Ted Montoya, David Hughes, Orville Werner
The existing Hinze Dam was raised beginning in 2007 to increase water storage capacity, improve its ability to regulate floods, and raise the level of structural safety as compared to the current dam. As part of the 15 m raise of Hinze Dam, the existing 33 m high spillway structure was raised using mass concrete. This new composite structure was constructed as a downstream raise, placing mass concrete on the downstream and top of the existing spillway. The designers of the composite spillway structure developed a finite-element model to consider the early expansion and subsequent slow contraction of the new concrete against the existing concrete. The temperature rise of the new section of mass concrete had to be monitored and controlled to reduce the tensile strains along its interface with the existing spillway, and differential temperatures had to be limited to avoid cracking of the new mass section. Low-heat cement for a conventional mass concrete mix was not readily available so a mix was developed using local materials.
Typical mass concrete dams are monolithic structures constructed with lowheat cement. The Hinze Dam spillway design was predicated on the use of materials readily available. The paper presents the assumptions, methods, and criteria that were used in developing the mass concrete mix. It also presents the means and methods for tracking temperature gain during construction of the raised spillway, and how temperature was influenced by placement temperature, construction sequencing, and seasonal conditions. Lastly, the paper will compare the actual performance of the mix with the design analysis, laboratory testing, and finite element studies that were performed during the design.
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Jim Walker, Sergio Vallesi, Neil Sutherland, Peter Amos, Tim Mills
The Tekapo Canal is a 26km long hydropower canal owned by Meridian Energy Ltd in New Zealand. Completed in 1976, the canal is 40m wide, 7m deep and has a capacity of 120m3/s. The canal was constructed from compacted local glacial soils with a compacted silt lining sourced from till deposits.
During 2007 and 2008 the canal showed signs of leakage where it crossed over a twin barrel culvert structure. In October 2008 a diver inspection identified depressions and sinkholes on the invert of the canal above the culvert. Approximately 6m3 of silty gravel lining material had settled. Testing showed direct and rapid connections between lining defects and seepage outflows at the culvert outlet headwall. Subsequent ground penetrating radar survey confirmed the presence of voids above the culvert barrels. Diver placed filling of the defects with granular materials was immediately implemented, and a series of remedial actions over the next four months were required to arrest deterioration and enable the canal to remain operational.
The paper describes the initial response to this situation and the immediate measures taken to prevent failure. It also describes the medium term and ongoing measures implemented to maintain the safety of the canal while permanent remediation requirements are assessed. The lessons learned from this event, and their impacts on Meridian’s Dam Safety Assurance Programme (DSAP) are also discussed.
Immediate response measures included ongoing filling of lining defects with filter gravel, intensive land based and diver surveillance of the canal, planning and resourcing for emergency contingency actions in the event that a risk of breach developed. Medium term measures included arresting leakage by placing a low permeability blanket of silty gravel over the damaged area using a concrete pump, and constructing external buttresses capable of safely withstanding large discharges should deterioration of the canal structure occur.
These short and medium term remedial measures were completed with the canal full and in operation and continue to perform well 20 months later. Continuing risk mitigation measures include enhanced surveillance and monitoring (land based and using divers), localised treatment of defects, as well as ongoing monitoring and review of the Dam Safety management regime and sustained Emergency Management preparedness.
Jared Deible, Richard Herweynen, Gary Dow
The foundation is an important element in the stability of any dam. Understanding the foundation and the potential failure mechanisms associated with the dam foundation is critical to developing the final dam design. This paper will discuss the challenges encountered with the foundation at the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Dam and the Wyaralong Dam.
The Upper Reservoir of the Taum Sauk project is a 2.3 million cubic metre roller compacted concrete (RCC) dam located near Ironton, Missouri, USA. The RCC dam was constructed in accordance with United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) guidelines to replace a rockfill dike that failed abruptly on December 14, 2005. Wyaralong Dam is a new RCC dam, for water supply, located on the Teviot Brook near the township of Beaudesert in south-east Queensland.
Wyaralong and Taum Sauk each had challenges associated with identifying potential failure mechanisms in the foundation and with analysing the stability of the dam for these potential failure mechanisms. The geology at the projects was very different, but challenges for each project were quantifying the amount of reliance that was placed on the rock mass at the toe of the dam, developing the shear strength parameters, and developing the associated failure mechanisms that would be analysed.
