P Amos, N Logan and J Walker
There are a number of geological faults in close proximity to Aviemore Power Station in the South Island of New Zealand, including a fault in the foundation of the 48m high earth dam component of the power station. Possible movement of the Waitangi Fault in the earth dam foundation is of particular concern for dam safety, and the effects on the dam of a fault rupture has been the subject of detailed investigation by the dam’s owner Meridian Energy Ltd. These investigations have concluded that the dam will withstand the anticipated fault displacement related to the Safety Evaluation Earthquake without catastrophic release of the reservoir.
The identification of damage to the dam following an earthquake and monitoring of the dam to identify the development of potential failure mechanisms are important for determining the post-earthquake safety of the power station. The first stage of the post-earthquake response plan is the quick identification of any foundation fault rupture and damage to the dam to enable immediate post-earthquake mitigation measures
to be initiated, such as reservoir drawdown. Following initial response, the next stage of the postearthquake monitoring programme for the embankment dam is longer term monitoring to identify a changing seepage condition due to damage to the dam that might lead to a piping incident. Such an incident may not occur immediately after an earthquake, and it can be some time before the piping process becomes evident.
This paper presents some key instrumentation installed at Aviemore Dam and included in the emergency response plan for the post-earthquake monitoring of the embankment dam.
Nerida Bartlett, David Scriven, Peter Richardson
The failure of a number of consecutive wet seasons has resulted in storage levels in Eungella Dam being at dangerously low levels such that supply could be exhausted by June 2007. Eungella Dam supplies bulk water to the Bowen Basin coal fields as well as the Collinsville power station and the Collinsville township.
The Collinsville township, power station and coal mine as well as the Newlands mines take water from the Bowen River Weir which is supplied from Eungella Dam some 95 kilometres upstream. Transmission losses of the order of 25 to 50% have been experienced for releases from Eungella Dam to Bowen River Weir.
The Eungella Dam catchment area is 142 square kilometres. Significant flows occur in the Bowen River downstream of Eungella Dam, the catchment area above Bowen River Weir being 4,520 square kilometres. The topography in the surrounding area (near Collinsville) is not suitable for dam construction.
The opportunity existed for the construction of an offstream storage adjacent to the Bowen River Weir so that the downstream flows could be captured reducing the demand on Eungella Dam thus making more water available for upstream users.
A 5,200 ML offstream storage, associated pump station and rising main was designed, constructed and filled within a period of 12 months.
Foundations at the site are highly permeable sands. Marginally suitable clay for a seal was in short supply as was suitable rock for slope protection. A fixed price budget had been set by the contributing customers.
This paper describes the hydrology, site conditions, design and construction of the project.
Manuel G. de Membrillera, Ignacio Escuder, David Bowles, Eduardo Triana, Luis Altarejos
The work herein presented is an application of the risk assessment process to retroactively estimate the justification of an operating restriction implemented on a Spanish Dam. Since the risk approach is not yet an established practice in Spain, the main objective of this case study is to show, the utility that risk assessment can have as a decision support tool for decisions on dam safety risk reduction investments.
An operating restriction has been imposed at this dam since its first impoundment. All studies, analysis and documents related to the safety of the dam and reservoir have been completed, as required by the Technical Regulation on Dam and Reservoir Safety (Spanish legislation, 1996). In addition, the structural corrective actions recommended in these evaluations are being implemented, so it is expected that the operating restriction can be removed in the near future.
In this context, the problem that has been formulated and solved comprises an evaluation, after more than 30 years since construction, of the operating restriction justification in terms of risk mitigation. In order to achieve the objective of the work, ANCOLD guidelines on Risk Assessment (2003) have been followed in addition to tolerable risk guidelines from several other countries and organizations.
C Lake and J Walker
Meridian Energy is the owner and operator of a chain of hydro dams on the Waitaki River in the
South Island of NZ. It operates a Dam Safety Assurance Programme which reflects current best
practice; consequently it has focused primarily on managing civil dam assets. Advances in plant control technology have allowed de-manning of our power stations, dams and canals through centralised control. The safety of our hydraulic structures is increasingly reliant on the performance of Dam Safety Critical Plant (DSCP) – those items of plant (eg water level monitoring, gates, their power and control systems, and sump pumps) which are required to operate automatically, or under operator control, to assure safety of the hydraulic structures in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances.
Recent dam safety reviews have highlighted that the specification and testing of our DSCP is based on the application of ‘rules of thumb’ which have been established through engineering practice (eg. “monthly tests”, “third level of protection”, “backup power sources”, “triple voted floats”). The
adequacy of these engineering practices is difficult to defend as they are not based on published
criteria. The realisation that such rules may not be relevant to the increased demand on, and complexity of, DSCP led us to ask “Which belts and braces do we really need?” The current NZSOLD (2000) and ANCOLD (2003) Dam Safety guidelines give little guidance regarding specific criteria for the design and operation of DSCP.
Meridian has identified the use of Functional Safety standards (from the Process industry, defined in IEC 61511) as a tool which can be applied to the dams industry to review the risks to the hydraulic structures, the demands on the DSCP, and utilise corporate “tolerable risk” definitions to establish the reliability requirements (Safety Integrity Levels) of each protection, and determine lifecycle criteria for the design, operation, testing, maintenance, and review of those protections.
This paper outlines the background to identifying Functional Safety as a suitable tool for this purpose, and the practical application of Functional Safety Analysis to Meridian’s DSCP.
The Water Act 2003 established a new role for the Environment Agency, that of the Enforcement Authority for the Reservoirs Act 1975 in England and Wales. The transfer of this regulatory role from 136 Local Authorities has had a significant impact on the regulated community. Further change is heralded with the forthcoming introduction of Reservoir Flood Plans, Post-Incident Reporting and a review of current regulations. The improvements sought in reservoir safety may be at risk due to a growing skills shortage and increasing financial constraints imposed by owners.
This paper highlights the issues impacting on the reservoir industry in England and Wales and in recognising developments made by ANCOLD members the author seeks to understand how they are being responded to in Australia.
Jeffrey A. Schaefer, Ph.D., P.E., P.G. and David M. Schaaf, P.E.
In 2005 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) developed and implemented a Screening Portfolio Risk Assessment (SPRA) process for Dam Safety. The screening process considered loading frequency, an engineering rating to estimate a relative probability of failure, and both human life and economic consequences of failure. The results were utilized as a tool to help prioritize funding for dam safety modification projects and required studies. Three multidisciplinary cadres evaluated what was considered the worst 10% of the USACE’s dam projects in 2005 and the next worst 10% in 2006. The dams evaluated included flood control, navigation, and multi-purpose dams. Approximately seventy facilities were evaluated each year.
As a result of the aging of the USACE’s dam portfolio and the state of the art at the time of design and construction (mostly 1940’s-50’s), significant dam safety deficiencies exist at many USACE dams. This paper summarizes the major deficiencies identified from the SPRA process. Examples, including foundation seepage, karst development, embankment stability, gate deterioration, liquefiable foundations, and inadequate spillway capacity are provided along with discussion on which deficiencies contribute the greatest risk.