R. Dawson, J. Grimston, R. Cole, D. Bouma
The authors have been involved in the design and construction of several embankment dams in New Zealand over the past decade, and have considerable corporate knowledge from dams designed by the company in its 47-year history. This paper examines four dams which are relatively small to medium, ranging in height from 10 to 19 m with moderate storage volumes. Three of the dams service landfills and the fourth a wood processing mill. Such dams may provide the designer with considerable challenges due to their relatively low capital cost resulting in limited investment in geotechnical investigation at the front end of the project, with varying levels of change often required during construction due to unforeseen conditions as a result of the limited investigations.
The general arrangement and conceptual design principles for each of the dams is described followed by the field investigation and laboratory testing undertaken for each dam, together with the interpreted ground conditions.
The experiences from construction have helped to develop techniques for a balance between preliminary design, investigation, and evolution of the design and specification during construction. It is imperative to develop a sufficiently detailed preliminary design, on the basis of readily available information such as visual and geological assessment, to allow the investigation to be thoughtfully designed to allow the major assumptions to be verified. This needs to be followed by a skilfully executed geotechnical investigation with the designer advising on findings and changing direction as necessary through the investigation. An investigation trench along the full alignment of the cutoff trench (if envisaged in the design) is warranted. Earthworks specifications should be evolved early in the construction phase through compaction trials using specific plant for the site, and backed up by insitu and laboratory testing.
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Now showing 1-12 of 59 2970:
G. L. Sills, N. D. Vroman, J. B. Dunbar, R. E. Wahl
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall just east of New Orleans and inflicted widespread damage on the Hurricane Protection System (HPS) for southeast Louisiana. Subsequent flooding was a major catastrophe for the region and the Nation.
The response to this disaster by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers included forming an Interagency
Performance Evaluation Taskforce (IPET) to study the response of the system and, among many lines of inquiry, to identify causes of failure of levees and floodwalls.
Beginning in September 2005, the IPET gathered geotechnical forensic data from failed portions of levees and floodwalls. Major clues discovered at the 17th Street break, including clay wedges dividing a formerly continuous layer of peat, led to an explanation of the failures. Field data from the failure sites were interpreted within the regional geologic setting of the New Orleans area to identify geologic and geotechnical factors that contributed to the catastrophe. The data gathered provided a method that resulted in the “IPET Strength Model.” This strength was used in analyses of the I-walls and levees using limit equilibrium stability analyses, physical modeling using a powerful centrifuge, and finite-element analyses.
The results of all three types of studies revealed a consistent mode of failure that included deformation of the I-walls and foundation instability. The IPET also studied non-failed I-walls at Orleans and Michoud Canals, to identify geotechnical, structural, and geologic distinctions between failed and non-failed reaches.
Performance of the HPS during Hurricane Katrina offered many lessons to be learned. These lessons learned include: the lack of resiliency in the HPS; the need for risk-based planning and design approach; the need for the examination of system-wide functionality; and knowledge, technology, and expertise deficiencies in the HPS arena. In addition, understanding of the failure mechanisms and related causes of the levee and floodwall breaches provides a new direction for future designs of hurricane protection systems.
G. Hunter, R. Fell, S. McGrath
The main embankment at Tullaroop Reservoir is a 42m high zoned earth and rockfill dam that was constructed in the late 1950s. The constructed embankment has a very broad, well compacted clay earthfill zone with dumped rockfill on the mid to lower upstream and downstream shoulders.
Over a two week period in April 2004 a diagonal crack of 60mm width and greater than 2m depth developed on the downstream shoulder of the main embankment. The crack was located on the left abutment and extended from the crest to the toe of the embankment. The diagonal crack terminated at the downstream edge of the crest. A continuous longitudinal crack extended along the downstream edge of the crest from the diagonal crack almost to the left abutment. Since April 2004 no further widening of the diagonal crack has been observed.
This paper presents the findings of a series of site investigations and analysis to understand the mechanism for formation of the diagonal crack, and the risk assessment process that culminated in the eventual construction of a full height filter buttress on the left abutment of the main embankment. Factors that influenced the cracking included the change in slope in the foundation profile, the temporary diversion channel on the left abutment, residual stresses in the dam abutment due to differential settlement during construction, a complex foundation geology and presence of shear surfaces in a Tertiary alluvial sequence that formed due to valley formation, an historic dry period and a prolonged period of drawdown. The presence of the crack and its assessed mechanism of formation presented a dam safety risk of piping through the embankment. The risk evaluation process was worked through with URS, Goulburn-Murray Water (G-MW), and G-MW’s expert panel, and eventuated in construction of the localised filter buttress in February – March 2006 to address the dam safety deficiency.
Peter Hill, Rory Nathan, Phillip Jordan, Mark Pearse
This paper outlines the development and application of the Risk Analysis Prioritisation Tool (RAPT) which has been developed as an interactive tool to aid dam safety risk management. RAPT allows the risk profile and prioritisation of upgrades to be incrementally updated as inputs are refined. The paper outlines some of the requirements of a risk management tool and the resulting functionality of RAPT and the lessons learnt from its application to more than 75 dams.
Issues covered include:
SunWater manages its portfolio of 29 major dams through 6 business centres each responsible for the Dam Safety Program for the dams under its management control.
The effectiveness of responses during an emergency depends on the amount of planning and training performed. Management must show its support for dam safety programs and the importance of emergency planning.
If management is not interested in community protection and in minimising property loss, little can be done to promote dam safety. It is therefore management’s responsibility to see that a program is instituted and that it is frequently reviewed and updated.
The input and support of all communities must be obtained to ensure an effective program. The emergency response plan should be developed locally and should be comprehensive enough to deal with all types of emergencies specific to that site.
SunWater is a responsible dam owner and has recently upgraded all its emergency action plans in consultation with emergency services of Queensland. This paper details the basic steps to handle emergencies of water infrastructure. These emergencies include inflow floods, rapid drawdown, earthquake, sunny day failure, changes in reservoir water quality and terrorist attacks including hoax.
This paper is intended to assist small dam owners that do not have dam safety programs in place. It is not intended as an all inclusive safety program but rather a provision of guidelines for planning for emergencies.
The Water Act 2003 established a new role for the Environment Agency, that of the Enforcement Authority for the Reservoirs Act 1975 in England and Wales. The transfer of this regulatory role from 136 Local Authorities has had a significant impact on the regulated community. Further change is heralded with the forthcoming introduction of Reservoir Flood Plans, Post-Incident Reporting and a review of current regulations. The improvements sought in reservoir safety may be at risk due to a growing skills shortage and increasing financial constraints imposed by owners.
This paper highlights the issues impacting on the reservoir industry in England and Wales and in recognising developments made by ANCOLD members the author seeks to understand how they are being responded to in Australia.