A brief overview of dam surveillance is given from a South African perspective and more specifically the perspective of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). DWAF’s Ten Commandments for the design of dam monitoring systems serve as introduction and this is followed by a summary of the design steps. The various parameters that can be measured and the South African preferences are discussed briefly followed by a synoptic description of crack and joint monitoring in South Africa. This provides the background for DWAF’s recent developments in 3-D Crack-Tilt gauges. Some of DWAF’s achievements as well as some of the blunders made by the author during the past 30 years are illustrated by means of a few case histories.
Lawrie Schmitt and Angus Paton
As the owner of most of the large dams in South Australia the South Australian Water Corporation (SA Water) is responsible for the safety of these structures and their designed function of water supply and flood control. In order to meet these responsibilities SA Water monitors the performance of the structures using engineering deformation surveys and various forms of instrumentation. This paper outlines the instrumentation and survey monitoring undertaken at SA Water large dams and discusses the issues arising.
G. L. Sills, N. D. Vroman, J. B. Dunbar, R. E. Wahl
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall just east of New Orleans and inflicted widespread damage on the Hurricane Protection System (HPS) for southeast Louisiana. Subsequent flooding was a major catastrophe for the region and the Nation.
The response to this disaster by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers included forming an Interagency
Performance Evaluation Taskforce (IPET) to study the response of the system and, among many lines of inquiry, to identify causes of failure of levees and floodwalls.
Beginning in September 2005, the IPET gathered geotechnical forensic data from failed portions of levees and floodwalls. Major clues discovered at the 17th Street break, including clay wedges dividing a formerly continuous layer of peat, led to an explanation of the failures. Field data from the failure sites were interpreted within the regional geologic setting of the New Orleans area to identify geologic and geotechnical factors that contributed to the catastrophe. The data gathered provided a method that resulted in the “IPET Strength Model.” This strength was used in analyses of the I-walls and levees using limit equilibrium stability analyses, physical modeling using a powerful centrifuge, and finite-element analyses.
The results of all three types of studies revealed a consistent mode of failure that included deformation of the I-walls and foundation instability. The IPET also studied non-failed I-walls at Orleans and Michoud Canals, to identify geotechnical, structural, and geologic distinctions between failed and non-failed reaches.
Performance of the HPS during Hurricane Katrina offered many lessons to be learned. These lessons learned include: the lack of resiliency in the HPS; the need for risk-based planning and design approach; the need for the examination of system-wide functionality; and knowledge, technology, and expertise deficiencies in the HPS arena. In addition, understanding of the failure mechanisms and related causes of the levee and floodwall breaches provides a new direction for future designs of hurricane protection systems.
The Koralpe hydropower scheme is a major development on the Feistritzbach tributary of the River Drau to utilize water in a 50 MW powerhouse located in the south-eastern Carinthia, Europe. The Soboth reservoir is situated 735 m higher in a narrow valley and is created by the 85 m high Feistritzbach dam which was constructed near the border of Austria and Slovenia between 1988 and 1990. This rockfill dam is the latest addition to KELAG’s more than 15 structures and is sealed by an asphaltic core. The excellent deformability and impermeability of the asphaltic core is able to follow the deformation of the compacted rock-fill material best during construction, initial filling and operation period without any seepage. The asphaltic core was placed in three 20 cm layers per day by a specially developed placing unit from a contractor. The upstream and downstream filter zone was placed at the same time with the same machine and compacted carefully by vibrating rollers. The dam is curved in plan with a radius of 650 m and contains about 1.6 million m³ rock fill material. The surface of the downstream side was built exceeding the environmental standards of the time.The most important indicator of the normal function of a dam is the behaviour of seepage. A monitoring system of seepage, piezometers, earth pressure cells and deformation has been installed. The seepage water is monitored online at seven points of the dam base and at the access tunnel to the bottom outlet valve. Geodetic measurements on and inside the dam are done once a year. Several additional pieces of surveillance equipment were installed to observe the behaviour of the asphaltic core. The paper concentrates on the design, construction and performance of the dam with the asphaltic core.
John Bosler and Francisco Lopez
The ANCOLD “Guidelines for the Design of Dams for Earthquake” were published in August 1998. The guidelines contain a brief outline of the performance requirements and recommend, in general terms, a method of analysis for intake towers.
Over the last three decades there has been considerable research on the seismic performance of intake towers as they move into their inelastic range. In the years following the publication of the ANCOLD guidelines, some of the findings from this research have been incorporated into revised design procedures issued by the US Army Corps of Engineers. These procedures, if embraced by ANCOLD and the local dam engineering community, are likely to have a significant impact on how the structural adequacy of existing towers under seismic loading are assessed.
Rocking behaviour in which the tower becomes unstable as a transient condition has long been recognised as acceptable under certain conditions. Attempts to prevent tower rocking by measures such as retrofitting tensioned ground anchors may, in some situations, be of limited value in improving the seismic performance of a tower and could result in an increase in bending moments in the tower stem. Guidance is now available on the amount of rocking behaviour that is tolerable.
For seismic events greater than the Operating Basis Earthquake most towers will start to exhibit inelastic behaviour. Specific guidance is also now available on the length of time during an earthquake that bending moments in excess of the elastic capacity can be tolerated, the amount by which these moments can exceed the nominal bending moment capacity and the vertical extent of the tower stem that can be stressed beyond its elastic limit.
The paper discusses the different approaches taken by ANCOLD and the Corps of Engineers. Key differences in outcomes are highlighted using a worked example for a typical reinforced concrete tower and the ANCOLD approach is found to be generally, but not always, more conservative. The paper concludes with recommendations for dealing with these differences.
Ensuring compliance with the Regulator’s requirements is a cornerstone consideration for any water corporation in planning its risk minimisation strategies against dam failure. With the increased focus on due diligence and corporate governance however, there are emerging themes that are of equal importance for a water corporation in planning protections against its core risks to dam safety. These considerations include: