alliance (WRA) for Melbourne Water has highlighted the lack of current Australian guidelines for appropriate emergency release capacity. With no relevant ANCOLD Guidelines, current practice still references the 1990 USBR guidelines which relate the length of time to empty a reservoir to the hazard and risk associated with dam failure. As hazard category assessment criteria has been improved since and dam design and safety standards are more stringent, the applicability of the USBR criteria in today’s environment is under consideration.
With the prevailing climatic conditions requiring the augmentation of Melbourne’s water supplies, the Tarago Reservoir was recently brought back into service. However, the dam lacked adequate emergency and environmental release capacity, with this being critical to manage construction flood risk for a pending filter raising project. Through an analysis of recorded inflow data, it was evident the existing scour facility had insufficient capacity to handle the recorded inflows, and would not be able to maintain the reservoir at an appropriate level during the proposed works. The length of time to empty the reservoir for the existing scour facility and the preferred scour upgrade option were calculated and it was found that by providing a new 1200mm scour facility, USBR emptying times were met or exceeded. The enlarged outlet capacity was also required to meet the new environmental flow requirements for the dam.
The paper will review international guidelines, share the experience of several Australian water authorities in assigning emergency release capacity for their dams, and discuss the specific work undertaken to provide suitable emergency release capacity at Tarago Reservoir for Melbourne Water.