Here you can search for and access individually, all ANCOLD papers that have been published as part of a conference proceedings and deposited to the National Library.
For authors wishing to reference ANCOLD papers, the following applies to papers published post the cessation of the ANCOLD Bulletin.
The template is as follows:
Author surname, author initials, year of publication, title, publisher, place. Add start and finish pages.
Herweynen R, Campbell J, and Moeini M (2017) Turkey’s Nest Dam on Top of a Waste Rock Dump – An Innovative Solution for the Kidston Pumped Storage Project. In Proceedings of the 2017 ANCOLD (Australian National Committee on Large Dams) Conference. ANCOLD, Hobart, Australia, pp. 5-16.
Where we have previously lodged proceedings with the National Library that do not have continuous page numbers through from the first paper to the last paper, people wishing to reference the papers will have to leave out the page numbers.
From 2021 onwards the individual papers accessed via the website will show the continuous page numbers.
Use the search below using keywords, year or author.
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Damien Bryan, John Sukkar, Erin Hughes, Michael Cawood
Alert triggers are a critical component of Dam Safety Emergency Management, aligning clearly defined adverse conditions with alert levels to initiate an appropriate emergency response. Early detection of these conditions allows for potential mitigation measures to be undertaken, early engagement of key stakeholders such as emergency agencies, and where necessary, the warning or evacuation of affected downstream communities. The Dam Safety Alert Trigger Framework provides WaterNSW with a consistent, repeatable, and defensible methodology for the determination of appropriate dam safety alert triggers. The framework was developed through the engagement of consultants, emergency and regulatory agencies (NSW SES & DSNSW), and several Australian large dam owners.
The determination of appropriate Dam Safety Alert Triggers is a challenge faced by all dam owners. Through the development and implementation of the Alert Trigger Framework, WaterNSW has achieved the ability to define defensible alert triggers through a consistent and repeatable methodology. This has resulted in an improved dam safety emergency response posture for WaterNSW, key emergency services partner the NSW SES, and greater protection for affected downstream communities. Concepts, processes and methodology covered in this paper could be used by other dam owners in addressing their own dam safety alert trigger challenges.Learn more
Ryan Singh, Jiri Herza, James Thorp, Michael Ashley
Performance-based risk-informed decision making is an underlying principle of the Global Industry
Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM). While owners make significant efforts to align with this
principle, commonly used risk assessment and management practices in the mining industry have largely been based on the HSE principles, which consider more frequent, lower consequence incidents.
As a result, the existing risk assessment frameworks do not provide the owners with a comprehensive understanding of the risk profiles of their tailings storage facilities (TSFs). Without the understanding of a facility’s risk profile, the owners cannot appreciate how changes to their facility, processes and operational activities may impact the risk profile. A large step-change in thinking is therefore required in risk assessment practices for the owner to align their TSF management with GISTM requirements.
Beyond risk assessments, the mining industry has other valuable concepts to manage the safety of their tailings management practices, such as Critical Controls, however, commonly used risk assessment and management practices do not incorporate these concepts.
This paper explores commonly used risk assessment practices and the concepts of Critical Controls. It proposes how these concepts can be linked, with Critical Controls being embedded in the risk assessment process. The outcomes of linking these concepts result in an estimation of the effectiveness of the Critical Controls and how they can be improved to demonstrably reduce the risk presented by a TSF. A case study has been included to demonstrate the benefits of linking risk assessment with Critical Controls and how owners can readily identify deficiencies and efficiently manage the risk profiles of their facilities.Learn more
Chris Nielsen, Ron Guppy, Gary Hargraves, Robert Fowden
Dam safety upgrade projects of major dams typically involve a large capital investment. It is important that expenditure decisions are based on sound criteria, both technical and non-technical. Independent peer review of technical matters plays a key role in meeting design, construction and safety objectives within practical financial constraints and assuring robust, resilient and reliable project outcomes.
An independent technical review is recommended for all dam projects.
