Ensuring compliance with the Regulator’s requirements is a cornerstone consideration for any water corporation in planning its risk minimisation strategies against dam failure. With the increased focus on due diligence and corporate governance however, there are emerging themes that are of equal importance for a water corporation in planning protections against its core risks to dam safety. These considerations include:
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The paper describes the methodology, operative techniques and organizational aspects that are used for dam safety assessment procedures. Kelag owns 15 larger dams with wall heights up to 110 m. It is necessary to monitor the aging of the structures and to check all safety equipment regularly. The manned control centre is situated at the KELAG Headquarter in Klagenfurt, which is the capital of Austria’s southern-most Province, Carinthia. KELAG is the principal electricity supplier in Carinthia, and owns several reservoirs in the Austrian Alps. The whole hydropower system has a capacity of 434 MW with an annual production of 1000 GWh. During the last century KELAG employees designed, supervised and constructed most of the structures in cooperation with the authorities. Most of the rock-fill dams have a bituminous concrete sealing on the upstream face. KELAG owns one concrete arch dam with a height of 30 m. A pendulum monitors the movement of the dam crest. This information is transmitted to both the power house and the manned control centre in Klagenfurt. Seepage is monitored at all rock-fill dams. In case of an alarm a skilled engineer has to be informed by the staff of the manned control centre. This dam safety engineer starts to check the reasons on site and manages the emergency action plan. Data has been collected since 1998 and special software is used to handle this information, carry out interpretation and safety assessments. One aim of data collection is to develop a decision support system performing online evaluation, explanation and interpretation of dam behaviour. Normally, once a year geodetic measurements are carried out at all dams.
KELAG’s experience gained in the use of automatic monitoring and risk assessment of dams is covered in this paper. The monitoring systems show the state of the structures and those showing anomalous situations requiring human intervention can be identified as soon as possible. Although the repercussions of the free market system have led to substantial staff reductions, the quality of dam surveillance has had to remain unaffected. Dam safety is guaranteed by new types of instrumentation, data transmission and data assessment. A special software has to be updated constantly.
Legal and moral requirements necessitate an “equivalent to industry standard” approach to dam management by all dam owners. As an urban authority Central Highlands Water has a portfolio of dams with a broad range of classification and risk. ANCOLD Guidelines form the basis of our approach to dam management. Thus any guidelines developed can have significant affect on our budget and operation. Guidelines with requirements targeted at extreme and high hazard dams managed by large authorities with “deep pockets” may not be reasonable to impose upon low risk structures managed by lesser authorities. This does not mean smaller authorities want to do it on the “cheap” but budgets for such infrastructure can be hard to sustain. Consequently when guidelines are considered so too should the flow on affect to those who must implement them.
Peter Hill, Rory Nathan, Phillip Jordan, Mark Pearse
This paper outlines the development and application of the Risk Analysis Prioritisation Tool (RAPT) which has been developed as an interactive tool to aid dam safety risk management. RAPT allows the risk profile and prioritisation of upgrades to be incrementally updated as inputs are refined. The paper outlines some of the requirements of a risk management tool and the resulting functionality of RAPT and the lessons learnt from its application to more than 75 dams.
Issues covered include:
Verbund – Austrian Hydro Power (AHP) is the owner and operator of 27 large dams. The highest dam is the 200 m high Koelnbrein arch dam and the highest embankment dam is the 83 m high Durlass-boden dam. Instrumentation of the dams of AHP comprises almost all kinds of instruments employed in dam monitoring. Manual measurements are carried out with the help of portable terminals. Auto-matic monitoring with an early warning system is implemented at all dams. Besides a description of the monitoring system and some “interesting” measurement results the article also deals with organisational aspects of dam surveillance.
The case study of Koelnbrein arch dam is appended to the article. It contains a brief description of the original dam and the encountered problems as well as of the main elements of the remedial works. Dam surveillance and the performance up to now are also dealt with.
John Bosler and Francisco Lopez
The ANCOLD “Guidelines for the Design of Dams for Earthquake” were published in August 1998. The guidelines contain a brief outline of the performance requirements and recommend, in general terms, a method of analysis for intake towers.
Over the last three decades there has been considerable research on the seismic performance of intake towers as they move into their inelastic range. In the years following the publication of the ANCOLD guidelines, some of the findings from this research have been incorporated into revised design procedures issued by the US Army Corps of Engineers. These procedures, if embraced by ANCOLD and the local dam engineering community, are likely to have a significant impact on how the structural adequacy of existing towers under seismic loading are assessed.
Rocking behaviour in which the tower becomes unstable as a transient condition has long been recognised as acceptable under certain conditions. Attempts to prevent tower rocking by measures such as retrofitting tensioned ground anchors may, in some situations, be of limited value in improving the seismic performance of a tower and could result in an increase in bending moments in the tower stem. Guidance is now available on the amount of rocking behaviour that is tolerable.
For seismic events greater than the Operating Basis Earthquake most towers will start to exhibit inelastic behaviour. Specific guidance is also now available on the length of time during an earthquake that bending moments in excess of the elastic capacity can be tolerated, the amount by which these moments can exceed the nominal bending moment capacity and the vertical extent of the tower stem that can be stressed beyond its elastic limit.
The paper discusses the different approaches taken by ANCOLD and the Corps of Engineers. Key differences in outcomes are highlighted using a worked example for a typical reinforced concrete tower and the ANCOLD approach is found to be generally, but not always, more conservative. The paper concludes with recommendations for dealing with these differences.