D.N.D. Hartford and R.A. Stewart
It seems perfectly logical, obviously desirable and apparently sensible to prioritise dam safety reviews, deficiency investigations and capitalised remediation projects in terms of risk. However, our experience in attempting to apply the various deterministic and risk- based approaches in prioritising dam safety activities has revealed that, while it may appear to be quite logical and desirable to prioritise in terms of risk, it is rather less feasible than it appears.
This paper explores why different prioritisation processes can lead to different priority rankings across the same portfolio of dams. B.C. Hydro’s Preliminary Risk Exposure Profile process, which utilises the best and most robust attributes of risk analysis process at the preliminary level but avoids the pitfalls associated with estimating risks which will often have little or even no basis is presented. The paper explains how this process provides a “fail-safe” backup which will identify non-conservative and erroneous facility risk estimates; thereby allowing for correction in a timely fashion. The paper also raises some awkward philosophical issues which the profession will have to address in order to permit confident dam safety decision-making on the basis of risk analyses. Not the least of these is the following issue – “If preliminary estimates of risk are reasonably good, then there should be little need for more detailed risk analysis for confident and defensible decisions concerning making or not making dam safety improvements”.
Raymond A. Stewart
On I7 June 1996 while investigating a small pothole on the crest 183 m high Bennett Dam an unexpected crest collapse occurred resulting in a large sinkhole. Following this incident the safety status of the dam was uncertain. The reservoir was lowered by 2 m over a six week period by spilling up to 5,000 m 3 over the spillway and through the turbines.
An unprecedented dam investigation commenced immediately and was completed December 1996. During drilling a second sinkhole was discovered at another location on the dam.
A sophisticated compaction grouting technique was developed to remediate the sinkholes to the depth of 5 m and the work was successfully completed by 1997. -The reservoir was returned to service in time to collect the freshet in spring 1997. This event was the most dam safety concern in the history of BC Hydro operations.
This paper describes how B.C. Hydro managed the crisis, and the subsequent safety assessment.
D. C. Green
The disaggregation of public water supply bodies in recent years has seen the functions of ownership, design and operation transferred to separate bodies. Consequently , issues of risk management associated with legal liability which previously could be ignored because all risks were absorbed in -house must now be faced and addressed in a more formal way.
This paper looks firstly at the general principles of legal liability for dam performance associated with construction and design, ownership of an existing dam and monitoring of its performance. Liability under several different areas of the law is discussed. Special issues associated with “design and construct” contracts are then highlighted, and warnings are given for project sponsors who control the letting of contracts and the briefing of consultants.
As New Zealand’s largest dam owner, ECNZ has actively managed dam safety since its inception in 1987. During this time it has managed several major dam safety issues and enhanced its dam safety management practices. This has occurred in an environment of organisational change and increasingly competitive commercial pressures.
The change in emphasis from a primarily technical emphasis to dam safety towards a commercial focus is described together with details of highly rated dam surveillance system, some continuous improvement initiatives, and recent enhancements to the dam safety programme. The position of responsible ownership in regard to risk and legal requirements is also discussed.
A safety review of the Corin dam has identified several deficiencies including an inadequate spillway capacity. A hydraulic model test, included in the review indicated that the construction of a 1.3m wave wall along the top of the dam was required to prevent overtopping during the flood of 10,000 years.
The original post tensioning anchors installed along the spillway crest were also identified as unreliable due to inadequate corrosion protection measures.
This paper presents safety assessment and aspects of the construction of the remedial works for Corin Dam. As part of the safety review, the condition of the dam was reviewed against the risks of piping, slope instability, flood and seismic forces. The paper also discusses the long term effects of the acidic leakage on the grout curtain and on the integrity of the core.
The risk associated with the flooding during anchor installation and the discovery of a gap formation between the clay core and the concrete spillway wall are also considered.
Over the last 30 years, the demand for water storages in Queensland’s Mary’s River has grown significantly. As a result of this growth in demand it was decided to raise Borumba Dam, the major storage on the system, in two stages The first stage was to be approximately 2 metres in I997 and the 25 metre raising be required in about 2010.
Borumba Dam was completed in 1964. It is a 43 metre high concrete faced dam with a 32 metre long on the left abutment. The first proposal for initial raising was to install a two metre high air-inflated rubber dam on top of the existing crest. However, it was determined that this method of raising presented a number of prob and a new solution was sought.