The Queensland dam safety regulator has developed guidelines associated with technical review for dam safety projects that considers scope and limitations, expertise and governance. The guidelines are informed by literature, recent projects, a commission of inquiry, internal and external review and industry feedback. The guidelines are being implemented across major dam safety upgrade business cases through preparation of terms of reference by the Queensland Government’s business planning and implementation entities, who maintain the responsibility of providing assurance to state government projects, as well as the state’s major dam owners.
The terms of reference, supported by the underlying principles in the guidelines, provide a platform for consistent and appropriate application of technical assurance to dam projects in Queensland. Among other matters, governance is highlighted as a critical factor for success as well as clarity of the roles, responsibilities and reporting lines of all parties. The application of both guidelines and terms of reference to recent projects is discussed.Learn more
David Reid, Andy Fourie, Riccardo Fanni, Cristina Vulpe, Alexandra Halliday
Recent failures of a number of tailings storage facilities (TSFs) has highlighted the need for better
governance and operational management of these structures. One means to improve their safety is clearly better and more focussed monitoring. Significant efforts are underway in this area, with a number of technologies being deployed. In particular, the monitoring of deformations through a variety of means (direct, satellite inferred) is increasingly being applied. While deformation monitoring to warn against failure has a long history in geotechnical engineering, some aspects of the rapid triggering and resulting flow of some TSFs may not be amenable to deformation monitoring, in the sense that actionable warning of an impending failure is not assured.
To examine this issue, a series of numerical models of an idealised TSF are carried out. This idealised TSF is brought to failure by means of a rising phreatic surface – often referred to as the constant shear drained (CSD) stress path. Deformations of the outer slope and crest of the numerical model – i.e. those that could be monitored for a real TSF – are tracked and analyses for the models carried out. It is seen that under CSD loading distinct deformation patterns indicative of impending failure are not always clear. Rather, minimal deformations and indeed swelling of the crest is seen leading to failure. The importance of recognising the minimal pre-failure deformation patterns that may manifest with a rising phreatic surface is noted.Learn more
Vicent Espert, Peter Buchanan, Colleen Baker, Malcolm Barker, Mark Locke
Mangrove Creek dam is an 80 m high CFRD constructed between 1976 and 1982 for water supply to the NSW Central Coast area, and is currently operated by Central Coast Council (CCC). The dam is classified as a ‘High A’ Consequence Category dam for both Sunny Day and Flood breach in accordance with ANCOLD guidelines.
Previous assessments of the dam identified that it would not be able to safely pass the ANCOLD Fallback flood capacity of the PMP flood in its current configuration. As such, the dam has been operated at a restricted full supply level for many years.
In 2020, GHD was engaged by CCC to develop a concept and detailed design to increase the spillway capacity using a standards-based approach to achieve the flood capacity fallback position. The first phases of this contract also required GHD to undertake additional investigations and analyses of various aspects of the dam and spillway to confirm the scope of works for the upgrade. During this review, it became evident that although the spillway capacity does not meet the ANCOLD fallback position, the Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) of the existing capacity was relatively low and could potentially be deemed acceptable from a risk-based position.
A Risk Assessment was subsequently undertaken, with a SFAIRP assessment developed based on the new Dam Safety NSW guidelines. This assessment may be the first one to be completed for a major dam using the Dam Safety NSW guidelines. This paper discusses the different outcomes for a standards-based ‘Fallback’/’Simplified’ criteria and risk criteria based on DS NSW regulations, as well as the investigations developed to maintain confidence in the assessment. In addition, it describes a practical case for the application of SFAIRP criteria to a major dam.
In the case of Mangrove Creek Dam, the application of the new DS NSW Guidelines resulted in the dam being assessed as acceptable in its current state, with the FSL returned to the original design level. The outcome provided significant savings to the client, by avoiding costly upgrade works and avoiding disruption to the operation of the storage – a real success story.Learn more
Christopher Dann, Chad Martin, Garry Fyfe, Nigel Rutherford
This paper presents a case study on remedial works that were undertaken at Lock and Weir One
along the River Murray, that to our knowledge are the first of their kind in Australia.
The weir structure’s left abutment is comprised of a stepped concrete structure founded on timber
piles, with timber sheet piles extending beneath the structure to cut off seepage through underlying
alluvium. A piping incident occurred at the left abutment in late 2014 and a filter blanket was
installed as an emergency response measure. A detailed review of historic construction documents
showed that there was a “missing” timber sheet pile upstream of the piping boil. Geotechnical
investigations, including piezometer installation confirmed the missing timber sheet pile was the
likely cause of the piping incident. A piping risk assessment showed the residual risk of further piping
was reasonably high.
A range of remedial works was considered as permanent risk reduction works. However, theseLearn more
solutions required extensive temporary works to expose the missing timber sheet pile including a
cofferdam to access the defect and partial demolition of a recently constructed fishway structure.
An alternate Secant ‘Grout Column’ solution was developed that comprised targeted drilling and
backfill grouting to close the gap where the sheet pile was not installed and to grout an inferred void
under the abutment structure. This solution was successful at reducing seepage through the
abutment structure, as indicated by monitoring piezometers.
Regulatory risk for large civil engineering projects such as dams and hydropower schemes can be larger than the engineering risks. The seriousness of project regulatory risks is rarely acknowledged publicly and almost never dealt with contractually. The recent adoption by the World Bank of the FIDIC/ITA Emerald Book contractual framework introduces geotechnical baseline reports as a contractual mechanism for managing ground risk in World Bank hydro projects. Regulatory risks created by government agencies and utilities due to changing project requirements can likewise be managed by adopting the concept of geotechnical baselines to regulatory impositions as a baseline report.
Government agencies changing regulatory burdens mid project can fairly be held accountable for the
burdens of those changes by establishing regulatory baselines at the earliest stages of a project. By
contractually embedding regulatory risk baselines, governments and their agencies can adjust their
payments to reflect the changed cost in delivering an agreed project caused by regulatory changes. In this way the compensation for delivering a project more closely aligns with its value and cost. A regulatory baseline report in reducing project exposure due to regulatory change driven costs is a new tool in more efficient and competitive project delivery.
A transparent mechanism for costing regulatory change risk and apportioning it in accordance with pre agreed mechanisms, is an innovation of great use to the dam and hydropower sector.Learn more
Management of dams requires the use of experienced dam engineers and other competent personnel familiar with all relevant basic principles, technical guidelines, articles and manuals. This requires appropriate qualifications, registrations and adequate knowledge and experience relevant to the type of dam and the task required.
Engineering services in Queensland must comply with the Professional Engineers Act 2002 which requires a registered professional engineer of Queensland (RPEQ) to undertake or directly supervise an engineering service. Attributes in addition to RPEQ are recommended for personnel responsible for dam safety management. Inputs are often required from non -engineering technical specialists, such as geologists. Supervising these inputs in the context of meeting the Professional Engineers Act 2002 should be considered.
A matrix of skills for dam safety management personnel has been prepared as part of the Queensland dam safety management guideline and subject to extensive stakeholder feedback in its preparation. The matrix consists of a list of roles typically required for dam safety management and, for each role, a corresponding set of recommended core attributes.Learn more
Dr Mark Leonard
The quantification of the 85% and 95% hazard fractiles, as required by the ANCOLD 2019 Guidelines for design of dams, is investigated. It is found that there are four independent sources of uncertainty in the PSHA input models that have a significant effect on the hazard. So all four need to be quantified, particularly for Extreme and High A consequent dams. It is also found that the uncertainty of many of the other parameters, which are routinely included in probabilistic seismic hazard assessments, have minimal effect on either the mean or the higher fractiles so do not necessarily need to be routinely included. The complexity of the input models required to satisfy the new standards are substantially higher than those routinely used in prior decades.Learn more
Chris Nielsen, Irene Buckman
As individuals, we are concerned about how a risk affects us and the things we value
personally. We may be willing to live with a risk if it secures us certain benefits and if the
risk is kept low and clearly controlled. We are less tolerant of risks over which we have little
ANCOLD’s risk assessment guideline (2003) identifies an individual risk threshold as being
one where “the dam safety risk to an individual should be close to the average background
risk of the population”. This is a principle of equity, where “all individuals have
unconditional rights to certain levels of protection” (HSE, 2001). The definition of
population at risk applied to Queensland’s referable dams (DNRME, 2018), being
individuals within a residence or workplace and typically not participating in any risky
activities such as driving a vehicle or walking through flooded waters, provides further
justification of this right.
In practice addressing societal risk tolerances and duty of care considerations may result in
individual risks being substantially lower than the thresholds. This may not always be the
case and, irrespective, should not distort the purpose of the individual risk tolerance test;
the principle of equity that drives individual risk tolerability has foundations in our societal
values and is easily and widely understood as a core value. This should be succinctly
described when justifying expenditure on risky infrastructure such as dams.
This poster describes aspects to consider when selecting a threshold individual risk
tolerance. Subject to site-specific considerations of the particular age group of individuals
most at risk, the wider benefit of the dam to society and ALARP, a single threshold
individual risk tolerance of less than 10-5 per annum (or 1 in 100,000 years) would appear
The aspects described are elaborated in the revised Guidelines on Safety Standards forLearn more
Referable Dams, soon to be published on the Queensland Government website (RDMW,
Chris Nielsen, Ron Guppy, Donna Dunn, David Murray
Following several years of investigations and analysis a serious safety issue with the stability of the primary spillway during major flood events was identified at Paradise Dam that required urgent risk reduction works. The response to this safety issue was significant.
The Inspector General Emergency Management conducted a review into the effectiveness of emergency response if a dam safety event were to occur, taking into consideration process and communications to manage around 40,000 population at risk, comprised mostly of residents within the city of Bundaberg.
An essential works program to reduce the risk was urgently prepared then executed effectively within a calendar year. This short timeframe required significant and novel amendments to Queensland’s laws to bypass normal legislated process for such a major project.
The Paradise Dam Commission of Inquiry was established to identify the root cause of the issues, the facts and circumstances that contributed to them and recommendations to consider for future dam projects. All recommendations from the commission were accepted by the Queensland government and, following an extensive stakeholder engagement exercise, have been implemented through changes in policy and methodology and described in published guideline revisions.
For future dam projects the lessons learnt highlighted the need for early and ongoing engagement ofLearn more
independent technical review, project governance that is cognisant of risk and the ownership and capacity to bear of that risk, the need to consider testing to confirm critical design parameters and the need for an effective regulator. The essential works program has established a precedent for the timely and appropriate application of risk reduction measures.
Sonel Reynolds, Alex Gower, Bob Wark
During the outlet works upgrade in 2017 it was found that the valve pit and stilling basin at Mundaring Weir were not founded on rock. Based on these observations and the arrangement of the spillway and outlet works, it was considered that during significant spillway overflow events, a high velocity jet could displace the stilling basin slabs, erode the underlying material, and progress to failure of the outlet pipe and valve pit. A comprehensive risk assessment was conducted to estimate the likelihood of stilling basin slab uplift, erosion of the underlying material, and failure of the outlet works. A geotechnical investigation was undertaken comprising drilling nine boreholes and a program of geophysical downhole logging. Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) modelling was used to determine the pressure fluctuations and turbulence intensity over the spillway slab which could lead to uplift. The erodibility of the rock mass material below the stilling basin slabs was assessed using the outcomes of the geotechnical investigations and CFD output, with analyses based on the Kirsten Index and eGSI. A net benefit analysis was conducted to assess whether preventative remedial works were justified. Through this process it was demonstrated that the business risk was low and risk reduction measures were not justified.Learn more