The Victorian Water Industry Seismic Network was substantially upgraded in 1999. This paper will look at the design and outcomes of the seismic network from a risk management and emergency management perspective. Funding issues for a diversified network providing benefits to a range of clients within the one industry group will also be discussed.
Prior to 1999 the Victorian seismic network had been developed on an ad hoc basis resulting in an incomplete level of seismic coverage throughout the state. The upgraded network now provides sufficient coverage to provide an intensity based alarm service for all contributing Victorian Water Authorities.
Community expectations of essential service providers such as the water industry are that they will carry out their own risk management to provide for service continuity and sustainability and that they will contribute to emergency management processes because it is in their own best interest to do so.
The risk management model looks at creating resilient communities through planning for the four R’s. Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery. The Seismology Research Centre’s Earthquake Preparation Alarm and Response system (EPAR) deals with the four R’s in relation to seismic hazard.
The EPAR system contributes to the risk management processes of identifying risks and vulnerability’s; potential consequences; and mitigation opportunities. The EPAR system additionally contributes to the emergency management processes of crisis response, impact assessment and recovery.
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Now showing 1-12 of 27 2964:
Mark Locke, Buddhima Indraratna, Phillip Cummins and Gamini Adikari
ABSTRACT: Australia has a large number of older embankment dams, which have been in service and performed adequately for over 50 years. However, current industry practice in embankment dam design predicts that the granular filters within these dams may not be adequate. This may require refurbishment of the dam by retro-fitting a new filter to ensure the continued safety of the structure. This paper outlines the potential problems with older embankment dam designs, and the reasons for constructing a new filter. Potential problems may include inadequate or non-existent filters, risk of failure due to earthquake, piping, or excessive foundation seepage. Design methods for granular filters are described briefly, concentrating on whether an existing filter is adequate, and the potential improvement by constructing a new filter. Construction issues for placing filters on existing dams are also discussed.
A new analytical method, developed to describe the time dependent erosion and filtration within embankment dams, is described briefly. The model predicts particle erosion, transport and retention based on fundamental fluid mechanics and geotechnical concepts. The application of this model to the design of filters for new and existing dams will be described. The predictions of such analytical modelling can give a designer a significantly clearer picture of the purpose of a granular filter, the extent of core erosion that can be expected, and the effect of retrofitting a new filter to an existing dam.
Robert Wark, Nihal Vitharana and Michael Somerford
This paper reviews the history of dam remedial works on publicly-owned dams in Western Australia over the last 40 years. Projects have ranged from refurbishment of the facilities, through capacity upgrades to complete reconstruction. Major work has been undertaken on at least thirty dams. Most of these dams are now owned by Western Australia’s Water Corporation. The Corporation continues to undertake remedial works where necessary and now has a strategy in place for an on-going program of remedial works.
The paper outlines the scope of the work undertaken and why the work was required. The current status of the Corporation’s planning for an on-going remedial works program is also reported.
M. B. Barker and D. Holroyde
A detailed study was completed for the Stage 2 works of the Grahamstown Dam augmentation to investigate various alternatives for the slope protection of the Saddle Dam and Subsidiary Dam embankments, including a standards based and a risk management approach. The standards based approach required an evaluation of the slope protection level and least cost option based on the hazard rating of the dam. Due to the sand construction of the embankments, it was possible to apply a wave erosion model SBEACH to develop an economic risk model for optimising the slope protection alternatives. The erosion model included the effects of the wind direction, reservoir level and wind speed variation during flood events, embankment profile and material parameters. The risk management approach clearly showed that significant cost savings could be achieved by using the risk management approach. Furthermore, the cost curves indicated the sections of the embankments for which present capital works would not be economically justified and for which ongoing maintenance works would be economically advantageous.
D. S. Bowles
Portfolio risk assessment (PRA) can now be considered to be a standard of practice in Australia. In this paper various advances in the state-of-the-practice for performing PRA’s are reviewed, including some pitfalls and limitations. The uses of PRA outcomes by owners are discussed, along with some ways to improve the value derived from PRAs. The challenges that are common in seeking to achieve an integration of the PRA process into the owner’s dam safety management program and with broader business processes, and the importance of targeting PRA outcomes to an owner’s specific business needs, are emphasised.
Glen Hobbs and Danny Azavedo
Recent years have seen a growing awareness and understanding of the factors that contribute to the reliability of spillway gates and the incorporation of reliability data into overall dam risk studies.
The study of a number of spillway gate failures shows that no one component or incident leads to gate failure, but rather a combination of factors have resulted in gate failure. A rigorous reliability assessment should consider all factors, not only the equipment condition and performance but the complete system, from the receipt of data through to the actuation of the gates. It should take into account issues such as human factors, poor design, maintenance history and policy. Unfortunately one of the main hindrances to quantifying gate reliability is the lack of information on spillway gate equipment and system performance and failures.
This paper considers a number of gate failures, then looks at some of the tools of reliability assessment and the role of human factors in gate reliability.
The paper then discusses a recent study of four gated dams. For this study a systems approach was adopted and human factors were considered. The results compare favourably with other similar critical structures, and show that for these well designed and maintained structures human factors are the limiting criteria in multiple gate operations. The study also shows that the probability of opening all the spillway gates at a dam improves with time (2-4 hours) during the flood operation, and it is considered that time based reliability provides a more meaningful and useful assessment of overall spillway gate reliability.