The design of Wyaralong and the rebuilt Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir, including the geometry of the dam sections, were developed based on the foundation features at each project. Foundation treatments and excavation designs were developed based on the stability analyses conducted during the design phase. These foundation treatments included removal of weak layers or defects where necessary, but features were left in place in the foundation at selected locations at each project. Where features were left in place, stability analyses concluded the dam was stable. The stability analyses at each project considered three dimensional effects along features in the foundation where appropriate.
As the foundation was uncovered during the construction phase of each project, the parameters used in the stability analysis conducted during the design phase were confirmed or adjusted. The excavation and foundation preparation activities were adjusted as necessary based on actual conditions during the construction phase.
Challenges Associated with Identifying and Analysing Potential Failure Mechanisms in Dam Foundations – Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Dam & Wyaralong Dam Case Studies
Rick W. Schultz P.E.
The Corps of Engineers Risk Management Center is undergoing a nationwide assessment of its navigation and flood control projects. Development of the methodology and tools used to determine probability of failure of mechanical and electrical systems for dams is being presented in this document. Development of the Weibull formulas for specific use in dam will be addressed along with use of fault tree analysis to determine system reliability.
Keywords: Dormant-Weibull Formula, Fault Tree, Characteristic Life of Components, Beta Shape Parameters, Inspection intervals.
Karen Riddette, David Ho
Recent dam safety reviews of a number of Australian dams have identified that the arms of raised radial gates may be partially submerged by extreme flows which exceed the original design flood for the dam. Various design solutions have been proposed to secure and strengthen the radial gates, however an important concern is the potential for flow-induced vibration. Under extreme flood conditions, flows near the gate arms will be high-velocity, free-surface, with a steep angle of attack on the arm beams. Traditional hand calculations for computing vibrations are of limited applicability in this situation, and there is little published data available for this combination of flow conditions and arm geometry. A detailed study using CFD modelling of the potential for vibration around radial gate arms was carried out for Wyangala Dam. This paper presents the results of the validation and reveals some interesting flow patterns and vortex shedding behaviour.
Assessment of flow-induced vibration in radial gates during extreme flood
Jim Walker, Jamie Macgregor
The Pukaki Canal Inlet structure is a large gated culvert and stilling basin structure, it is a High PIC appurtenant structure to the Pukaki Dam, located in the Mackenzie Basin area of New Zealand’s South Island.
The 560m3/s capacity inlet structure is founded on glacial moraines. It controls flow from the178 km2 Lake Pukaki storage into the 80m wide, 22km long Pukaki/Ohau canal. It is the owner’s (Meridian Energy) most important valve, as it feeds 1550MW of hydro generation on the Waitaki River.
A risk assessment in late 2009 identified a previously unrecognised trigger for a potential failure mode for the stilling basin. Principally, ongoing erosion of the reinforced concrete base slab could lead to failure of water stops in the slab joints potentially leading to slab uplift, foundation erosion, and ultimately, catastrophic failure of the Pukaki Dam. To better define the risk to the structure, further inspection of the stilling basin was recommended.
A dewatered inspection of the stilling basin was required, as further dive inspections would not improve our understanding of structure condition. Because the stilling basin cannot be isolated from the canal, this requires dewatering the entire Pukaki/Ohau canal, presenting significant risks of damage to the canals from slumping and lining failure. A dewatered outage also has major business revenue impacts.
This paper describes how Meridian were able to take advantage of a transmission network outage, scheduled for just six days after the risk was identified, to plan, safely dewater, inspect, and rewater 22km of hydro canal, and not just to inspect the Pukaki Canal Inlet structure, but also to implement repairs to the stilling basin slab which have successfully mitigated the structure safety and operational risks. This huge undertaking involved mobilising an army of people, plant and materials, and cost over NZ$1.8m. From identifying the risk to the structure, to completing repairs took just 13 (very busy) days.
Lessons learned in the areas of dam safety and asset management are presented. As well as those contributing to the success of the project in seizing an opportunity to mitigate the identified dam safety and operational risks.