John Grimston Sally Marx Robin Dawson and Peter Thomson
The Wai-iti Valley is located in the northern region of New Zealand’s South Island. Water demand during summer in the Wai-iti Valley is greater than the available supply, resulting in water allocation restrictions and pressure on in-stream habitat and uses. Further, the summer water resource in the Wai-iti Catchment is currently over-allocated. Thus, since the mid 1980s, Tasman District Council (TDC) has been unable to grant new water permits to take water from either rivers or groundwater in the Wai-iti Catchment. Existing water permit quotas have been reduced where they were not being used, but despite this agricultural, horticultural and domestic use is frequently restricted during dry years.
Recently, the need for a community solution was identified for the Wai-iti Valley area. The Wai-iti Water Augmentation Committee (comprising representatives from the local community and TDC) was set up in 1995 to find the best option for the northernmost extent of the Wai-iti valley. A feasibility study for a community dam was completed in 2001 identifying small off-river storage dams as options. The proposed scheme is located in a tributary of the Wai-iti River and is essentially a water harvesting project where winter flows in the stream would be impounded and stored, and gradually released on a regular basis back into the stream and Wai-iti River system during dry summer periods.
The paper will cover the project’s economic objectives as well as community and environmental impacts and the consenting process under the Resource Management Act. Dam construction is planned to start in October 2004.
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This paper outlines how Grampians Wimmera Mallee Water (trading as GWMWater) and its consultants managed the upgrading of Bellfield dam’s 43m high, reinforced concrete dry outlet tower and discharge facilities. The upgrading included improvements to operations, the provision of safe person and materials access into the tower and its 1200 mm diameter steel penstock, anchoring the tower with post tensioned cable anchors to resist seismic loads, refurbishing a 1200 mm butterfly valve and penstock corrosion assessments and repair.
Prior to the upgrading, access to all areas was difficult and unsafe to some areas. In particular no provision had been made during the original construction for butterfly valve removal or safe access into vertical sections of the penstock. Overcoming these deficiencies required considerable survey, detailed movement planning and attention to detail.
The Ross River Dam was constructed in 1974 following design by the State Government, including
hydraulic model testing, by SMEC. The maximum spillway discharge at that time was 1100 m3/s.
Latterly, the dam and spillway have come up for a comprehensive review given that the dam is in an extreme hazard category because of its location only a short distance upstream of the city of
Townsville. The revised hydrology has produced outflow hydrographs peaking at over 4 000 m3/s – more than three and a half times the original – to be passed through the 130 ft (39.62 m) wide
The paper describes the hydraulic modelling planned and carried out to determine changes needed to handle such high discharges. The modelling was to provide for the installation of radial gates and piers, and study of the water level, pressure and dissipation conditions in the dissipator for several key discharges through the range to PMF. Pressure measurements included transients, consideration of the potential for uplift of the basin floor slabs, the integrity of the walls to handle the differential loads, and, as a major consideration, the energy conditions in the flow exiting the dissipator and the integrity of the rock downstream to avoid erosion. Each of these aspects will be addressed in the paper both from the modelling and interpretation standpoint and from the civil structural analysis standpoint, together with a description of the strengthening works required to achieve a satisfactory outcome.
The Stage I construction of the Ross River Dam was completed in December 1973. The reservoir
reached full supply level (FSL) and then spilled in January 1974. In 1976, the left embankment was
raised to Stage II level. Spillway gates were installed in February 1978 with full supply level for
Stage 1A (FSL).
In the years following the first filling of the reservoir after the raising of FSL, salt scalding
downstream of the northern portion of the left embankment occurred. This was attributed to
foundation seepage. Investigations started in 1978 to define what remedial measures were required to ensure the safety of the left embankment. Fissured clays were first discovered in the foundations of the Ross River Dam during these investigations.
Fissures could substantially reduce the overall strength of the soil foundations. Therefore the effect of these fissures needs to be considered when evaluating the acceptable levels of reliability against embankment failure. More extensive fissuring was discovered during the current investigations and a cataloguing system was employed to characterise the foundation conditions.
A simplified layer model was adopted early on in the design but did not fully demonstrate the
complexity of the subsurface conditions. Extensive use was made of historical geological data,
current investigation data and the application of GIS systems. The resulting model more clearly
represents the foundation conditions and high degree of variability and was used in subsequent risk assessments for the upgrade design.
Stuart Macnish, Natarsha Woods, Michael Dixon
What happens when the people that undertake early environmental investigation stay on as part of the delivery team throughout the design and construction phases of a major project such as the Wivenhoe Alliance?
Often, the early investigation for projects, particularly in the case of environmental impact assessments and approvals processes, is carried out independently of the construction team. In the case of the Wivenhoe Alliance, these issues were set out in the scope of the project itself and delivered by the same team during construction.
The benefits and outcomes have been impressive not only for the project, but for SEQWater and the local community into the future. Improved biodiversity values, increased water quality protection, safety improvements, and value for money are only some of the key benefits experienced.
Individuals within the team also benefit. Environmental professionals are able to implement their
knowledge ‘on-ground’ and progressively improve practices in an area of constant change due to
construction initiatives and timeframes.
This paper explores the specific areas in which the involvement of environmental professionals throughout early investigation and planning, design and construction have benefited the Wivenhoe Alliance and the outcomes that have resulted from this innovative approach.
This paper sets out the principles, practices and issues relevant to the sharing of
costs for dam safety upgrades in southwest Western Australia and other locations.
? the general principles (noting that in practice multiple conditioning factors
? the practical outcomes for cost sharing in Australian jurisdictions;
? the beneficiaries of the dams, the water and the safety upgrades;
? legacy costs (including IPART’s framework and whether this can be directly
applied to the southwest);
? the Bulk Water Service Agreement;
? the question of price impacts and affordability based on surveys of farm
performance, water use and profitability; and
? the pricing impact of treating safety upgrades as if Harvey Water owned the
We examine the impact of applying economic allocation principles to this task and the
impact of other criteria such as dam safety obligations, hazards presented by a large dam,
community expectations for public safety, the broader public safety, welfare and state and
regional economic benefits reliant on dam safety, significant community costs subsidised by
irrigation customers, State Government ownership, and the effects on bulk water prices
should customers be required to fully fund the necessary dam safety upgrading.