Richard Olive John Wonnacott, Stefan Schwank
The Diavik Dyke was constructed in 2001/2 in a major sub-Arctic lake in Canada’s Northwest Territories, to permit an open-pit diamond mining operation. The dyke, 3.9km long, was built in water up to 20 metres deep in a period of 17 months. For ten months of this period the lake was frozen. The project was notable for the extreme climate, discontinuous permafrost in the dyke foundations, very difficult logistics and the exceptional environmental constraints.
Project economics dictated a short construction period to permit the early generation of revenue from the mine. To confidently deliver a secure dyke within the time frame, the world’s most technologically advanced cut-off wall equipment was designed and fabricated in Germany.
This paper provides an overview of the dyke and focuses in more detail on the specialty equipment used for the cut-off wall and foundation treatment.
Gregg Barker B.E. (Hons.) GradIEAust
Dam safety emergency plans (DSEPs) are typically produced for individual dams. For owners of a large portfolio of dams, this approach creates document control difficulties, requires excessive time and effort and can lead to confusion when a single emergency affects multiple dams having individual DSEPs. Hydro Tasmania has developed a single DSEP which is applicable to its portfolio of 54 referable dams. The DSEP contains generic emergency response procedures, is applicable to a whole range of generic dam safety incidents, uses a simple colour-coded flowchart-action list format, has a two-stage emergency response, retains all necessary dam-specific information and can be easily adapted to any organisational structure. This approach was found to have benefits in document control, flexibility in the management of the emergency response and short lead time in terms of having DSEPs which cover an entire portfolio of dams.
This paper discusses reliability issues of the fourteen 3.85m high by 7.89m wide radial gates at Glenmaggie Dam in Victoria and the twin 3.6m high by 16.5m wide drum gates at Little Nerang Dam in Queensland. The Glenmaggie dam radial gates are manually controlled using electrically driven (mains and diesel generator power supply) hoist motors with a petrol driven hydraulic pack for use in the event of complete electrical power supply failure. A detailed fault tree analysis was developed for the spillway gate reliability of the Glenmaggie Dam gates as part of the risk assessment for the dam, which was being completed at the time of publishing the paper. Each of the identified components of the spillway gates, including human error in operation was used to evaluate the probability of failure of a single gate or multiple gates for inclusion in the event tree to estimate the risk and assist the evaluation of the requirement for remedial works. The Little Nerang drum gates are fully automatic hydraulically operated gates with independent operating mechanics and a common override system in the event of automatic system failure. Drum gates are uncommon on dams and the system operation is discussed together with an assessment of the reliability and measures taken for handling operating risks during floods for the dam, which has some stability concerns.
Hydro Tasmania has recently upgraded the control systems for the spillway gates of three of its dams, Clark Dam, Meadowbank Dam and Liapootah Dam. The upgrades followed internal reliability assessments that highlighted high reliance on operator attendance, single points of failure and operational difficulties on each of the three gate systems.
The three gates are of contrasting types. Clark Dam Spillway Gates are submerged orifice type radial gates, operated by wire rope hoists. Meadowbank Crest Gates are flap type gates, held by 10 hydraulic cylinders per gate, a design that has had a difficult operating history. Liapootah is a floating drum gate. The upgrades for each gate therefore required different solutions, albeit within a common basis of design framework. The solutions arrived at are innovative, and meet or exceed worlds best practice.
All three gates are now fully automatic, with PLC control. The use of PLC’s significantly enhances the reliability of the gates. Extensive use is also made of the PLC in monitoring key systems. For example, an impossibly rapid lake level rise detected by one transducer, but not its duplicate, will be alarmed but ignored to avoid unnecessary discharge. All systems incorporate appropriate redundancy. The PLC systems also provide some automatic functional testing functionality and enhance remote alarms and local fault finding.
Mechanical systems were modified to facilitate automation and increase reliability. Stand by power sources used include auto-start diesel genset, DC batteries and a micro hydro generator.
The design and implementation of each of the upgrades was carried out by the Electrical and Mechanical Group of Hydro Tasmania’s Consulting Division, in conjunction with Generation Division’s Project Management Group.
M. Barker, B. Vivian, J. Matthews and P. Oliver
In 1998, ANCOLD Guidelines entitled “Guidelines for Design of Dams for Earthquake” was issued. The Guideline mainly deals with the seismic aspects of dams and only a basic reference is made to the seismic assessment of intake towers in Section 8.3. Although the much needed and pioneering step taken to introduce this Guideline is to be appreciated and it has covered the seismic aspects of dams, some confusion does exist amongst dam / structural engineers in assessing the seismic performance of concrete intake towers. This is mainly due to the fact the behaviour of reinforced concrete intakes towers is quite different from that of earth or concrete gravity dams. This confusion could potentially lead to gross overestimate of the inertia loads on concrete intake towers resulting in unnecessary expenditure in investigation and remedial works.
The energy dissipation due to inelastic hysteresis behaviour of concrete members results in a great reduction in the inertia loads compared with those calculated with traditional “elastic” analysis methods. This consequently results in significant reductions in bending moments and shear forces on the tower and its foundation. It is very important to understand the basic behaviour of reinforced concrete, considering the composite action of concrete, longitudinal & hoop reinforcing steel, before embarking in sophisticated dynamic analysis the outputs of which are highly dependent on the input parameters
The authors have developed a methodology in which the hysteresis energy dissipation due to the inelastic behaviour of concrete intake towers is considered. Various criteria were defined for serviceability and ultimate failure modes such as excessive deflection, spalling of concrete, buckling of reinforcing steel. The confinement effect of hoop steel on the core concrete is also considered.
This paper will present the fundamental aspects of seismic behaviour of reinforced concrete structures with practical cases as applied to intake towers. The results showed that the current methods adopted by various Dam Authorities in Australia are cursory and the energy dissipation aspect should be considered, in conjunction with expert advice, before undertaking any remedial works.