This paper sets out the principles, practices and issues relevant to the sharing of
costs for dam safety upgrades in southwest Western Australia and other locations.
? the general principles (noting that in practice multiple conditioning factors
? the practical outcomes for cost sharing in Australian jurisdictions;
? the beneficiaries of the dams, the water and the safety upgrades;
? legacy costs (including IPART’s framework and whether this can be directly
applied to the southwest);
? the Bulk Water Service Agreement;
? the question of price impacts and affordability based on surveys of farm
performance, water use and profitability; and
? the pricing impact of treating safety upgrades as if Harvey Water owned the
We examine the impact of applying economic allocation principles to this task and the
impact of other criteria such as dam safety obligations, hazards presented by a large dam,
community expectations for public safety, the broader public safety, welfare and state and
regional economic benefits reliant on dam safety, significant community costs subsidised by
irrigation customers, State Government ownership, and the effects on bulk water prices
should customers be required to fully fund the necessary dam safety upgrading.
This paper outlines how Grampians Wimmera Mallee Water (trading as GWMWater) and its consultants managed the upgrading of Bellfield dam’s 43m high, reinforced concrete dry outlet tower and discharge facilities. The upgrading included improvements to operations, the provision of safe person and materials access into the tower and its 1200 mm diameter steel penstock, anchoring the tower with post tensioned cable anchors to resist seismic loads, refurbishing a 1200 mm butterfly valve and penstock corrosion assessments and repair.
Prior to the upgrading, access to all areas was difficult and unsafe to some areas. In particular no provision had been made during the original construction for butterfly valve removal or safe access into vertical sections of the penstock. Overcoming these deficiencies required considerable survey, detailed movement planning and attention to detail.
Howard and Opper
Dam safety planning is a team game. There are many players involved and there is a need for information to be shared and actions to be properly coordinated. The State Emergency Service is the legislated combat agency for flooding in New South Wales and is responsible for planning for and conducting the warning and evacuation of communities at risk from floods, including floods affected by dams. The successful execution of these responsibilities is dependent upon the continuing development of a strong, cooperative relationship between the dam owners and managers, dam regulators and emergency managers and the effective incorporation of community expectations in dam safety planning.
This paper explores some of the ways that this relationship can help to meet well accepted community expectations in respect of risk to life and property and outlines progress made in dam safety planning to date. The emergency response aspect of dam failure planning is still a relatively immature field in Australia, and it follows that there are lessons to be learned as we proceed. In that context, the paper also describes some of the difficulties the State Emergency Service has encountered in its role as the response planning agency and suggests some guiding principles to enhance future interactions between the key stakeholders.
Stuart Macnish, Nikki Bennett
The $70 million upgrade of Wivenhoe Dam is being undertaken by the Wivenhoe Alliance, in close
proximity to the town of Fernvale, Queensland. As part of the Alliance’s commitment to delivering positive outcomes for the local community, it was decided part way through the project, to commit to delivering a ‘signature’ community legacy project. The team brainstormed a range of options and a decision-making matrix was used to choose the project that would best meet its objectives.
A partnership has been formed between the Alliance, Esk Shire Council and SEQWater to deliver a
master-planned project which incorporates elements such as a community information/service facility,upgrade of Fernvale Memorial Park, streetscape enhancements, improved parking and installation of shelters along the adjacent rail trail. These major partners, together with representatives of the local community, constitute the steering committee, which oversees planning of the project.
The project aims to encourage visitors to the area, to provide improved amenity and sense of pride for the region, and in turn encourage strong relationships for SEQWater in the area in which they operate. Due to tight time frames the partnership is managing the fund raising activities, community consultation and design processes in parallel.
This paper discusses the process by which the Alliance was able to deliver this remarkable project, within a short timeframe. It also discusses how the local community has been involved and the benefits, which have resulted.
David Ho, Karen Riddette, Michael Hogg, Jayanta Sinha and John Roberts
Blowering Dam was constructed in 1968 by the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority, on behalf of the Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission. It is a large earth and rockfill embankment dam, approximately 112m high and 808m long, with a concrete chute spillway at the right abutment. The reservoir holds about 1,628GL of water that is mainly for irrigation and supplying an 80MW hydro-electric power station. The dam is owned and operated by State Water Corporation, NSW.
Revisions to the design flood estimate have highlighted the dam requiring an upgrade to cope with increased discharge rates. The NSW Department of Commerce has carried out feasibility studies of different upgrade options. The need to evaluate the hydraulic performance of the existing un-gated spillway was identified. Flow overtopping the chute walls can potentially erode the backfill behind the walls, and, the rockfill on the downstream toe of the embankment. Consequently, this may lead to significant damage of the spillway and may risk the safety of the dam.
Hydraulic analysis of the spillway using a 3-D computational fluid dynamics model was performed for
various flood levels to determine the discharge coefficients and the discharge rating curve. It was also required to identify whether the chute walls need raising to contain the increased discharges. These results were compared with those calculated by other “standard” methods. Such verification provided a level of confidence in the analysis results which were then used in the studies to assess available upgrade options.
In order to have further confidence in the analysis, the computed results were validated against physical test data and some limited information from an actual discharge. Further verification against established theory was conducted by modelling a supercritical flow through a contraction in an open-channel in order to see if the computation could predict the shock wave effect that was observed in physical models as well as full scale channels. A reasonably good correlation was obtained from all validating tests.
This paper presents some background of the proposed dam upgrade, potential upgrade options considered and details of the hydraulic modelling of the spillway. Some interesting flow behaviour caused by the shock wave will be highlighted.
The Tarong coal-fired power station near Kingaroy in southern Queensland discharges ash to a storage facility of 42,000 ML capacity, impounded by a 48 m high-zoned earth and rockfill dam embankment. The embankment was constructed in 1980–81. In recent years, Tarong Energy Corporation (TEC) has investigated a number of options for a new storage facility as the remaining capacity of the existing ash dam storage diminishes. TEC determined that the existing facility should be upgraded to provide additional storage capacity for the short term. At the same time, there emerged a requirement to improve the long-term seismic resistance of the embankment. Enlarging the existing spillway cut provided the material for a 400,000 m3 weighting zone and, by reducing the design flood freeboard, extended the ash disposal capacity by several years without a need to raise the embankment. Challenges included significant foundation seepage and deteriorated riprap. The paper describes the issues, risks, adopted criteria, investigation undertaken, and implementation of the upgrading works. Innovative approaches to the provision of future storage capacity are outlined.