M. Barker, T. Burt, K. McCallum-Gaul, Dr M. Barry
The disused Stapylton quarry is located in the suburbs of the Queensland Gold Coast. Gold Coast City Council, as part of the Northern Wastewater Strategy, has included the use of the quarry for storage and re-distribution of reclaimed water from the Beenleigh Water Reclamation Facility (WRF) to the downstream cane farmlands. A comprehensive EIS has been produced, which has strict water quality requirements for the quarry environs as well as the reservoir and outflow. This paper presents the background to the Northern Wastewater Strategy, the requirements for the Stapylton reservoir and the analysis performed for the detailed design of the embankment dam and the inlet bubble plume destratification system. The modelling of the destratification system was undertaken using the programme DYnamic REservoir Simulation Model (DYRESM) coupled with Computational Aquatic Ecosystems DYnamics Model (CAEDYM). The outcomes and implications of the modelling for the design and system operation including environmental monitoring are discussed.
P Maisano, M Taylor , M Barker and A Parsons
South Para Dam, completed in 1958, is located on the South Para River, 38 km north of Adelaide. The embankment is 45 m high and comprises compacted crushed phyllite with rockfill toes. The 13 m high rock fill toes are protected with three-stage filters but the remaining 32 m of embankment height has no downstream filter protection.
The South Australian Water Corporation (SA Water), the owner and operator of the dam, is considering modifications to the dam, to augment its flood mitigation role. The proposed works, while not affecting the full supply level, involve a modification to the spillway crest and raising of the embankment crest to accommodate increased flood levels. SA Water therefore commissioned a dam safety review to assess the need for any piping or overtopping protection that may be required. This was followed by concept designs to ensure that flood mitigation work is compatible with any required dam safety upgrade work.
The results of a detailed dam failure risk analysis using event trees showed that the Societal Risk for the existing dam needed to be reduced, and that the proposed spillway modifications increased the Societal Risk due to the increased risk of piping failure with higher flood levels.
The risk analysis showed that eliminating the overtopping modes of failure by raising the dam crest is not sufficient in itself to achieve the required reduction in risk. The provision of filter protection to reduce the risk of piping failure is required, but it was shown that it is not necessary to provide full height filters as the provision of filters only above full supply level would be sufficient to achieve the required reduction in risk.
The recommended upgrade works, in addition to the proposed spillway modification for flood mitigation purposes, consist of filter protection and a weighting fill above the top berm (4.4 m below FSL) to facilitate connection to a possible full height filter in the future, and a parapet wall to provide overtopping protection.The resulting cost saving compared with the installation of full height filters is in excess of $2 Million.
The dam surveillance industry relies on deformation survey data to assist in understanding and monitoring dam performance. My paper presents an overview of New Zealand dam deformation surveying. The fundamentals and best practice of deformation surveying are discussed, along with accuracies achieved and developments in automated measurements in real time. The key to achieving high accuracy in the results is using precise well calibrated survey instruments, many redundant measurements, quality survey marks and rigorous computational routines.
This paper discusses reliability issues of the fourteen 3.85m high by 7.89m wide radial gates at Glenmaggie Dam in Victoria and the twin 3.6m high by 16.5m wide drum gates at Little Nerang Dam in Queensland. The Glenmaggie dam radial gates are manually controlled using electrically driven (mains and diesel generator power supply) hoist motors with a petrol driven hydraulic pack for use in the event of complete electrical power supply failure. A detailed fault tree analysis was developed for the spillway gate reliability of the Glenmaggie Dam gates as part of the risk assessment for the dam, which was being completed at the time of publishing the paper. Each of the identified components of the spillway gates, including human error in operation was used to evaluate the probability of failure of a single gate or multiple gates for inclusion in the event tree to estimate the risk and assist the evaluation of the requirement for remedial works. The Little Nerang drum gates are fully automatic hydraulically operated gates with independent operating mechanics and a common override system in the event of automatic system failure. Drum gates are uncommon on dams and the system operation is discussed together with an assessment of the reliability and measures taken for handling operating risks during floods for the dam, which has some stability concerns.
M. Barker, B. Vivian, J. Matthews and P. Oliver