G. L. Sills, N. D. Vroman, J. B. Dunbar, R. E. Wahl
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall just east of New Orleans and inflicted widespread damage on the Hurricane Protection System (HPS) for southeast Louisiana. Subsequent flooding was a major catastrophe for the region and the Nation.
The response to this disaster by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers included forming an Interagency
Performance Evaluation Taskforce (IPET) to study the response of the system and, among many lines of inquiry, to identify causes of failure of levees and floodwalls.
Beginning in September 2005, the IPET gathered geotechnical forensic data from failed portions of levees and floodwalls. Major clues discovered at the 17th Street break, including clay wedges dividing a formerly continuous layer of peat, led to an explanation of the failures. Field data from the failure sites were interpreted within the regional geologic setting of the New Orleans area to identify geologic and geotechnical factors that contributed to the catastrophe. The data gathered provided a method that resulted in the “IPET Strength Model.” This strength was used in analyses of the I-walls and levees using limit equilibrium stability analyses, physical modeling using a powerful centrifuge, and finite-element analyses.
The results of all three types of studies revealed a consistent mode of failure that included deformation of the I-walls and foundation instability. The IPET also studied non-failed I-walls at Orleans and Michoud Canals, to identify geotechnical, structural, and geologic distinctions between failed and non-failed reaches.
Performance of the HPS during Hurricane Katrina offered many lessons to be learned. These lessons learned include: the lack of resiliency in the HPS; the need for risk-based planning and design approach; the need for the examination of system-wide functionality; and knowledge, technology, and expertise deficiencies in the HPS arena. In addition, understanding of the failure mechanisms and related causes of the levee and floodwall breaches provides a new direction for future designs of hurricane protection systems.
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Karen Riddette, David Ho & Julie Edwards
Over the last five years in Australia, the use of computational fluid dynamics for the investigation of waterflows through hydraulic structures has been steadily rising. This modelling technique has been successfully applied to a range of dam upgrade projects, helping to assess spillway discharge capacity and structural integrity, and giving insight into flow behaviours including orifice flow, shock wave formation and chute overtopping (Ho et al, 2006). Innovative and cost effective upgrade solutions have been implemented from numerical model studies including baffle plates (Maher and Rodd, 2005) and locking arrangements to protect radial gates from extreme floods.
This paper will begin with a review of recent dam engineering applications, including outlet flow through a fish screen, the performance of a fishway against hydraulic and environmental criteria and pipe flow in a large pumping station. Some of the difficulties and limitations of the modelling technique will be examined together with current research being conducted to address these issues and further validate the numerical results against published data. Some interesting results to date will be reported on elliptical crest discharge, boundary geometry, and model/prototype correlation.
With increasing computing power and software enhancements, the potential applications for numerical simulation in dam engineering continue to grow. This paper will also examine the future outlook and highlight some recent advances such as the thermal simulation of cold water pollution, air entraining flows and combined free-surface and pipe flow in a morning glory spillway.
Michael Somerford, Alex Gower
The Water Corporation is the principal dam owner in Western Australian with a portfolio of 95 dams. In the absence of dam safety legislation in Western Australia the Corporation has adopted a policy of self regulation. This paper presents how the Corporation’s dam safety policy has been implemented with respect to dam instrumentation and monitoring. It includes a summary of the type of instruments used and experiences with automated data collection systems. The paper concludes that the Corporation does not see a need for a dam instrumentation guideline, however a document summarising current Australian practices and experiences would be of value.
Marius Jonker, Malcolm Barker and Gary Harper
This paper provides a framework for conducting an effective Failure Modes Analysis. It explains the fundamental principals and methods of Failure Modes Analysis. The current international state of practice on Failure Modes Analysis is discussed, and the objectives, benefits and limitations of Failure Modes Analysis assessed. Guidelines are given on how to apply the outcome of Failure Modes Analysis in dam safety management and surveillance.The effective application of Failure Modes Analysis is illustrated in a case study where the process was applied in the safety review and risk assessment of Rocklands Dam for Grampians Wimmera Mallee RegionWater Authority in Victoria.
Ridges Basin Dam is part of the Animas-La Plata Project. When topped out in approximately 2008, it will be Reclamation’s newest dam. It will have a structural height of 273 feet and impound 120,000 acre-feet of water. This paper will discuss the design of the embankment and will detail the site geology, the general design considerations for layout and zoning, and other technical considerations. The construction, which began in 2004, is ongoing. This paper will also discuss foundation treatment and cleanup, the placement of the embankment material, grouting, and the unusual material processing for filters and drains, along with general construction details. Also included in the paper are the challenging arrangements for contracting by the American Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Law, an overview of the dam safety risk analyses conducted on the yet-to-be-constructed embankment, and modern construction techniques being utilized to build the embankment.
Jeffrey A. Schaefer, Ph.D., P.E., P.G. and David M. Schaaf, P.E.
In 2005 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) developed and implemented a Screening Portfolio Risk Assessment (SPRA) process for Dam Safety. The screening process considered loading frequency, an engineering rating to estimate a relative probability of failure, and both human life and economic consequences of failure. The results were utilized as a tool to help prioritize funding for dam safety modification projects and required studies. Three multidisciplinary cadres evaluated what was considered the worst 10% of the USACE’s dam projects in 2005 and the next worst 10% in 2006. The dams evaluated included flood control, navigation, and multi-purpose dams. Approximately seventy facilities were evaluated each year.
As a result of the aging of the USACE’s dam portfolio and the state of the art at the time of design and construction (mostly 1940’s-50’s), significant dam safety deficiencies exist at many USACE dams. This paper summarizes the major deficiencies identified from the SPRA process. Examples, including foundation seepage, karst development, embankment stability, gate deterioration, liquefiable foundations, and inadequate spillway capacity are provided along with discussion on which deficiencies contribute the greatest risk.