Maged Aboelata, David S. Bowles, and Anthony Chen
This paper describes and demonstrates some recent enhancements in LIFESim, a modular, spatially distributed, dynamic simulation system for estimating potential life loss from natural and dam-failure
floods. LIFESim can be used for dam safety risk assessment and to explore options for improving the effectiveness of emergency planning and response by dam owners and local authorities. Development of LIFESim has been sponsored by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and ANCOLD.
Recent enhancements include a dynamic transportation model in the Warning and Evacuation module, additional variables in the Uncertainty Mode, and some new output displays. The transportation model represents the effects of traffic density on vehicle speed and also contraflow, which is sometimes used in evacuations, without requiring the details of road geometry and traffic signal operations.
The Deterministic and Uncertainty Modes of LIFESim are demonstrated for the sunny day failure of a
large dam. Sensitivity studies are presented for varying the warning initiation time, four emergency
shelter location cases, and a five-fold increase in population with no change in the capacity of the
road network. Comparisons with the Graham  Method are included. Plans for further model
development are summarised, including a user-friendly version that can be distributed to other users
and a Simplified Mode for making approximated life-loss estimates for preliminary studies.
B Dyer, A Evans, J Titterton
Hume Dam is managed by State Water Corporation, NSW while Dartmouth Dam and Yarrawonga Weir are managed by Goulburn-Murray Water (G-MW),Victoria, all under direction from River Murray Water (RMW).
A series of dam safety emergency exercises commenced with an exercise involving the above agencies and has built up to a multi-agency exercise. The exercises have been designed to test the Dam Safety Emergency Plans, Emergency Action Plans and Flood Operations Plans for these dams under a variety of emergency situations.
These exercises have consisted of a tabletop exercise in 2002 involving the water agencies RMW, G-MW and State Water which presented terrorism and earthquake scenarios; a flood exercise in 2003 for Dartmouth Dam, Hume Dam and Yarrawonga Weir with six control rooms set up at dam sites and water agencies; and a multi agency tabletop flood exercise in 2004 for Hume Dam, involving RMW, G-MW, State Water, Police, SES and local government authorities from both NSW and Victoria.
The third exercise focused on communication and flow of information between agencies, not detailed tactical response.
Outcomes aimed for in these exercises have been improvement in the water agency emergency response plans and inter-agency communications, clarification of roles, responsibilities and capabilities, and to determine opportunities for improved cooperation between agencies.
The exercises highlighted areas which require improvement in the area of emergency response. Implementation of recommendations arising from each exercise is in progress.
Roy Fenderson & Wayne Peck
Although most people realise that earthquakes cannot be predicted, the Community expects that Dam Owners will utilise leading edge technology and the latest scientific understanding of earthquakes to mitigate the impacts of significant earthquakes once they occur.
The rapid analysis of large earthquake events with respect to critical dams can greatly enhance an emergency response. In order to achieve this enhancement, three sequential, interdependent processes must be in place. These processes are data collection, processing of the data into intelligent warnings and responding to the warnings appropriately. The absence of any one of these three processes or three “legs of the stool” destabilises the other two – greatly reducing the effectiveness of the whole.
This paper will discuss how Hydro Tasmania and the Seismology Research Centre designed, operate and manage an innovative system that encompasses the first two processes, and how their results integrate into Hydro Tasmania’s Dam Safety Emergency Plan (DSEP).
Clare Weir, completed in 1978, is situated on the Burdekin River some 50 kms from the mouth near Ayr in North Queensland.
A fish ladder was built on the right bank as part of the original construction but observations of the fishway’s performance over a number of years and more recently by the Queensland Fisheries Service (QFS) have established that the fishway is not functioning as well as had been expected. Sampling upstream of the weir has shown a distinct reduction in both fish numbers and fish species.
Since 1997, a number of studies have been undertaken to examine options for improving the fishway performance. The outcome of the studies concluded that the installation of a fish lock clearly represented the best means of improving fish transfer performance at the weir.
This paper presents the various options investigated and outlines how the new fish lock will be integrated into the existing weir structure.
SEQWater is the major supplier of bulk water to Local Governments and industry in South East Queensland. SEQWater owns Wivenhoe, Somerset and North Pine Dams. Wivenhoe Dam ( Lake Wivenhoe) is located on the Brisbane River in Esk Shire. The storage provides both flood mitigation and water supply storage to Brisbane and Ipswich. The water supply storage capacity at full supply level is 1,160 GL. An additional 1,450 GL of storage above full supply level is used for flood mitigation.
Changes to the estimation of extreme rainfall events has resulted in significant increases in the estimates of the PMF since the original design of Wivenhoe Dam. To upgrade the dam SEQWater formed an alliance with Leighton, Coffey, MWH and the NSW Department of Commerce Dam & Civil Section.
A preferred upgrade option for Wivenhoe Dam has been selected, designed and construction started by the Wivenhoe Alliance. This paper presents details of the selected upgrade option.
J Walker, M Gillon and L Mejia
The Aviemore Dam was built in the late 1960’s and is located on the Waitaki River in the South Island of New Zealand. It is comprised of a 56m high earth dam and a concrete dam housing the power plant and spillway. The dam is located across the Waitangi Fault. This fault was considered to be an ‘inactive’, normal fault at the time the dam was built. The dam is owned and operated by Meridian Energy Ltd.
This paper is in two parts. The first is to introduce the owners Dam Safety management processes. The second discusses the application of these processes to a State of the Art investigation of the faults near the dam, the derivation of seismic loads and the assessment of the dam for seismic loads including potential movement on the Waitangi Fault affecting both the earth dam and the reservoir.
Notable features of the work will be described including: