Anthony Moulds and Anthony M Watson
The selection of lightning protection equipment will always remain within the cost versus benefit, or risk management area. As more and more monitoring equipment becomes electronic and microprocessor based, we need to have a better understanding of the ways to protect it, and maintain the data flow.
Recent experience has shown that utilising the Australian Standard (NZS/AS 1768-1991) Lightning Protection, in conjunction with a six-point plan, will go a long way to providing total integrated protection for both structures and contents. However, no matter how much protection is applied, damage due to lightning may still occur. For dam surveillance instrumentation the aim ultimately is to protect the transducer ‘in the ground’ or ‘in the dam’, because generally these instruments are inaccessible and non-replaceable without prohibitive drilling and retrofitting costs.
The six-point plan was applied initially to designing lightning protection for a large, well- instrumented RCC dam, completed in 1991. The protection proved to be not as good as was hoped. The paper describes how the lightning protection at the dam was subsequently developed. This experience, which has pointed the way to achieving a good level of protection at a reasonable cost, has been applied to a number of other, instrumented dams.
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ANCOLD Environmental Guidelines have been under preparation for a considerable time. A brief for their preparation followed a resolution by the ANCOLD executive in 1991] that:
“ANCOLD should be seen by the profession and the community as a credible and informed source of information on the risks and benefits associated with dam projects.”
Why the guidelines were initiated, why they have taken the time they have to prepare and what they cover are described in this paper.
To the author’s knowledge, they are the only guidelines of their type, addressing the environmental effects of dams and associated works. It is hoped that they generate substantive debate. This paper initiates the public comments phase.
The paper has two purposes:
° = To introduce the guidelines ° To use the guidelines to introduce this environmental issues session of this conference
The role of judgement in risk assessments as applied in dam safety management has been the source of considerable debate in recent years. With regard to risk analysis of dams, and while there is general agreement that judgement is an essential element of the process, essentially two schools of thought have emerged. One view holds that, in the assignment of probabilities, reliance can be based on collective engineering judgement that is anchored to a knowledge base. The second view holds that judgement should be based on the knowledge that is revealed by an appropriate amount of analysis. The paper, written from the perspective of the latter view, explores some of the underlying issues in this debate.
The role of judgement in risk evaluation, the process of judging the significance of risk, is considered to be equally important. However, the process of making value judgements and statements of principles is complex and often beyond the sphere of engineering. The third issue addressed in the paper concerns the search for answers to the question, “How good is the assessment?”
Duane M. McClelland and David S. Bowles
There is a growing concern about the limitations of the approaches to life-loss estimation that are currently used in dam safety risk assessment. This paper summarises insights into factors that affect evacuation effectiveness, loss of life, and survival, based on a detailed review of historical dam breaks and other types of floods. The understanding and empirical characterisation of life loss dynamics being developed from these case histories are intended to provide the foundation for an improved practical life-loss estimation model.
Brian Haisman, Clarke Ballard and Neville Garland
In early 1997 the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council instigated a review of the operations of its primary reservoirs, the Hume and Dartmouth Dams, in response to concerns of floodplain communities below the dams, coupled with changing community values in relation to the in-stream environmental effects of dams. The review, completed in May 1999, achieved a consensus between parties advocating what are on the surface irreconcilable objectives for the management of the water resource. Foremost competing objectives were flood mitigation, consumptive water use, and environmental health of the river system, plus subsidiary objectives related to recreation, hydro-electric generation, salinity management, tourism and the like. The keys to success were firstly, creation of a community-based Reference Panel which took on a steering role coupled with extensive consultation, and secondly a determination to describe situations wherever possible by means of factual information. The paper describes the identification and evaluation of issues, the consensus building process, the intensive hydrology and economic modelling undertaken, and the development of a comprehensive set of flow parameters which could be viewed as surrogates for environmental outcomes. Conclusions and recommendations are drawn for future reviews of similar dams.
S. Knight, B. Cooper and P. van Breda
Warragamba Dam was completed in 1960 and impounds Sydney’s main water supply storage. Hydrological studies in the 1980’s showed the existing spillway to be significantly undersized by modern standards. Considering the dam’s High Incremental Flood Hazard category, the current risk of dambreak is unacceptably high. This has resulted in a two-stage program to upgrade the dam to full Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) capability.
The interim (first stage) measures were completed in 1990 and involved a 5.1 metre raising of the dam crest and significant post-tensioning of the dam wall. Following many feasibility/option studies and detailed technical and environmental studies, a contract was let by Sydney Water Corporation (SWC) in late 1998 for the construction of an auxiliary spillway as the major (second stage) component of the flood security upgrading. The spillway will be a large capacity (about 18,000m*/s) concrete lined chute 700 metres long around the dam’s right abutment. In the upper curved section will be the largest fuse plug embankments in Australia (up to 14.5 metres high). The lower straight section will terminate with a flip bucket structure.
The NSW Department of Public Works and Services (DPWS) designed the earlier Interim Works, undertook the subsequent engineering option studies for the Major Works and carried out the concept design and technical specification for the new auxiliary spillway and associated dam modification works. This paper summarises the project, describes the main features of the concept design of the spillway and outlines the associated dam modifications.