The Bundaberg Irrigation Area (BIA) is served by a reticulation system of channels, pipelines, pump stations and balancing storages drawing water from a major dam (Fred Haigh on the Kolan River), augmented by a number of weirs and tidal barrages. The scheme as originally proposed in the late 1960’s included a major dam on the Burnett River that has never been built. Accordingly, the reliability of the system was lower than desired, a situation exacerbated by prolonged drought during the 1990’s.
In the 1980s, alternative (cheaper) sources of water supply were investigated and a weir site on the Burnett River (Walla) was selected as the most promising. In 1993, the Commonwealth and Queensland Governments agreed to the Sugar Industry Infrastructure Package (SHP). Walla Weir was included in the Package, subject to environmental and economic assessment.
Detailed impact assessment studies were carried out and submitted to both State and Commonwealth Environment departments. In the light of strong opposition from environmental groups (whose major concern was the Queensland Lungfish), the Federal Minister for the Environment commissioned an independent review of the IAS before granting approval.
Approval was conditional on the implementation of an Environmental Management Plan and a River Operation Plan as well as a commitment to undertake extensive baseline studies before any new development is proposed in the area. This paper will discuss the investigation and approval process and describe the additional monitoring/studies being carried out.
Kumara Arachchi and Kelvin J Lambkin
Wetlands by their very nature act as storages of pollutants and nutrients in systems subject to environmental stresses. Wingecarribee Swamp acted in this manner and enhanced the quality of catchment runoff flowing into the Wingecarribee Reservoir until the structural failure of early August 1998 in which 6000 megalitres of peat and sedimentary material were moved into the Reservoir. Protection of the Swamp’s functions and values is directly related to Sydney Catchment Authority’s core objectives of protecting the environment and protecting public health by supplying drinking water of acceptable quality. Due to the catastrophic failure, water quality in the reservoir and the ecological integrity of the Swamp have been compromised. The incident has also resulted in significant dam safety issues.
This paper describes the dam safety, catchment management and water quality response to the failure of a major peatland which covered 8% of the catchment of Wingecarribee Reservoir in the Southern Highlands of New South Wales.
A strategy designed to ensure that an existing dam continues to perform effectively will include:
This paper will explore each of these issues and how they may be applied to dams in a variety of situations. These situations include water supply reservoirs, flood retarding basins, levees and wastewater lagoons. While each situation is different, the underlying principles will remain consistent. The range of situations encountered by Victorian Water Authorities provides the inspiration for the development of an efficient approach to the management of the safety of dams.
Ahmad Shayan, Robert J. Wark and John Waters
The Canning Dam concrete gravity structure located in Western Australia has shown an upward movement of 18.3 mm and lateral upstream movement of 14.2 mm over the past 15 years of monitoring. These movements have been associated with considerable cracking of the upper parts of the dam and the upper gallery. Investigations have shown that the cause of the cracking was a strong alkali-aggregate reaction (AAR) in the concrete, brought about by a deformed granitic rock. Extensive horizontal and vertical cracking in the upper part of the dam wall has necessitated the removal of the section above the floor of the upper gallery level, and construction of a new reinforced concrete section to act as head beam for post-tensioning of the rest of the dam wall.
A set of small diameter cores were taken from the various parts for diagnostic purposes, and a vertical core of 100 mm diameter was taken through the whole thickness of the wall for the determination of the strength properties, alkali content and residual expansion potential. Based on these, a post-tensioning stress of 1.5-2.0 MPa has been calculated for restraining the residual expansion of the concrete. The spillway bridge structure which is part of the dam wall has also shown mild signs of deterioration. The piers and abutment walls and the deck were surveyed for corrosion activity and extent of AAR. This work showed that the spillway bridge structure was sound and only needed maintenance. The performance of a triple blend concrete mix containing a high volume of fly ash (45%) and silica fume (5%) developed for the replacement of the old concrete is also discussed.
The role of judgement in risk assessments as applied in dam safety management has been the source of considerable debate in recent years. With regard to risk analysis of dams, and while there is general agreement that judgement is an essential element of the process, essentially two schools of thought have emerged. One view holds that, in the assignment of probabilities, reliance can be based on collective engineering judgement that is anchored to a knowledge base. The second view holds that judgement should be based on the knowledge that is revealed by an appropriate amount of analysis. The paper, written from the perspective of the latter view, explores some of the underlying issues in this debate.
The role of judgement in risk evaluation, the process of judging the significance of risk, is considered to be equally important. However, the process of making value judgements and statements of principles is complex and often beyond the sphere of engineering. The third issue addressed in the paper concerns the search for answers to the question, “How good is the assessment?”