Robert E Saunders
The vast majority of dams in Australia are relatively small affairs. For example, approximately 90% of Queensland’ referable dams are less than 15 m in height. Most of these dams are owned by small communities, mining companies or farmers, many of which have smaller operations than those of Australia’s larger dam owners. In many cases the dam represents the owner’s sole source of water supply.
Many smaller dam owners are unaware of the key factors affecting the safety and best management of their facilities. Added to this is a general lack of understanding of dam related issues by the community at large. This often leads to significant owner and community concerns (and conflicts) that have the potential to jeopardise the viability, or worse, the safety of a project. The relative importance of the dam to the smaller dam owner often exacerbates these issues.
This paper serves to illustrate, by way of example, a consultant’s viewpoint of some of the issues encountered on small dam projects and suggests actions that the dams industry as whole could take to improve the situation.
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Now showing 1-12 of 33 2963:
Duane M. McClelland and David S. Bowles
There is a growing concern about the limitations of the approaches to life-loss estimation that are currently used in dam safety risk assessment. This paper summarises insights into factors that affect evacuation effectiveness, loss of life, and survival, based on a detailed review of historical dam breaks and other types of floods. The understanding and empirical characterisation of life loss dynamics being developed from these case histories are intended to provide the foundation for an improved practical life-loss estimation model.
Dr. Azam Khan and Dr. Anil Patnaik
Concrete dams are thinner than embankment dams and impose more concentrated loads on the foundation and abutments. A narrow valley with sufficient rock foundation is a typical site for concrete dam, which require a solid foundation that is relatively free of faults, shears, and major changes in foundation strength. Such discontinuities can overstress the concrete by causing some areas of dams to carry more loads than other areas. The measurement of deflections and use of finite element technique can predict the stresses in the concrete dams. A computer model is underdeveloped for prediction of deflections and stresses in Concrete Dam by using finite element. At the first stage of this study, measured deflections from Burrinjuck Dam are compared with the predicted deflections by using finite element. This paper outlines the deflections measured in the dam due to temperature variations and comparison of the measured thermal deflections with those predicted from a finite element analysis.
Jim Walker, Murray Gillon and John Grimston
Karapiro Dam is at the end of a cascade of hydropower dams on the Waikato River in New Zealand’s North Island. The 52m high, high hazard, arch dam retains the lake for a 96MW power station at its downstream toe. Safety reviews recommended a re-evaluation of the dam stability under seismic loading.
Dam owner, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ), commissioned consultants Tonkin & Taylor Ltd to carry out a series of studies and investigations which provided better understanding of the dam’s safety status. Investigations located a previously unrecorded continuous low strength thrust fault underlying the left abutment. This provided the potential for movement of the left abutment gravity blocks under earthquake loading, with adverse effects on arch dam and reservoir safety. Investigations showed the abutment cut off walls to be lower than the PMF lake level. High groundwater levels and erodible pumiceous soils were found at the left abutment. These findings prompted ECNZ to implement stability enhancement works.
This paper describes the studies and investigations, peer review process, and design and construction of enhancement works.
Ahmad Shayan, Robert J. Wark and John Waters
The Canning Dam concrete gravity structure located in Western Australia has shown an upward movement of 18.3 mm and lateral upstream movement of 14.2 mm over the past 15 years of monitoring. These movements have been associated with considerable cracking of the upper parts of the dam and the upper gallery. Investigations have shown that the cause of the cracking was a strong alkali-aggregate reaction (AAR) in the concrete, brought about by a deformed granitic rock. Extensive horizontal and vertical cracking in the upper part of the dam wall has necessitated the removal of the section above the floor of the upper gallery level, and construction of a new reinforced concrete section to act as head beam for post-tensioning of the rest of the dam wall.
A set of small diameter cores were taken from the various parts for diagnostic purposes, and a vertical core of 100 mm diameter was taken through the whole thickness of the wall for the determination of the strength properties, alkali content and residual expansion potential. Based on these, a post-tensioning stress of 1.5-2.0 MPa has been calculated for restraining the residual expansion of the concrete. The spillway bridge structure which is part of the dam wall has also shown mild signs of deterioration. The piers and abutment walls and the deck were surveyed for corrosion activity and extent of AAR. This work showed that the spillway bridge structure was sound and only needed maintenance. The performance of a triple blend concrete mix containing a high volume of fly ash (45%) and silica fume (5%) developed for the replacement of the old concrete is also discussed.
Javad Tabatabaei! and Christopher Zoppou
Cotter Dam was constructed in 1912 to 19m and was raised to 31m in 1949. Due to its close proximity to a popular recreational resort, it is considered as a high hazard dam. It forms a storage with a capacity of only 4500ML and receives flows from a catchment area of 482km?. Concern about the ageing and structural integrity of Cotter Dam was expressed as early as 1967. There has also been a major revision of the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) and new earthquake requirements for the dam. All these factors have contributed to the decision to undertake remedial works on the dam. The remedial work could be interrupted by flows over the spillway. This would increase the cost of the works because the construction equipment must be removed and reinstated (de/remobilisation) when there are flows over the spillway. Additional costs are also incurred for each day the construction equipment remains idle (standby). The total tender price therefore includes the cost associated with the remedial work as well as any standby and de/remobolisations. Risk analysis was used to establish the frequency the reservoir water level exceeds the spillway level. The risk analysis was used to select the successful remedial works tender.