Thomas Zink, Michael Howat, Clive Anderson, Richard Davidson
This paper describes the refurbishment of Diversion Gate No 2 at Roxburgh Dam on the Clutha River, New Zealand. This 53m high concrete, gravity dam constructed in the 1950’s had three diversion gates fitted with stoney rollers which when opened into flow allows the rollers to disengage from the gate precluding subsequent closure. Diversion gate No. I was sealed off with a concrete plug. The remaining two diversion gates are required to provide additional flow control flexibility at the dam. Key aspects of the refurbishment design and construction include the system used to remove silt from upstream of the gate, and the condition of the gate itself and the concrete diversion channel after nearly fifty years of service. Brief details of the commissioning testing are also presented.
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Graeme Bell, Robin Fell and Mark Foster
Standards based, dam safety management has always been about managing risks. Risk based approaches attempt to quantify the risks in a formal manner, but are based on the same requirement for good investigation and engineering, and understanding of the physical processes, as standards based methods.
This is demonstrated by the assessment of the potential for internal erosion and piping of Eucumbene Dam. The assessment is a combination of semi-quantitative risk based, and standards based approaches, and considers the likelihood of initiation, continuation, progression to form a pipe, and breach. The filter transition zones are coarser than required to meet modern filter design criteria, but it has been demonstrated by laboratory testing, and relation to the performance of other dams, that if, in the low likelihood erosion of the core initiates, it will after some erosion, seal on the filter transition zone. The downstream zone of rockfill has sufficient permeability to discharge any potential leakage which might occur, so the likelihood of breach of the dam by piping is
Jenny Stewart, Murray Gillon
This paper describes decommissioning studies carried out as part of a dam safety improvement project by Coliban Water. The project results from a Portfolio Risk Assessment of 20 referable dams and the selection of 10 dams for safety improvements. Due to future water supply commitments and possible alternative supplies, eight of the reservoirs were subject to a decommissioning analysis as part of the dam safety options studied. The decommissioning studies included alternative uses, flora and fauna and other environmental issues, and European and aboriginal heritage studies.
As a result of the studies, five of the reservoirs will no longer be required for water supply. Two will be upgraded and handed over to others to manage as recreation sites and one will be decommissioned. Two are still being considered for either decommissioning or hand-over to others at a reduced capacity for habitat and heritage benefits.
For many years, engineers associated with the design, construction and operation of large dams have been undertaking environmental effects studies in association with their projects in the belief that they were thereby satisfying their obligation to the community whose interests they served. With increasing environmental consciousness of the community in developed countries, methods have been developed one by one for assessing environmental impacts of various kinds, and techniques have been developed for abating them.
However, the issue in November of the report of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) has focussed attention not only on the importance of bigger issues such as regional ecology, national economic disbenefits and social dislocation, but also on the vulnerability of dams to social and political hindsight.
This paper develops the above background, and shows why some excellently conceived techniques developed in the early 1970’s were capable of identifying almost all imaginable environmental impacts of dam projects, but were not applied in such a way as to deal adequately with the larger issues. It is argued that tools for dealing with all known issues now exist, but that responsible and competent application of the tools are not equivalent to successful application of them. d A new approach is suggested both to upgrade the quality of the decision and to make successful adoption of a soundly based decision more likely to withstand long term critical appraisal, by expressly recognising these decisions as ethical ones.
Bill Hakin, Phillip Solomon, Geoff Hughes, Peter Siers
Lyell Dam is located on the Coxs River near Lithgow NSW Australia. It was constructed in 1982 to supply cooling water to Delta Electricity’s Mt. Piper and Wallerawang power stations.
In 1994 the storage capacity of the dam was increased by 7,500 MI by raising the embankment height and installing two 3.5m high inflatable rubber dams on an enlarged and slightly raised spillway sill.
Two significant failures of the rubber dams in 1997 and 1999, led the dam owner, Delta Electricity, to seek a more reliable way of maintaining the increased FSL whilst still providing spillway capacity for the design flood.
Following a detailed review of options, Delta Electricity chose to reinstate the storage capacity with the Hydroplus Fusegate System. The Hydroplus System consists of a series of fusible units that progressively tip off the spillway as flood magnitude increases, thereby forming a controlled breach in the spillway and providing for passage of the design flood. At Lyell Dam it has been designed such that no units tip until the 20 000 AEP flood. The System is designed to act as a normal free overflow spillway up until extreme events when it is required to commence operation. Key factors in the selection process were safety, reliability and operation/maintenance.
This is the first installation of the Hydroplus Fusegate System in Australia or New Zealand. There are currently 35 installations throughout the world. The System has wide application with dam owners either seeking to store additional water and/or to increase the capacity of their existing spillways for safety reasons in an economical and efficient manner.
This paper examines the decision and selection process adopted by Delta Electricity. It also presents a case study for the design and construction stages of this unique solution for Lyell Dam.
Peter Lilley, Kelly Deighton, Don Tate, Craig Scott
In recent years TrustPower has undergone a rapid transition from a part owner of three dams in the Kaimai ranges south of Tauranga and the Hinemaiaia and Wheao schemes near Taupo in 1998, to the present ownership situation. Today TrustPower owns 22 dams comprising a range of structure types, including arch, earthfill, rockfill, concrete gravity and a number of embankment canal systems. The dam classifications for the dam portfolio vary from small to large and the NZSOLD potential impact ratings vary from very low to high. The portfolio includes some of the largest dams in New Zealand, for example Matahina Dam a 70m high central core rock fill, Patea Dam an 80m high earthfill dam and Mahinerangi Dam a 40 m high concrete arch dam with concrete gravity abutments.
The dam structures vary significantly in terms of age, potential impact and risk to TrustPower . The Dam Safety Management Procedures (including monitoring and surveillance systems, inspections and reviews) that existed for each dam also showed considerable variation in comparison.
The approach adopted for dam safety management is described, and the interrelationship with commercial objectives and commonly accepted standard practices.